Mathematics with the potential infinite
Matthias
matthias.eberl at mail.de
Fri Jan 27 06:28:23 EST 2023
Dear Tim,
my approach is different in the sense that I want to understand (almost)
all of mathematics with the notion of a potential infinite. So I adopt
model theory and let the calculus (e.g. classical logic) basically as it
is --- in other words, there should be no statements that become
unprovable using the potential infinite. I say "basically", because
there is a restriction in what can be *formulated* in a way that makes
sense from the point of view of a potential infinite. Problematic is in
my opinion the totality of higher-order application, which I already
mentioned (this is also related to the discussion in some of Weyl's
writings).
Different to completed infinite sets in set theory, I use systems, since
they are "dynamic" (roghly, direct system for finite objects, inverse
systems for infinite objects). One might say that within all of these
systems (used in an investigation), you never do the final limit step,
you always stay within the system. So you keep track of the stages of
each of these systems, in particular keep track of how far you have to
go to be sound. It might be not decidable which stages are required in
some cases, though, but they exist from a finitistic perspective. In
other words, I start with a basic finitistic principle, casually
formulated
(FP0) Every object lives within a finite world.
For instance, each natural number n occurs in some finite set N_i = {0,
..., i-1}, clearly, take any i>n. The same holds for expressions: each
formula is within a finite set of expressions that I use for my
investigation. Now extend this principle to other mathematical objects.
E.g. each property/set on natural numbers exists within some finite set
P(N_i) --- here one needs inverse systems instead of direct systems,
otherwise one considers only fixed finite sets, no potential infinite
sets. And then apply it to functions as well.
Again formulated differently, you use the reflection principle from the
very beginning. In ZFC set theory it is usually applied at the end. So
you allow unrestricted quantification over all (indefinitely extensible
stages of the set theoretic hierarchy (V_\alpha)_{\alpha an ordinal})
and at the end say, roughly, for a finite set of formulas, we could have
used some stage V_\alpha instead of V. Similar for Grothendieck
universes in models of type theory, where at the end one creates a
hierarchy of universes up to \omega (or 2*\omega, in Agda, as far as I
know).
I am convinced that you have to apply a reflection principle in order to
interpret the universal quantifier in a potential infinite world. A
naive interpretation boils down to assume a definite extension of the
concept "natural number", which means an actual infinite set N. The
question is: What should it mean to see N as potential infinite, and at
the same time talk about all natural numbers?
Regarding the FOM discussion as of 2015 (I probably joined later). I
agree with Arnon Avron, when he stated that
<--
I take this opportunity to note about the false claim that quantifying
over N in general, and PA in particular, are justified only if one
accepts N as a complete object which is actually infinite.
According to this "logic", the quantification that is done in ZF over
the universe of sets is justified only if one accepts V as a complete
object which is absolutely infinite.
-->
and I agree with Marcin Mostowski, saying that
<--
Timothy Y. Chow observed:
I've never seen anyone define two separate axioms and declare one of
them to be an "axiom of potential infinity" and the other an "axiom of
actual infinity."
No wonder, potential and actual infinity are [not?] views on
mathematical truths, but on nature of mathematical reality.
-->
In the same direction, i.e., there is no axiomatic way to express what
potential infinte means, goes the analysis of Niebergall, mentioned in
my paper.
Marcin Mostowski's approach however leads to a restriction, which
functions and relations are allowed within a potential infinite reality.
His approach is less dynamic than Jan Mycielski's. Mycielski allows that
within a single formula the range of quantifier may change. This is in
line with Dummett's notion of "indefinite extensibility" and with
reflection principles. However, Mycielski uses a translation of formulas
and then applies the common Tarskian model theory, whereas I do not
manipulate expressions.
Regards,
Matthias
------ Originalnachricht ------
Von "Timothy Y. Chow" <tchow at math.princeton.edu>
An fom at cs.nyu.edu
Datum 26.01.2023 01:14:59
Betreff Re: Mathematics with the potential infinite
>Matthias wrote:
>
>>for several years I have been engaged in developing mathematics solely with the concept of the potential infinity. Two publications of mine are now available.
>
>This is interesting. The topic of potential infinity has come up on FOM before a few times, e.g., in March 2015---
>
>https://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2015-March/
>
>---and in July 2020, when you made a few comments:
>
>https://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2020-July/
>
>One question I have in general for any account of potential infinity is this: Can you give examples of statements that are provable using "actual infinities" but that are not provable using "potential infinity" only? (Here, I exclude statements that don't even make sense unless you assume actual infinities.) As a specific test case of interest, can you prove "PA is consistent" using only only potential infinity?
>
>Tim
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