Fw: Re: Some remarks on Gödelian style ontological arguments

[Dr. Cyrus F Nourani]

Sent: Friday, November 25, 2022 at 12:02 PM
From: "Dr. Cyrus F Nourani" <akdmkrd at mail.com>
To: "Frode Bjørdal" <frode.bjordal at ifikk.uio.no>
Subject: Re: Some remarks on Gödelian style ontological arguments

Greetings, regarding Gödel ontologies, while computational categorical ontolgoies, have been a topic I published with colleague professor Patrik Ekliund, let me interject for the discussion here that Gödel ontologies a topic I never in such terms pondered for, are not disparete areas from topics that are treated for Gödel set functions with respect to core models, so on and soforth. This must be a topic that for example, has a glimpse at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340161914_Ultrafilters_on_n-types_Categories_and_the_V_Universe

Kind regards,
Cyrus: Acdmkrd AI Labs & cyrusfn at alum.mit.edu
 

Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2022 at 7:17 PM
From: "Frode Bjørdal" <frode.bjordal at ifikk.uio.no>
To: "Foundations of Mathematics" <fom at cs.nyu.edu>
Subject: Some remarks on Gödelian style ontological arguments

 
Many contributions to the literature are in the bibliographies of B. W. Paleo & A. Kanckos, Variants of Gödel’s Ontological Proof in a Natural Deduction Calculus, Studia Logica 105 (3):553-586, (2017); A. Kanckos & T. Lethen, The Development of Gödel’s Ontological Proof, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 14 (4): 1011-1029, (2021) and F. A. Bjørdal, All Properties are Divine or God exists, Logic and Logical Philosophy 3 (27):329-350, (2018).
 
A central result of the last paper is that we may altogether avoid the use of axioms, to obtain the thesis stated, if we presuppose a third order impredicative modal logic, and the use of Gödelian style definitions. This satisfies a promissory note issued at the end of  F. A. Bjørdal, Understanding Gödel's Ontological Argument, in T. Childers (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 1998, Prague 1999, 214-217.
 
The result of Bjørdal (2018) is of interest in as far as higher order modal logic with impredicative comprehension are of interest for such reasoning as is discussed.
 
Notice that the thesis of the title of Bjørdal (2018) may combine well with such pantheistic proposals as the one considered by Vaughan Pratt. 
 
Towards the end of the paper I suggest what I call an apathiatheistic attitude: "I have, as opposed to the theophilic and theophobic attitudes considered by Roberto Magari in Logica e teofilia, Notizie di Logica VII, 4 (1988): 11–20., come to adopt what I call an apathiatheistic opinion according to which the best concepts ‘God’ cum understandings of reality are such that the question as to whether there is a God or not is academic in a sense similar to the question as to whether there are holes or just holed things."I have, as opposed to the
theophilicandtheophobicattitudes con-sidered by Magari in [21], come to adopt what I call anapathiatheisticopinion according to which the best concepts ‘God’ cum understandingsof reality are such that the question as to whether there is a God or notis academic in a sense similar to the question as to whether there areholes or just things