geometric interpretation of the expansion of an epistemology
José Manuel Rodríguez Caballero
josephcmac at gmail.com
Tue Jul 12 20:15:40 EDT 2022
dennis hamilton wrote:
> Wow, doubling-down on worldview to posit a ?purely rational worldview.?
> The problem of distinguishing such a thing (and who does it) aside, I
> think the difficulty of subjectivity is not appreciated. This just came to
> my attention:
I think there was a misunderstanding of what I meant by "purely rational
worldview". I repeat my abstract:
My starting point is the concept of the Riemann manifold, (M, g), where M
> is a smooth manifold and g is a metric. S. L. Lauritzen
defined a statistical manifold (M, g, C) as a Riemannian manifold (M, g)
> equipped with a totally symmetric cubic tensor C. I propose a model of how
> disinformation can affect an entity learning about the world through
> statistical inference. My model involves constructing a fiber bundle on a
> statistical manifold. The points on the base space play the role of
> possible worldviews according to a family of statistical models
> corresponding to the official narrative. A fiber over a point is the set of
> all unconscious biases related to the purely rational worldview that point
> represents. My thesis is that disinformation exploits the fact that the
> maximum likelihood on the bundle can be projected to a point that is not
> the maximum likelihood on the base space. Therefore, in my framework, the
> art of disinformation can be formalized as the construction of a fiber
> bundle through an alternative narrative that is an extension of the
> official one (base space).
The worldview associated with a point in the base space is purely rational
with respect to the official narrative which generates the base space. It
is not purely rational from an absolute point of view. Furthermore, the
notion of worldview is just another name for a statistical model. IMy model
doesn't pretend to exhaust the informal meaning of the notion of worldview.
Indeed, I wrote that
Of course, one of the limitations of my model is that it assumes that the
> audience learns from statistical inference.
dennis hamilton wrote:
> ?Yo! You speakin? to me?? is not likely to stand out,
> information-theory-wise.
Immanuel Kant and Soren Kierkegaard walk into a bar. Thoreau is slumped
> over a table in the shadows. The bartender, William Kingdom Clifford,
> looks up at the newcomers from his friendly chat with Joseph Weizenbaum, a
> question forming on his lips.
I am not confronting the problem of disinformation from a philosophical
perspective, for me, it is a statistical problem. Of course, an
unrestricted notion of a purely rational worldview, it can't stand out
information-theory-wise or in any formal system, but what I call purely
rational with respect to the official narrative and what I call worldview
are well-defined mathematical objects. A possible way to criticize my
approach is to disagree that the mathematical structure that I am calling
worldview really represents the informal notion of worldview in a useful
way. As statisticians like to say: all models are wrong, but some are
useful. In this framework, if I am able to predict (with a low probability
of error) the effect of disinformation on an agent (person or device),
based on computations in my model, then it will be empirically shown to be
useful.
Kind regards,
Jose M.
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