[FOM] Re Second-Order Logic and Logicism.
panu.raatikainen at helsinki.fi
Mon Mar 30 11:56:25 EDT 2015
Alan Weir <Alan.Weir at glasgow.ac.uk>:
> but I do find Panu's remarks ... [about British philosophers] ...
> and the contrast with 'competent people' like Burgess, Heck and
> Linnebo, puzzling.
I am very sorry if my message suggested such a contrast. I certainly
intended no such thing. These were two separate thoughts.
I was simply recording my subjective experience; that there exist such
philosophers: with somewhat one-sided strong enthusiastic opinions
about SOL and perhaps neo-logicism, but not aware about many the
issues I discuss in my paper (which is hardly surprising; I guess some
of them are not taught even in the advanced mathematical logic
courses, but you'll have to learn them from various sources). As I
haven't really spent much time elsewhere than in UK, that happens to
be my sample. But certainly there are lots of "competent people" (in
whatever sense) in UK.
Then again, there are some people such as Burgess, Heck and Linnebo
(and few others) who have worked with these issues intensively for a
long time; they hardly represent the average philosopher, and what may
well be clear to them is hardly clear for everyone, and perhaps still
worth spelling out explicitly.
BTW, I am inclined to agree that whether or not SOL is a "logic" is
not the key issue (largely verbal). But whether or not SOL (even if
given only in the form of the Gentzen-style introduction and
elimination rules; cf. Wright 2007) brings with it, over HP or Q (or
such), some additional set-theoretical power, is a different and
substantial question. In my paper, I am trying to argue, and make the
case as clear as I can, that it really does.
All the Best
Ph.D., Adjunct Professor in Theoretical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies
P.O. Box 24 (Unioninkatu 38 A)
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
E-mail: panu.raatikainen at helsinki.fi
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