[FOM] FOM Digest, Vol 126, Issue 6

Tue Jun 4 12:23:11 EDT 2013

[ Please broadcast/post/forward. Apologies for duplicates]

LAP 2013 CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT

LOGIC AND APPLICATIONS - LAP 2013
September 16-20, 2013, Dubrovnik, Croatia

http://imft.ftn.uns.ac.rs/**math/cms/LAP2013<http://imft.ftn.uns.ac.rs/math/cms/LAP2013>

The conference brings together researchers from various fields of logic
with applications in computer science.
Topics of interest include, but are not restricted to:
- Formal systems of classical and non-classical logic;
- Category theory;
- Proof theory;
- Lambda calculus;
- Process algebras and calculi;
- Behavioural types;
- Systems of reasoning in the presence of incomplete, imprecise and/or
contradictory information;
- Computational complexity;
- Interactive theorem provers.

The first conference Proof Systems was held in Dubrovnik on June 28, 2012,
co-located with the conference LICS 2012.

IMPORTANT DATES
Abstract Submission: June 21, 2013
Author Notification: June 30, 2013

SUBMISSION
Authors should submit an abstract in LaTeX format, not exceeding three
pages, to
vlp at mi.sanu.ac.rs
(with the subject "LAP 2013").

LOCATION:
IUC - Inter University Center Dubrovnik
http://www.iuc.hr/

COURSE DIRECTORS
- Zvonimir Sikic, University of Zagreb

- Andre Scedrov, University of Pennsylvania
- Silvia Ghilezan, University of Novi Sad
- Zoran Ognjanovic, Mathematical Institute SANU, Belgrade

On Tue, Jun 4, 2013 at 6:04 PM, <fom-request at cs.nyu.edu> wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Psychological basis of Intuitionism (sambin at math.unipd.it)
>    2. SOL vs. ZFC (Joe Shipman)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 03 Jun 2013 16:35:40 +0200
> From: sambin at math.unipd.it
> To: Foundations of Mathematics <fom at cs.nyu.edu>, Steve Stevenson
>         <steve at clemson.edu>
> Cc: Foundations of FOM <fom at cs.nyu.edu>
> Subject: Re: [FOM] Psychological basis of Intuitionism
> Message-ID: <20130603163540.32942tzuzb7ho4g0 at webmail.math.unipd.it>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; DelSp="Yes"; format="flowed"
>
> Steve, I am pleased by your post.  I have been thinking on questions
> related to the ones you put since very long ago.
> I believe "since ever" that mathematics is a creation of our minds; it
> is part of the struggle of mankind to survive. The difficult question
> (to which Brouwer and other do not give a convincing answer) is to
> explain how we can reach intersubjectivity. Perhaps this is equivalent
> to your question: "just how do we do it".
>
> My explanation is that all human abstractions, including those of
> mathematics, are built through a  dynamic process which takes place
> both in our minds and socially. So it is partly a matter of internal
> creation and partly an adaptation to what we learn from other. Here is
> where psychological analysis could come in. The key point is that
> nothing exists unless we construct it, in whatever way. In the two
> papers below you can find a more systematic exposition of this
> attitude, which I have called dynamic constructivism.
>
> I also agree with Andrej Bauer on the non-idelogical motivations for
> constructivism in mathematics. In my opinion, the matter is only the
> quality of information that one wishes to be preserved by one's
> mathematical abstractions.
>
> Giovanni
>
> G. Sambin, Steps towards a dynamic constructivism,  in: In the scope
> of logic, methodology and philosophy of science.
> Volume one of the XI International Congress of  Logic, Methodology and
> Philosophy of Science, Cracow, August 1999,
> P. G?rdenfors,  J. Wolenski and K. Kijania-Placek eds.,  Synthese
> Library 315, Kluwer 2002, pages 261 - 284
>
> G. Sambin,  Real and ideal in constructive mathematics, in:
> Epistemology versus Ontology, Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations
> of Mathematics in honour of Per Martin-L?f, eds. P. Dybjer, S.
> Lindst?m, E. Palmgren and G. Sundholm,  Logic, Epistemology and the
> Unity of Science 27, Springer  2012, pages 69 - 85
>
> Quoting Steve Stevenson <steve at clemson.edu>:
>
> > ?Intuitionism is based on the idea that mathematics is a creation of
> > the mind. The truth of a mathematical statement can only be conceived
> > via a mental construction that proves it to be true, and the
> > communication between mathematicians only serves as a means to create
> > the same mental process in different minds.?
> > (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/)
> >
> >
> > Now that I'm retired, I would like to research how exactly this plays
> > out, especially metacognitive processes. The question, simply put, is
> > ?Just how do we do it??
> >
> >
> > Some mathematicians who have commented are Poincare, Hadamard, and
> > Polya. Smullyan's work in refutation starts with the human aspect and
> > so did Lakatos. I am also familiar with the Craik and Johnson-Laird
> > mental models view of reasoning.
> >
> >
> > I would appreciate any comments FOM readers can provide.
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > D. E. (Steve) Stevenson, PhD
> > Emeritus Associate Professor,
> > School of Computing, Clemson University
> >
> > "Those that know, do. Those that understand, teach," Aristotle.
> > _______________________________________________
> > FOM mailing list
> > FOM at cs.nyu.edu
> > http://www.cs.nyu.edu/mailman/listinfo/fom
> >
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2013 18:18:56 -0400
> From: Joe Shipman <JoeShipman at aol.com>
> To: fom at cs.nyu.edu
> Subject: [FOM] SOL vs. ZFC
> Message-ID: <7604122B-81E9-427B-BCE3-E1BC4B806F58 at aol.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset=us-ascii
>
> The set of validities in Second Order Logic with standard semantics is
> Pi^1_2 complete, so we can't give a complete axiomatization. My question
> has two parts:
> 1) is there any commonly used system of axioms for second order logic that
> includes sentences which ZFC does not prove are validities?
> 2) is there any sentence which ZFC proves is a validity of second order
> logic, but which is not a consequence of any commonly used system of axioms
> for second order logic other than the system "enumerate sentences with
> ZFC-proofs of their validity"?
>
> -- JS
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> ------------------------------
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> End of FOM Digest, Vol 126, Issue 6
> ***********************************
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