[FOM] Neutrosophic Mathematics!?
Keith Brian Johnson
joyfuloctopus at yahoo.com
Thu May 27 15:30:08 EDT 2010
I looked at the link http://arxiv.org/pdf/math.GM/0306384 given by A. Mani in his post about neutrosophic mathematics, and something in it jumped out at me and provoked a question that I'm not sure anyone can answer but which I hope someone can: Why do some people find it preferable to say that the truth-value of "It will rain tomorrow" is 0.3 at time t1 but 0.4 at time t2 (presumably both before tomorrow), rather than saying that the epistemic probability that it will rain tomorrow, given the information available at time t1, is 0.3, but that the epistemic probability that it will rain tomorrow, given the information available at time t2, is 0.4; or even, depending on what they intend, that the actual (metaphysical) probability that it will rain tomorrow, given the state of the universe at time t1, is 0.3, but that the actual (metaphysical) probability that it will rain tomorrow, given the state of the universe at time t2, is 0.4? (I am not
addressing whether or not the latter pair, about actual probabilities, makes sense, or whether or not such a locution would be applicable at the quantum level; I am only asking why some people find it preferable to speak of changing truth-values rather than of changing conditional probabilities [under changing conditions].)
Similar questions may be asked about speaking of different truth-values depending on location, personal circumstances, and so on, but I assume the underlying reason will be similar.
Keith Brian Johnson
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