[FOM] The characteristic S5 axiom and the ontological argument
Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine
plumsdai at andrew.cmu.edu
Fri Apr 10 10:22:55 EDT 2009
On 9 Apr 2009, at 20:21, Vaughan Pratt wrote:
> From a mathematical standpoint I find it remarkable that those in
> possession of an argument for the existence of something seem to be
> able
> to get unique existence out of the same argument.
Surely it's from a mathematical standpoint that this should seem least
surprising? We have plenty of definitions of things which, if they
exist, are automatically unique: a two-sided identity for a binary
multiplication; a least element in a poset; anything defined by a
universal property (unique up to isomorphism, in this case)...
If "a god" were a local, physical object, then yes, a robust
statistical argument for the existence of one would have to suggest
the existence of many. But I don't think those who make or enjoy such
arguments conceive of "a god" as such an object.
-p.
> Plantinga has made a
> career of creating God from logic and statistics. If, as he argues,
> it
> is likely that an entity exists meeting our criteria for godliness,
> then
> it would seem even more likely that there are say a hundred of them
> than
> one, and more likely still a thousand.
>
> Given the size of the universe, any predicate whose satisfiability is
> within the realm of possibility is highly likely to be satisfied not
> just once but many times. Any conception of God that happens, for
> whatever combination of reasons, to rule out the possibility of
> membership of God in this universe ensures of course that God does not
> exist in it. Any other conception however is highly likely to admit
> many instances. By far the least likely outcome is exactly one God,
> whatever conception of God one uses. Monotheism is therefore the
> least
> plausible of all possible religious beliefs. That more than half the
> planet is monotheistic is yet another bit of evidence for the thesis
> that humans aren't very good at probability.
--
Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine
Carnegie Mellon University
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