[FOM] "Progress" in philosophy

[Charles Silver]

On Mar 12, 2007, at 2:05 PM,

  Isaac Malitz wrote:
> [1] It appears to me that there are certain *domains* within the  
> activity of
> philosophy where progress is possible. E.g.
>
>     [a] The development of "models" for deep concepts. (e.g. I  
> think of ZF
> and its various extensions, NF, Positive Set Theory, Aczel as being  
> "models"
> for the concept of a set.  [I'm using the term"model" in the ordinary
> English sense, not in the way it is used in mathematical logic.])   
> As more
> and better models are developed, this constitutes progress.

	What is meant by "the ordinary English sense" in the above?   Is the  
Cumulative Hierarchy such a model?  (Or the {an} "Iterative  
Conception of Set")?   This seems interesting to me, but it also  
seems very specialized--though maybe that's okay.  (And maybe I just  
don't understand what you mean by "model".)


>
>    [b]  The development of formalized arguments that relate to classic
> philosophical issues. (e.g. Goedel's attempts at a formalized proof  
> of the
> existence of God). Even if these
> formalized arguments do not settle the philosophical issue  
> definitively,
> these materials do constitute a body of knowledge which expands.  
> Expansion
> constitutes a kind of progress.

	Formalized arguments in philosophy tend to be awful, *especially*  
those purporting to prove the existence of God.   Expansion is...  
just expansion.  (Reminds me of a friend who once boasted that at  
least he never wrote a bad novel--not having written one at all.) If  
certain sorts of arguments are junky, more of the same are just more  
junk, it seems to me.



>    [c]  What I am doing right now - attempting to identify domains and
> characterizing "progress' within those domains - is an activity  
> where I
> think progress is possible.

	Agreed!!

>
> [2] That being said, it seems to be part of the subject of philosophy
> (defined broadly) that any view is subject to question, even to  
> serious
> dispute. So a philosopher could say
> the following of [1]: "Isaac, you have certainly sketched several  
> domains of
> activity where progress is possible. However, [a] [b] [c]  are  
> activities
> which are not really part of
> philosophy!  In my view, philosophy includes only activities which  
> in some
> sense are not subject to progress!" (I think there are some  
> philosophers who
> tend toward this view.)

	Well, suppose a formal argument, as you recommend above, was an  
actual *proof* of the existence of God.  Then, there would be no  
further progress, as a proof is a proof.  -->> I'm just quibbling; I  
know you didn't really mean this!   I agree with what you meant.


> [3] It appears to me that there are domains within philosophy where
> "progress" is difficult or perhaps intrinsically impossible to  
> achieve.
> Examples of domains where I find this
> especially plausible:
>
>    [a]  Fundamental issues in epistemology
>    [b]  The Mind-Body problem
>    [c]  "Therapeutic" Philosophy (Wittgenstein, Rupert Read, ...)

	I disagree with [b].   Continental philosophers (I think Levinas was  
mentioned earlier; also take Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard, Husserl,  
etc.) tend to believe that we meet the world as an <<entire human  
being>>, body & mind being inextricably linked.   The task (I'm  
overgeneralizing) is how we (as people who are both body and mind)  
deal with the  world that confronts us.
	Before there can be a mind-body problem, a good argument is needed  
for a mind-body distinction.   I do not think any (analytic)  
philosopher has given a good argument for such a distinction. To me,  
no distinction=no problem.


>
> Why is progress difficult in areas like this? (Part of the problem  
> may be
> practitioners who are not up to the task, but ) I suspect that  
> there may be
> intrinsic or structural
> factors in domains like this which may make "progress" impossible  
> or even
> impossible to characterize.

	Well, regarding the (purported) mind-body problem, one can easily  
(and I think speciously) *define* the distinction in such a way so  
that no solution is possible.  (It's pretty easy to do.  Start with  
the (purported) "fact" that there's such a thing as "substance  
dualism," the view that there are two distinct substances: a "mental  
substance" and a "bodily substance".   Then, claim that only things  
of the same substance can interact with each other.  We're now ready  
to raise the mind-body problem: How does the body interact with the  
mind?
	Some of the attempted solutions by philosophers are entertaining.   
"Entertainment value" might be a criterion for philosophical  
interest. (Descartes's view that the Pineal Gland connects body and  
mind is sort of funny.)   (There's the trick of inventing a new kind  
of relation {of "interaction"}.  Call it "supervenience".  Then  
conclude that the mind supervenes on the body.   Hmmm, how about  
this: suppose  we wish to consider only stupid minds.   We can invent  
the relation of "stupidvenience" and then say that such minds  
stupidvene over their bodies.  I know a lot of creepy people.  Their  
minds obviously creepivene over their bodies.  See, this can be a lot  
of fun, and, if entertainment value is to be considered, perhaps this  
is real philosophical progress.)

>
> [4] If I am right about [3], this does not mean that activity in such
> domains is of no value. Such activity provides rich source material,
> heuristics, and even
> strategic guidelines for those who prefer to work in the area that  
> Harvey
> Friedman has called "Applied Philosophy".

	Sorry, I don't follow.

Charlie Silver