[FOM] "Progress" in philosophy

[Isaac Malitz]

[1] It appears to me that there are certain *domains* within the activity of 
philosophy where progress is possible. E.g.

    [a] The development of "models" for deep concepts. (e.g. I think of ZF 
and its various extensions, NF, Positive Set Theory, Aczel as being "models" 
for the concept of a set.  [I'm using the term"model" in the ordinary 
English sense, not in the way it is used in mathematical logic.])  As more 
and better models are developed, this constitutes progress.

   [b]  The development of formalized arguments that relate to classic 
philosophical issues. (e.g. Goedel's attempts at a formalized proof of the 
existence of God). Even if these
formalized arguments do not settle the philosophical issue definitively, 
these materials do constitute a body of knowledge which expands. Expansion 
constitutes a kind of progress.

   [c]  What I am doing right now - attempting to identify domains and 
characterizing "progress' within those domains - is an activity where I 
think progress is possible.

[2] That being said, it seems to be part of the subject of philosophy 
(defined broadly) that any view is subject to question, even to serious 
dispute. So a philosopher could say
the following of [1]: "Isaac, you have certainly sketched several domains of 
activity where progress is possible. However, [a] [b] [c]  are activities 
which are not really part of
philosophy!  In my view, philosophy includes only activities which in some 
sense are not subject to progress!" (I think there are some philosophers who 
tend toward this view.)

[3] It appears to me that there are domains within philosophy where 
"progress" is difficult or perhaps intrinsically impossible to achieve. 
Examples of domains where I find this
especially plausible:

   [a]  Fundamental issues in epistemology
   [b]  The Mind-Body problem
   [c]  "Therapeutic" Philosophy (Wittgenstein, Rupert Read, ...)

Why is progress difficult in areas like this? (Part of the problem may be 
practitioners who are not up to the task, but ) I suspect that there may be 
intrinsic or structural
factors in domains like this which may make "progress" impossible or even 
impossible to characterize.

[4] If I am right about [3], this does not mean that activity in such 
domains is of no value. Such activity provides rich source material, 
heuristics, and even
strategic guidelines for those who prefer to work in the area that Harvey 
Friedman has called "Applied Philosophy".


Isaac Malitz
imalitz at rdic.com
818-231-3965        cellphone