[FOM] intuitions of logic in Chicago and Cambridge

[Eray Ozkural]

On 2/27/06, Gabriel Stolzenberg <gstolzen at math.bu.edu> wrote:
>    It goes like this.  I say something like, "How do you know that
> 'P or not P' is true?"  The immediate response is, "Well, suppose
> not.  Then we'd have a contradiction.  So it's true."

This sounds as if they are trying to use the principle of non-contradiction
to prove the principle of the excluded middle.

[Concerning your remarks about intuition]

The problem with those claims from intuition is that there is no
such thing as the most reliable or the most intelligent intuition or an
intuition of the highest authority (i.e., many such claims are usually
argument from authority in disguise). Some posters have claimed that
some "facts" are immediately obvious. That would usually mean
they see the "perception" of those "facts" as an intelligence test.

The arguments from intuition have caused a lot of problems in
philosophy. Tim Williamson had rightly criticized such appeals to
intuition in philosophy:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/faculty/members/docs/intuit3.pdf

I fully suspect that they are also problematic for FOM, thus I think
that the above paper will make good reading for those who
would prefer a philosophically sound FOM.

Regards,

--
Eray Ozkural (exa), PhD candidate.  Comp. Sci. Dept., Bilkent University, Ankara
http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~erayo  Malfunct: http://www.malfunct.com
ai-philosophy: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy
Pardus: www.uludag.org.tr   KDE Project: http://www.kde.org