[FOM] Reply to Franzen, Heck, Davis

[Dean Buckner]

Torkel -

You wrote (11 April 2003 12:02)

>it is perfectly trivial that no "thick" notion of truth is needed to
justify "If S is
>consistent then G is true". We need merely cite the proof of "If S is
>consistent then G" and add the emaciated principle "if G then G is
>true".

I objected that I was confused as to whether "G" stands for a sentence, or
for the name of a sentence.  You wrote

> .... My simple point was that I'm
> sure readers of the exchanges in question will be able to decide for
> themselves when "G" in my comments stands for a Godel sentence and
> when it stands for a term designating a Godel sentence, depending
> on the context. Does your "we can choose" express a contrary view?

Well I'm unable to decide for myself.  You specifically write "if G then G
is true".  If I decide for myself, then if "G" stands for a sentence, we get

    if grass is green then grass is green is true

where the rh side makes no sense.  If by contrast, "G" stands for the name
of a sentence we get

    if "grass is green" then "grass is green" is true

where the lh side makes no sense.  So which is it?

Dean