[FOM] mathematics and ordinary language
Vladimir Sazonov
V.Sazonov at csc.liv.ac.uk
Sat Apr 12 20:11:25 EDT 2003
Martin Davis replying to Dean Buckner wrote:
> Yes indeed, the numbers ordinary folk use in
> counting are the same entities as those with which mathematicians deal when
> they speak of "natural numbers".
Here I do not agree (cf. below). One of the questions is what
means "the same".
But does he [Dean Buckner] really imagine that it is
> simple minded statements about how many apples Johnny has if he picks 5 and
> eats 2 with which mathematicians are concerned.
If this phrase is intended to note that mainly in such kind
of considerations on natural numbers ordinary folk and
mathematicians agree, then, this is OK for me, too.
But in general, as I wrote many times, during mathematical
formalization of any ideas these naive ideas are somewhat
changing. By this reason only, mathematicians and the
ordinary folk have different ideas on natural numbers,
geometry, etc.
Moreover, people may be quite different. Say, children
before school education or other such people definitely
have much more vague and even different ideas on natural
numbers than mathematicians. I even would not say that
mathematicians have this idea as completely clear one.
Once I listened from a child that there should be a biggest
natural number which is "enough" [for all our goals].
Even some quite educated non-mathematicians consider
induction principle (and, say, reductio ad absurdum logical
rule) as something extremely strange and unreasonable.
The equivalent minimum number principle seems is acceptable
by everybody, but it (as well as induction principle) assumes
considering arbitrary properties of natural numbers.
Only logicians (and not all mathematicians) have clear idea
that these properties should be written in a framework of a
formal theory. But we have a lot of such theories (PA, ZFC,
ZFC + some additional axioms, etc.) The stronger is the theory,
the longer raw of natural numbers it guarantees, and vice versa.
Say, a simple arithmetical theory without induction (or with
some bounded induction) and with the cut rule forbidden guarantees
the existence of numbers only much less than 2^1000 which
nevertheless are closed under successor and have no
biggest number.
Also, what exactly mathematicians/logicians/FOMers mean when
they assume the idea of potential infinity for natural numbers?
This idea is usually considered (in the ordinary language) as
something self-sufficient. But, does it mean only closure
under successor, or something more? In general, I consider the
idea of potential infinity as highly unclear. But, if we agree
that each time we should work in a formal theory which explicates
this idea in some way, then no problem arises. All mathematicians
do this either explicitly or implicitly, just de facto.
I did not read the whole thread "mathematics and ordinary
language". But I hope, the above notes might be useful.
Vladimir Sazonov
More information about the FOM
mailing list