[FOM] consistency and completeness in natural language

[Sandy Hodges]

Dean:
More than half of Nixon's ****statements**** he said.  Not sentences.
The
statement *that* the office was not burgled or whatever.  A statement is

what somebody says, what they assert, something specified by a "that"
clause.

sh.   Note that while Nixon's assertions could be mentioned using 'that'
clauses (by someone who knew what he said), they can't be mentioned
using 'that' clauses by Jones, since Jones does not know what Nixon
said.    But let's suppose that Jones indeed ought to use "statement" to
refer to something that he, Jones, *can't* specify using a "that"
clause.

So we posit that, on July 1st, 1972, Jones says, as his only utterance
of the day:

"Nixon's first statement made on June 19th, 1972 is false."

and posit that, on June 19th, 1972, Nixon says, of his only utterance of
the day:

"The first statement Jones will make on July 1st, 1972, will be true."

And posit that Jones does not know what Nixon said, and Nixon does not
know what Jones will say.   Would you say that both Jones and Nixon made
coherent utterances?

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If this re-phrasing of the example, to accomodate your opinion on
reference to statements rather than sentences, still does not meet with
your approval, is there any expression Jones could have used to express
his meaning, that would have been coherent?

-----

It is by no means clear to me that when one refers to an event of
someone making an utterance, and says that that person is guilty of
falsehood on that occasion, without knowing what was said, that one
calls the *statement* made false rather than the utterance, the
illocutionary act, the token, the assertion, the utterance occasion, the
sentence, the formula, or the Gödel number of the formula.    However,
if you think it is one of these rather than another, it is of course a
trivial matter to rephrase the example to accommodate your opinion.

What is certainly clear, is that if Nixon said "There was no break-in."
one thing Jones can not possibly have meant is "It is false that there
was no break-in".   Jones can't possibly have meant that, because Jones
does not know that Nixon said that there was no break-in.    If Jones
had said or meant "It is false that there was no break-in", then Jones
would indeed have called the ****statement**** Nixon made false.    But
this is the one thing we know Jones can neither have said, nor meant.
I very much doubt that Jones's meaning was, of any *statement*, that it
was false.    But as I said, if you think so, the example is easily
modified to accommodate this view, and it makes no difference to the
consequences.


As far as I can tell from your posting, and Hartley's, you have not
considered the importance of Jones not knowing what Nixon said, and
continue to repeat arguments based the other case.

------- -- ---- - --- -- --------- -----
Sandy Hodges / Alameda,  California,   USA
mail to SandyHodges at attbi.com will reach me.