 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 

 

 

            September 18, 2013 

 

 

 
 

SYRIAN CRISIS: MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT, DIRE 

NEEDS AND A SHORTAGE OF SOLUTIONS 

 

 

ELIZABETH FERRIS, KEMAL KIRIŞCI AND SALMAN SHAIKH 

 

 
 

 

Co-Director, Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement 

Elizabeth Ferris  

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy 

 

Kemal Kirişci 

Director, Turkey Project, Center on the United States and Europe 

TÜSİAD Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy 

 
 

Salman Shaikh 

Director, Brookings Doha Center 

Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy 

 
 
 
 
 

With thanks to Chareen Stark and Vittoria Federici for their research assistance, to Leah 
Denman for her preparation of the final publication and to the Brookings Foreign Policy 

Acknowledgements: 

Director’s Strategic Initiative Fund for its financial support of this research. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Front Cover Photograph: Syrian refugee children post with their siblings in Amman, 
Jordan, August 19, 2013 (CARE/ Josh Estey) 
 

 

 
 
 

 
 

T A B L E   O F   C O N T E N T S  

 
ACRONYMS    

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

INTRODUCTION 

 

 

 

 

HOW DID IT ALL BEGIN?   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION INSIDE SYRIA 

 

 

 

 

 

SYRIANS ON THE MOVE: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The case of Kurdish displacement inside Syria  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SYRIANS ON THE MOVE: REFUGEES IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 

REFUGEES IN THE REGION 

 

 

 

Jordan: Hospitality under pressure 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lebanon: On the frontline 

 

Turkey: Refugees and politics 

Iraq: An August influx   

 

Egypt: No longer welcomed   

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendations 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 

 

 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Copyright © 2013 

 

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 

 
 

 

 
 
 

A C R O N Y M S  

 

AFAD 

AKP 

CoI 

DRC 

EDAM 

ERC 

EU 

FSA 

GA 

GDP 

ICG 

ICRC 

IDPs 

IHL 

IMF 

INGO 

IOM 

ISIS 

JAN 

JNAP 

J-RANS 

 

Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency 

Justice and Development Party 

Commission of Inquiry 

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies 

Emergency Relief Coordinator 

European Union 

Free Syrian Army 

General Assembly 

Gross Domestic Product 

International Crisis Group 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

Internally Displaced Persons 

International Humanitarian Law 

International Monetary Fund 

International Non-Governmental Organization 

International Organization for Migration 

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham 

Jabhat al-Nusrah 

Joint National Action Plan 

Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria 

J-RANS II 

Second Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria 

KRG 

LBP 

Kurdistan Regional Government 

Lebanese Pound 

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MOU 

MSF 

NATO 

NGO 

OCHA 

PKK 

PRS 

PYD 

R2P 

R&R 

SARC 

SHARP 

SNAP 

UN 

UNHCR 

UNRWA 

UNSC 

WFP 

WHO 

 

Memorandum of Understanding 

Médecins Sans Frontières 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Non-Governmental Organization 

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 

Kurdistan Workers’ Party 

Palestine Refugees from Syria 

Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat 

Responsibility to Protect 

Rest and Recuperation 

Syrian Arab Red Crescent 

Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 

Syria Needs Analysis Project 

United Nations 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 

United Nations Security Council 

World Food Programme 

World Health Organization 

 

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E X E C U T I V E   S U M M A R Y  

T
  

he mounting civilian casualties in Syria and the displacement of over 6 million Syrians – 
with prospects of both more casualties and more displacement – make this the most 
daunting humanitarian crisis facing the world today.1 The international community is 
struggling to respond to the humanitarian situation inside Syria and throughout the 

region. Political actors, unable to agree on how to end the civil war, seem to agree that 
humanitarian assistance is needed,2 but the funds are neither sufficient now nor likely to be 
sustainable in the long term. The humanitarian crisis has implications not only for Syrian 
civilians, but also for the course of the conflict, governments in and beyond the region, the 
international humanitarian system and, indeed, for global governance. The available data paint a 
graphic picture of the human misery that has become commonplace in Syria.   

This policy brief examines the various dimensions of the Syrian humanitarian crisis. Following a 
brief description of the evolution of the crisis, analysis turns to the humanitarian situation inside 
Syria and beyond Syria’s borders, focusing on both the immediate and long-term impact of the 
crisis on Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, with briefer reports on Iraq and Egypt. The brief then 
turns to conclusions based on this analysis and offers a series of recommendations for key 
stakeholders. This present summary provides a brief look at the displacement situation before 
presenting recommendations; further analysis is provided in the policy brief.  

The humanitarian effects of this conflict are horrific and we hope that this report will lead to a re-
doubling of efforts by the international community and particularly by the United States, to help 
Syrians find a political solution and bring an end to the war. 

In Limbo: The Displacement Crisis 

While there were 2 million refugees at the time of writing, the UN estimates that there will be 
3.45 million Syrian refugees in the region by the end of 2013; unfortunately, all present 
indications are consistent with this target being met.3 In addition, as of September 2013, there 
were at least 4.25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) many of whom have been 
displaced multiple times in search of safety. This means that almost one-third of Syria’s people 
have been forced to leave their communities. It should be noted that those who are displaced may 
not be the individuals most in need in Syria. In fact, it is likely that those who are unable to leave 
their homes – because they are elderly, disabled or simply lack the resources to move – are the 
most vulnerable. Those who are displaced, however, do have certain identifiable needs which 
require assistance.  

                                                
1 There were over 2 million refugees according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
as of 15 September 2013, and estimates of the numbers of IDPs range from 4.25 million to 5.1 million. According to 
official UN figures since April 2013, as of mid-September 2013, there were 4.25 million IDPs. The higher figure of 
5.1 million results from combining OCHA figures with estimates from the seven northern governorates of Syria 
assessed as part of the Second Joint Rapid Assessment in Northern Syria (J-RANS II); see further, Syria Needs 
Analysis Project (SNAP), Regional Analysis Syria, 30 May 2013, http://acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project, p. 9; 
OCHA, OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Syria, Issue 33, 9 September 2013, www.unocha.org/crisis/syria  
2 International Crisis Group (ICG), Syria’s Metastasizing Conflicts, No.143, 27 June 2013, p. iii, 
www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syrias-metastasising-conflicts.aspx 
3 The 3.45 million figure includes some 100,000 Palestine refugees registered with and assisted by UNRWA who 
are projected to be displaced from Syria, mainly to Lebanon (80,000) and Jordan (10,000); see UN, Syria Regional 
Response Plan – January to December 2013, 7 June 2013, p. 6, http://unhcr.org/51b04c9c9.html 

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The widespread displacement in Syria is the result of the failure of the Syrian government to 
resolve internal conflicts and to respect the basic rights of its people, and the failure of both sides 
of the conflict to respect international humanitarian law. The fact that so many Syrians have been 
displaced is also an indication of the inability of the international community to prevent the 
atrocities, large-scale violence, and widespread human rights violations that have forced a third 
of the country’s population to leave their homes.   

 

 

Displacement in and from Syria is highly dynamic. There seems to be a direct relationship 
between those displaced inside Syria and refugee movements into neighboring countries. Many 
of those turning up as refugees in Jordan and Lebanon report having been displaced within Syria 
before making it across a border. There are also reports of Syrians returning from other countries 
– either because of a perception that security back home has improved, because they want to 
check on relatives or property or because conditions in host countries are so bad.  

Governments in the region – those of Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt – initially 
responded with generosity and solidarity to the arrival of refugees on their borders. Although all 
of the governments have imposed restrictions on entry of one kind or another, they deserve 
recognition and appreciation for their policies of openness and welcome to refugees. They also 
deserve the financial support of the international community. It is hard to imagine Western 
countries responding with similar generosity should a comparable number of refugees have 
arrived on their borders. Governments hosting the region’s two million registered refugees need 
support to defray some of the economic, social and political costs they have born in allowing the 
refugees to enter and in providing for at least some of their basic necessities. As we discuss in 
this policy brief, the presence of Syrian refugees in neighboring countries incurs not only 
financial costs, but also presents political dilemmas for the host governments, particularly in 

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their relationships with other countries in the region and the ethnic and sectarian balance in their 
own countries.    

These refugee-recipient or ‘host’ governments also deserve support because their actions affirm 
the international system of refugee protection. This refugee regime, which has evolved since 
1951, is based on the idea that countries offer protection and assistance to arriving refugees on 
behalf of the international community. While notions of burden-sharing have been hotly debated 
almost since the beginning of the refugee regime, the idea that responding to refugees is a shared 
international responsibility – and not only the responsibility of the country on whose border they 
happen to have arrived – is a precious international norm which deserves to be upheld. And 
governments such as those of Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan have demonstrated a commitment to 
this norm, which is a positive affirmation of global systems that have been eroding on many 
fronts in recent years.  

 

The displacement of Syrians, both within the country and across borders, is likely to continue as 
long as the war continues and people perceive that they are more likely to be safe elsewhere. A 
swift end to the war is unlikely. Given the lack of political negotiations, the inability of the UN 
Security Council to take robust action, the reluctance of outside actors to intervene with decisive 
force, and the present military stalemate, the most likely scenario is that the war will continue. 
People will continue to flee their homes to places they perceive to be safer. Their choice of 
destinations will depend on their physical abilities, financial capacities, the openness of borders 

 

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and their family and social networks. In light of these realities, a series of recommendations is 
outlined below.   

Inside Syria 

1.  All parties to the armed conflict – including the Syrian government, 

paramilitary forces and the many opposition groups – should comply with the 
basic principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) and uphold basic, 
internationally-recognized human rights. Under IHL, states and non-state armed 
actors have the obligation to ensure assistance to and protection of people within their 
jurisdiction. The Syrian government and opposition movements therefore need to 
understand and respect international humanitarian law and to uphold the rights of all 
individuals under their jurisdiction, including the internally displaced. There is a 
critical need for training on IHL and humanitarian principles for parties to the conflict 
and participation in such training should be a condition of any support by the US 
government to the opposition. The failure to consider the protection of all civilians, 
regardless of which side they support, will result in the undermining of hopes for any 
coalition government. Steps to protect minorities are particularly important – not only 
for the needed protection of vulnerable groups – but in affecting the course of the 
country’s political future. There is a particular need to equitably protect and assist 
Palestinian refugees who had been living in Syria and are now either displaced 
internally or turned back at borders of neighboring states.   

2.  The humanitarian community should develop and maintain better statistics and 

assessments on internal displacement inside Syria. The present UN estimates of 
4.25 million IDPs date from 22 April 2013 and have remained unchanged even as the 
number of Syrian refugees has increased significantly. Given the restrictions on 
access inside Syria and the fluid nature of displacement, it is obviously more difficult 
to estimate the number of IDPs than refugees living in neighboring countries; 
nonetheless, more clarity is needed. It would be helpful for OCHA, which is 
responsible for compiling figures on IDPs, to be more transparent in its methodology. 
While assessments such as the Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria 
assessments, the Syria Needs Analysis Project and data collected by individual NGOs 
provide very useful information on humanitarian conditions, there is a need for better 
coordination of efforts and regular joint compilation and review of gathered data.   

3.  The Syrian government should remove obstacles to increasing humanitarian 

assistance inside Syria. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent, UN, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), international NGOs  and civil society 
organizations have all been working hard to access populations in need and yet both 
the bureaucratic and security obstacles are formidable. The Syrian government has a 
responsibility to enable the humanitarian action of international agencies, as set forth 
in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which reflect international 

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law and international human rights standards.4 The Syrian government should be 
pressed by the concerted action of the UN Security Council to exercise its 
responsibility to enable the humanitarian action of international agencies. As UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, stated to the UN Security Council in 
April and again in July 2013, these obstacles include long procedures for renewing 
visas, importing vehicles and medical supplies, restrictions on movement within the 
country, etc. These bureaucratic obstacles need to be removed. 

4.  International agencies must continue to affirm the humanitarian and non-

political nature of assistance.  In accordance with basic humanitarian principles and 
the UN Guiding Principles, humanitarian action inside Syria should be carried out 
solely on the basis of need, respecting impartiality and humanity, not on the basis of 
political objectives, and without discrimination. Assumptions should not be made that 
all those living in government or opposition-controlled areas are supportive of armed 
actors controlling those areas. The ICRC’s Professional Standards for Protection 
Work should be applied by all parties offering assistance in Syria.5 International 
organizations working with these actors should provide opportunities for basic 
training in IHL and in professional standards for humanitarian operations. 

5.  The UN Security Council should develop strongly-worded resolutions to support 

the necessary access for humanitarian assistance operations. In April 2013, 
following a briefing by Valerie Amos, the UN Security Council issued a statement 
(not a resolution)  calling on all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to 
cooperate fully with the UN and relevant humanitarian organizations and urged all 
parties to ‘assure safe and unimpeded access.’6 This is much weaker than the many 
Security Council resolutions referencing humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.7 Other efforts to address issues of humanitarian access in Syria have 
been blocked within the Security Council.   

6.  Cross-border operations for assisting IDPs and others affected by conflict should 

be continued and expanded. Given the desperate condition of internally displaced 

                                                
4 As the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state, “International humanitarian organizations and other 
appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not 
be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State’s internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith. 
Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to 
provide the required humanitarian assistance.” United Nations, UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
1999, Principle 25, para. 2, www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/idp/GPEnglish.pdf; see also, Walter Kalin, The 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (2nd Edition), The American Society of International 
Law and the Brookings Institution, 2008, www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/05/spring-guiding-principles. 
5 ICRC, Professional Standards for Protection Work Carried out by Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in 
Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 2013, www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0999.pdf 
6 See UN Security Council, “Top UN Official Says Situation in Syria ‘Humanitarian Catastrophe,’ Calls on Security 
Council to Take Actions Needed to End ‘Brutal Conflict,’” 18 April 2013, SC/10981, 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10981.doc.htm  
7 UN Security Council, Resolution 819: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 April 1993, S/RES/819. 

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Syrians and the difficulties international agencies face in accessing IDPs and other 
affected communities in parts of the country, these operations are needed to ensure 
the protection and assistance of vulnerable civilians. While cross-border operations 
are presently taking place, these need to be expanded and their legitimacy recognized 
through Security Council resolutions.  Establishing any UN cross-border 
humanitarian aid operation will be tremendously challenging both politically and 
logistically, but there are precedents that can and should be used. 

7.  International agencies, with the support of the United Nations, should consider 

the use of humanitarian ‘corridors’ and humanitarian ‘pauses’ to increase 
humanitarian assistance. While some have suggested the establishment of safe 
zones,8 it seems that the necessary international support for this is limited.  For 
example, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s idea of an internationally 
imposed safe zone or haven was met with silence or even disapproval from UNHCR 
and major powers when he presented it at the UN General assembly in August 2012.9  
There are precedents, however, for the use of more limited ceasefires to enable the 
evacuation of wounded and the vaccination of children.  Humanitarian corridors have 
been used occasionally by humanitarian actors in situations as diverse as Angola, the 
occupied Palestinian Territory and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  While these 
precedents were far from perfect, they do offer suggestions for ways of improving 
assistance in the midst of armed conflict.  In this regard, a research project to 
systematically evaluate the conditions and processes of past efforts and their 
relevance to Syria could be useful.  

8.  If the Security Council is unable to act on issues of humanitarian corridors, 
humanitarian pauses or cross-border operations, the UN General Assembly 
(GA) should mobilize action. As noted above, the record of the UN Security Council 
in either ending the conflict or strongly asserting humanitarian principles in the case 
of Syria has been disappointing.10 By substantial majorities, the GA has adopted 
resolutions deploring the Security Council’s inability to find a political solution 
(August 2012) and calling for an end to indiscriminate violence in Syria (May 2013). 
Perhaps it is time for the GA to engage more forcefully on issues of respect for 
international humanitarian law, displacement and basic principles of humanitarian 
assistance. In particular, this is an issue where the BRICS (Brazil, India, and South 

                                                
8 Diane Paul has written a persuasive article on how safe areas, protected by no-fly zones, can be used in Syria: 
“State of play in Syria: Rising human costs and the danger of Assad’s ‘Samson Button’,” Professionals in 
Humanitarian Assistance and Protection , 7 June 2013, http://phap.org/articles/state-play-syria-rising-human-costs-
and-danger-assad%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98samson-button%E2%80%99. 
9 International Crisis Group (ICG), Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, no.225, 30 April 2013, 
p.39, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-
risks-for-turkey.ashx. 
10 See for example, Security Council Report, Chronology of Events: Syria, revised 29 August 2013, 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php. 

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Africa in particular) and the 120 strong Non-Aligned Movement can and should 
assert greater leadership. In this regard, we suggest that exploratory meetings be held 
in New York to consider ways of strengthening GA action on humanitarian issues.  

IDPs, Refugees and Asylum  

9.  Collaboration and coordination of humanitarian response should be 

strengthened, particularly with respect to non-traditional actors.  A wide array of 
local and regional actors is presently working on humanitarian issues, both inside and 
outside Syria. In fact, most of the assistance being provided inside Syria is being 
delivered by local Syrian and regional NGOs. Many of these actors are not part of 
traditional coordination mechanisms and are acting independently in support of 
humanitarian – and sometimes, political – objectives. The UN and other international 
organizations have a responsibility to reach out to and support these actors by joining 
forces with other Syrian, Arab, and Islamic NGOs. At a minimum, those NGOs have 
a responsibility to share information on their activities with international agencies 
mandated to coordinate humanitarian efforts.    

10. Governments should be supported to preserve asylum space in the region.  Being 
able to seek protection in other countries is a basic human right – governments in the 
region need to be affirmed and financially supported to allow refugees to enter. 
Presently, the UN consolidated appeal for the regional response for June-December 
2013 is just under 50 percent funded. Interestingly, for the first time ever, the 
consolidated appeal included funds to support the governments of Lebanon and 
Jordan. Turkey, however, has received disproportionately less international assistance 
than other host governments and the limits of its capacity to shelter and provide 
services to refugees may be being reached. If host governments do not receive the 
support they need, it is likely that the living conditions for refugees will deteriorate, 
resulting in public health hazards for the host communities as well as the refugees. 
The security of humanitarian workers could be compromised, refugees could turn to 
violent protests, refugees might be returned to Syria and/or deterred from arriving in 
host countries or might seek protection elsewhere.  

11. Support to refugees and IDPs in urban areas should be improved and increased. 

While it is perhaps understandable that international attention has focused on the 
large visible refugee camps in Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, the fact is that far more 
attention needs to be directed toward those living outside of camps. The issue of 
urban refugees has received significant attention from international bodies for more 
than ten years but there is still a great deal that is not known. For example, what are 
the pros and cons of targeting refugees and IDPs when host populations are also 
needy? What are good models of working with local governments and service-
providers? Should international agencies be making contributions to the on-going 
work of such authorities? If so, should there be a requirement that a certain 

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percentage of beneficiaries are refugees or IDPs? The sheer scale of Syrian 
displacement in non-camp settings suggests the need for much more attention to the 
practicalities of providing assistance to host communities and the displaced. In this 
respect, it would be helpful for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to review its 
past efforts to address the needs of non-camp refugees and IDPs in order to provide 
concrete guidance to agencies and donors about effective models of assistance.  

12.  Gender perspectives should be incorporated into all humanitarian and 

development programs. While there has been some much-needed attention to sexual 
and gender-based violence among Syrian refugees, there needs to be a recognition 
that during crises such as these gender roles can be transformed. Support should be 
given for Syrian women to participate actively in consultative mechanisms and 
leadership structures that emerge among refugees in both camp and non-camp 
settings. Issues to address livelihood issues and documentation are especially 
important for Syrian women and their children. Birth registration of babies born to 
refugees are particularly difficult when women do not have documentation of their 
citizenship or marriage. 

13. Education must receive priority attention from governments in the region, 

international agencies and civil society groups. The fact that many Syrian children, 
whether internally displaced or refugees, do not have access to education is a major 
human rights issue with long-term implications for the future of the country. As this 
report highlights, the fact that most refugee children in Jordan and Syria are not 
attending school should be a cause for alarm – not only for over-stretched 
humanitarian agencies but also for development actors and advocacy groups.    

14.  Host countries must increase their efforts to guarantee the security of Syrian 
refugees.  In the last year, there have been violent attacks against Syrians in Egypt, 
kidnappings and assassinations in Lebanon and on-going security incidents in the 
Za’atari camp of Jordan. Young men and increasingly children have been recruited 
into armed groups. Unsafe security conditions will often prompt Syrians to return to 
their homes before conditions warrant, further increasing their security risks.  

15. Assistance to refugees should be increased. This could include the possibility of 

introducing or expanding cash assistance to refugees. Except for those living in 
camps in Jordan and Turkey, refugees throughout the region struggle to pay rent; 
most of the refugees arrived came with meager financial resources and those that did 
come with cash have found their reserves depleted. This leads them to be at further 
risk for protection concerns, by going into debt, returning to their homes despite 
ongoing violence, moving elsewhere, reducing their consumption of food, or 
resorting to early marriage or survival sex or child labor. In this respect, more 
attention needs to be given to supporting refugee livelihoods. Host countries have 
been resistant to allowing refugees to be involved in microfinance or vocational 

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training programs, but since displacement is likely to be protracted, this kind of 
support is needed to enable refugees to become more self-sufficient and to contribute 
to the economies of the host country. 

Long-Term Thinking 

16. Initiatives need to be carried out now to think about the long-term future of 
Syria’s IDPs and refugee. While it has become commonplace for international 
agencies to call for thinking about solutions to displacement early in the process, in 
fact it is extraordinarily hard to do when faced with overwhelming demands for 
emergency assistance. It is perhaps natural that those most knowledgeable and 
involved in humanitarian response are caught up in the intense demands of the day. 
But, surely with the international community asked to raise $5 billion to support 
refugees and IDPs over the next six months, more thought is needed now about how 
the situation will play out in the long-term.11 For example, what are the options – for 
the region and the international community – if the Syrian refugees cannot return 
home this year – or in the next five years? It is difficult to predict how the conflict 
will unfold, of course, but it is unlikely that the war will be over soon. And when the 
conflict does end, it is also unlikely that the 6 million+ refugees and IDPs will 
immediately pack up their belongings, go back home and resume their lives. The 
issue of returns is a complex issue, raising issues not only of reconstruction, but also 
issues of legal assistance with property claims and transitional justice. While there are 
ongoing initiatives to plan for transition in Syria, these have largely focused on the 
political, military and economic future of the country.12  Equal attention needs to be 
paid to the long-term future of Syrian refugees and IDPs.  As we have pointed out in 
this analysis, Syrian displacement is the most recent case of the region’s long history 
of displacements occurring since 1948, few of which can be said to have been 
resolved. The Middle East risks becoming a “region of the permanently displaced.”  
In this regard, we suggest that key donors support a research project which examines 
lessons learned from other on-going and persistent cases of displacement in the 
Middle East and which examines the particular strains caused by recurrent 
displacement.  

 

                                                
11 In June 2013, the United Nations launched a $4.4 billion humanitarian appeal – the largest aid request in its 
history – to assist those affected by the crisis in Syria. The appeal was revised from $1.5 billion in January and 
covers relief activities for the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and the Regional Response 
Plan (RRP). Of the $4.4 billion, $1.4 billion will go to SHARP, assisting Syrians inside Syria, and $3 billion to 
RRP, which provides life-saving aid and protection to refugees in the immediate surrounding region. In addition to 
this, the governments of Lebanon and Jordan are seeking $450 million and $380 million, respectively, to support the 
efforts to provide education, health and other services to the refugees who are now in their countries. 
12 For example, US Institute of Peace, “The Day After Project,” August 2012, www.usip.org/programs/projects/the-
day-after-project  

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17. Development actors should become fully engaged in addressing both the needs of 
the displaced and the communities which host them and in seeking solutions. As 
displacement becomes protracted, issues of livelihoods, provision of basic services, 
infrastructure development, local economies and environmental impact become more 
important. In addition, there is the need to address land tenure issues before any 
sustainable return can occur. These are all development issues. And yet, as long as 
this is seen as a ‘refugee’ emergency or a ‘humanitarian’ crisis, development actors 
will be reluctant to invest their scarce resources in what is seen to be the 
responsibility of the humanitarian community. While some development actors, such 
as the World Bank, have taken important steps to incorporate displacement concerns 
in their long-term planning, they need to be supported and other multilateral and 
bilateral development agencies need to play a more active role.  We specifically 
suggest that states explore setting up an Arab States Stabilization Fund to mitigate the 
financial and service provision burdens of key countries in the region as a result of 
the Syria conflict. Such a fund should be administered by the World Bank and could 
perhaps help draw in the Gulf states to work with other international donors in a 
constructive way.  

18. Plans need to be made now for the likelihood that displacement will be 

protracted, including in terms of addressing likely increase in numbers of 
refugees seeking asylum outside of the region. In 2012 according to UNHCR, Syria 
became the second highest-ranking source country of asylum seekers among the 44 
industrialized countries, up from 15th place a year earlier.13 Most fled in the second 
half of the year due to the sharp intensification of the armed conflict. There are also 
reports of increasing number of irregular Syrian arrivals. While the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees affirmed in July 2013 that the number of Syrian asylum 
claims in EU countries “remains manageable…,” if displacement drags on and 
international assistance is inadequate, this will change.14 European governments, in 
particular, should prioritize thinking about a collective response to Syrian asylum-
seekers which upholds their rights and shares responsibility for response. 

19. Focus should be placed on the appropriate role for resettlement of refugees 
outside the region.  So far, Germany has agreed to resettle on a temporary basis 
some 5,000 vulnerable Syrians and Sweden has announced that it will give asylum to 

                                                
13 In 2012, more than half of the Syrian asylum seekers requested refugee status in Sweden (7,800 claims) and 
Germany (6,200 claims). In Sweden, the figure increased twelve-fold (650 claims in 2011), while in Germany it 
more than doubled (2,600 claims in 2011). Other important destination countries were the United Kingdom (1,300 
claims), Switzerland (1,400 claims) and Austria (920 claims). See UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in 
Industrialized Countries – 2012, 2013, p. 16, www.unhcr.org/5149b81e9.html; in this report, UNHCR notes that in 
virtually all 44 countries, the number of Syrian asylum-seekers went up in 2012, with the exception of Greece. A 
growing number of Syrian nationals were recorded irregularly entering or present in Greece but asylum claim 
numbers from this group remained low. 
14 UNHCR, “UN's High Commissioner for Refugees urges Europe to do more for Syrian asylum-seekers,” 18 July 
2013, www.unhcr.org/51e7ecc56.html  

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all Syrian refugees who apply.   The Obama administration recently announced a new 
target of 2,000 Syrians for resettlement, an increase from the 90 or so Syrian refugees 
who have been permanently admitted to the US in the last two years. These are 
positive signals, but they are just a drop in the bucket in terms of the millions of 
Syrians who have been displaced by the violence. Resettlement programs do not just 
offer solutions to individual refugees but can also play an important role in 
demonstrating responsibility-sharing with regional governments hosting large 
numbers of refugees. Bold, creative, strategic thinking on resettlement is needed. For 
example, could present cumbersome US procedures to process refugees be revised to 
expedite and expand an eventual Syrian refugee resettlement program? Could 
countries which are relatively new to resettlement, such as Brazil, be encouraged to 
resettle more refugees from Syria? Could temporary resettlement mechanisms, such 
as the Humanitarian Evacuation program from Kosovo serve as models for new 
thinking about the role of resettlement in Syria?  

20. Discussions should be started now about the eventual establishment of an 

international mechanism to support solutions for displacement in Syria. 
International processes have, in the past, served as vehicles for creative multilateral 
approaches to resolving long-standing crises, for example in Central America and in 
Southeast Asia. Thought should be given now about what future mechanisms or 
processes could be used to resolve Syrian displacement when circumstances allow. 
For example, the role of regional organizations, Gulf states, UN agencies and donor 
governments should be considered. Ministerial-level meetings with governments of 
host countries are currently being held to discuss the challenges of humanitarian 
response. These could be important opportunities for informal consultations about 
long-term future efforts. Even when the international system seems blocked and weak 
in bringing about an end to the violence, creative steps can and should be taken – 
steps which could be implemented to bring about an end to long-term displacement 
and the suffering it has caused.

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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I N T R O D U C T I O N  

The mounting civilian casualties in Syria and 
the displacement of over 6 million Syrians – 
with prospects of both more casualties and 
more displacement – make this the most 
daunting humanitarian crisis facing the world 
today.15 The international community is 
struggling to respond to the humanitarian 
situation inside Syria and throughout the 
region. Political actors, unable to agree on how 
to end the civil war, seem to agree that 
humanitarian assistance is needed,16 but the 
funds are neither sufficient now nor likely to 
be sustainable in the long term. The 
humanitarian crisis has implications not only 
for Syrian civilians, but also for the course of 
the conflict, governments in and beyond the region, the international humanitarian system and, 
indeed, for global governance. 

Hundreds of Syrian refugees cross into Iraq at the 
Peshkhabour border crossing in Dohuk Governorate on 
August 15, 2013. (UNHCR / G. Gubaeva) 

This policy brief examines the various dimensions of the Syrian humanitarian crisis. Following a 
brief description of the evolution of the crisis, analysis turns to the humanitarian situation inside 
Syria and beyond Syria’s borders, focusing on both the immediate and long-term impact of the 
crisis on Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, with briefer reports on Iraq and Egypt. The brief then 
turns to conclusions based on this analysis and offers a series of recommendations for key 
stakeholders. 

Given the political impasse in exercising the international community’s responsibility to protect 
civilians inside Syria, especially in the aftermath of the August 2013 alleged use of chemical 
weapons by the Assad government in the Eastern Ghouta district of Damascus, scaling up 
humanitarian action may be the most positive response the international community can muster 
at this time. But, as our analysis shows, humanitarian assistance is not an easy or straightforward 
option and there are inherent political implications to the humanitarian response. 

Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria range from 4.25 to 5.1 
million – although given the difficulties of international access, the actual number could be 
higher.17 The issue of internal displacement is not only indicative of widespread human need in 
the country, but raises a host of operational issues around security of humanitarian workers and 
working with local partners from a distance. Responding to internal displacement also raises 

                                                
15 There were over 2 million refugees according to UNHCR as of 15 September 2013, and estimates of the numbers 
of IDPs range from 4.25 million to 5.1 million; see footnote 18, infra.  
16 International Crisis Group (ICG), Syria’s Metastasizing Conflicts, No.143, 27 June 2013, p. iii, 
www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/mena/syrias-metastasising-conflicts.aspx 
17 According to official UN figures since April 2013, as of mid-September 2013, there were 4.25 million IDPs. The 
higher figure of 5.1 million results from combining OCHA figures with estimates from the seven northern 
governorates of Syria assessed as part of the Second Joint Rapid Assessment in Northern Syria (J-RANS II); see 
further, Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP), Regional Analysis Syria, 30 May 2013, 
http://acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project, p. 9; OCHA, OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Syria, Issue 33, 9 
September 2013, www.unocha.org/crisis/syria 

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larger questions of sovereignty, particularly in the context of cross-border operations and 
negotiating access to affected communities with armed actors. Most fundamentally, responding 
to internal displacement illustrates the limits of humanitarian action. 

The number of Syrians registered as refugees or awaiting registration as a result of the war 
reached 2 million by September 2013 and is estimated to reach 3.45 million by the end of the 
year.18 These are UN estimates of registered refugees (and those waiting to be registered). The 
actual number of Syrians who have crossed borders may be far higher. In all of the neighboring 
countries, the refugees are adding to economic, political and social pressures on societies and 
governments. Jordan and Lebanon are hosting significant numbers of Syrian refugees; as of mid- 
September 2013, the official figures stood at nearly 520,000 and nearly 740,000, respectively.19 
Jordan has been most outspoken about the burden of the refugees. Indeed, Prince Zeid Ra’ad 
Zeid Al Hussein, Ambassador of Jordan, addressed the UN Security Council in a private meeting 
on 30 April 2013 to seek the Council’s determination that the influx of Syrian refugees into 
Jordan represents “a threat to international peace and security”20 and “threatens the security and 
stability of our country.”21 Although Jordan has been extraordinarily generous in allowing 
Syrians to enter its territory, it has imposed some restrictions against the entry of single young 
men and Palestinians. The Jordanian government is politically fragile and Jordanians are 
concerned about the threat of extremists crossing the border and carrying out activities inside 
Jordan – as occurred in 2005 alongside the flow of refugees from Iraq. If Jordan’s political 
situation is fragile, Lebanon’s stability is even more vulnerable, compounded by the fact that it is 
receiving even less international support than Jordan. With the recent spate of tit-for-tat 
bombings in predominantly Shi’a and Sunni areas of the country, Lebanese apprehension is 
growing that Syria’s civil war is spilling over into their country and will reignite a sectarian civil 
conflict there. UN planning figures for Lebanon anticipate one million refugees in the country by 
the end of 2013, up from the 740,000 as of September 2013.22 This would mean that the refugees 
would account for 25 per cent of the country’s population.23 

Turkey is currently hosting 450,000 registered refugees. In addition, more than 100,000 
internally displaced Syrians are living near the Turkish border in a de facto safe zone that is 
neither internationally recognized nor particularly safe. Cross-border operations from Turkey 
(and to a lesser extent from Jordan) are the major source of assistance to internally displaced 
persons and others in need in the rebel-held areas of Syria. But the borders in the region are 
porous: not only is humanitarian assistance moving across borders but so are rebels, smugglers 

                                                
18 See UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response Regional Overview,” Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-
agency Information Sharing Portal, September 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php and UN, 
Syria Regional Response Plan: January to December 2013, June 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/syria-
regional-response-plan-january-december-2013 
19 See UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response Regional Overview,” Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-
agency Information Sharing Portal, 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
20 UN SC, Letter dated 25 April 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 25 April 2013, www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_247.pdf 
21 UN SC, Letter dated 25 April 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 25 April 2013. 
22 UN, Syria Regional Response Plan: January to December 2013, June 2013, p. 26. 
23 UN, Syria Regional Response Plan: January to December 2013, June 2013, p. 26. 

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and arms.24 There is also growing concern about the manner in which the ethnic and sectarian 
aspects of the conflict in Syria could spill over into neighboring countries, including Turkey. In 
the event that the conflict in Syria and the humanitarian crisis persists, secondary movements of 
refugees towards the European Union are likely to increase with implications for European 
relations with countries in the region, particularly Turkey.25 

Iraq hosts 10 percent of the Syrian refugees – some 200,000 as of early September 2013 – yet 
has only received a fraction of international funding assistance and scant international 
attention.26 Most of the refugees are Kurds who have fled to the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG), with the majority living in urban areas outside of camps. Some 55,000 refugees reside in 
Domiz camp, near Dohuk, which was originally designed to host only 20,000 when it opened in 
April 2012.27 At least 40,000 fled to KRG in mid-August 2013 when the KRG reopened the only 
legal crossing, the Peshkhabour border crossing, after three months. While Syrian refugees have 
the legal right to work if they have a residency permit – for which legal documentation is 
required, which many refugees leave behind or no longer have – and the KRG has been 
generous, resources are strained and refugees often face difficulties accessing basic services.28 
As a result of these difficulties, some Syrians are reportedly opting to return home, trading the 
relative safety of the KRG for a warzone.29 

Conditions for Syrian refugees in Egypt have become precarious. Egypt initially welcomed 
Syrians with open arms, and presently hosts around 100,000 Syrian refugees registered with 
UNHCR. Many Syrians who fled to Egypt have been, by and large, more affluent than Syrians 
who fled to neighboring countries, working as small business owners or in white-collar 
industries.30 However, since former President Mohamed Morsi’s ousting, many Syrians in Egypt 
have become victims of xenophobia and scapegoating under the new transitional government, 
who see Syrians as aligned with former President Morsi and his supporters.31  

                                                
24 Jonathon Burch, “Turkish troops repel hundreds of 'smugglers' on Syrian border,” Reuters, 15 August 2013, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/uk-syria-crisis-turkey-border-idUKBRE97E0M520130815 
25 See BBC News, “'Syrians and Egyptians' among migrants reaching Italy,” BBC News, 9 August 2013, 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-2363086; Reuters “Hundreds of fleeing Syrian refugees reach Italian coast,” 
Washington Post, 14 September 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/hundreds-of-fleeing-syrian-refugees-reach-
italian-coast/2013/09/14/4d266fb4-1d61-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.html 
26 Figure is estimate by UNHCR: See UNHCR, “Iraq,” Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information 
Sharing Portal, 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=103; IRC, Hidden But Hopeful 
Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian Refugees in Northern Iraq, August 2013, p.1, www.rescue-
uk.org/sites/default/files/iraq%20report.pdf; UNHCR, From Slow Boil to Breaking Point: A Real-Time Evaluation 
of UNHCR’s Response to the Syrian Refugee Emergency, Policy Development and Evaluation Service, July 2013, 
www.unhcr.org/51f7d9919.html 
27 IRC, Hidden But Hopeful Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian Refugees in Northern Iraq, August 2013, p.2; Rebecca 
Gang, “Syrian refugees in Iraq risking lives to return home amid funding shortfall,” The Guardian, 30 August 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/30/syrian-refugees-iraq 
28 IRC, Hidden But Hopeful Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian Refugees in Northern Iraq, August 2013, pp.1-2. 
29 Rebecca Gang, “Syrian refugees in Iraq risking lives to return home amid funding shortfall,” The Guardian, 30 
August 2013. 
30 According to the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies in September 2013, Syrians in Egypt launched 
more than 370 small businesses over the last two years; see Daria Solovieva, “US Syria Bombing: Syrian Refugees 
In Egypt Face Increasing Hostility Due to Crackdown On Islamists, While Their Numbers Grow,” International 
Business Times, 7 September 2013, www.ibtimes.com/us-syria-bombing-syrian-refugees-egypt-face-increasing-
hostility-due-crackdown-islamists-while-their 
31 See the Egypt section, infra. 

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The Syrian humanitarian crisis has important implications for the international humanitarian 
system and indeed for global governance, throwing into stark relief the inability of UN 
mechanisms, including the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P), to bring an end to the 
violence. This policy brief is intended to provide a deeper understanding of the implications of 
Syria’s displacement crisis and offer recommendations for policy-makers. As in other politically 
complex situations, the path to a solution is difficult and complex and does not look likely any 
time soon. For now, the international community is faced with making decisions based on least-
bad options.   

 

 
Map 1. Syria: Number and Locations of Refugees and IDPs, September 13, 201332 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                
32 Department of State, Humanitarian Information Unit, “Syria: Numbers and Locations of Refugees and IDPs” 
[map], Humanitarian Information Unit, 12 September 2013, 
https://hiu.state.gov/Products/Syria_DisplacementRefugees_2013Sept12_HIU_U898.pdf. 

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H O W   D I D   I T   A L L   B E G I N ?  

Since the conflict began in March 2011, patterns of 
displacement in Syria have reflected the escalating 
violence. The first exodus of Syrians to 
neighboring countries started shortly after the 
outbreak of the Syrian crisis in March 2011 when 
some 250 refugees entered Turkey’s Hatay region. 
Two months later, Syrians fled the violence in 
Talkalakh, a town in the governorate of Homs, with 
many crossing into northern Lebanon to seek 
shelter in the towns of Wadi Khaled and Tripoli. In 
June 2011, the military siege of Jisr al-Shughour, in 
northwestern Syria, prompted thousands to cross 
the border into neighboring Turkey due to heavy 
shelling and fighting. By mid-month, the number of Syrians housed in refugee camps across the 
Syrian-Turkish border had reached 7,000.33 Displacement during this initial phase of the conflict, 
however, remained sparse, featuring large groups of people fleeing hot spots of violence as a 
result of targeted and localized violence.34   

Portrait of a young Syrian refugee taken in her 
mobile home in the Zaatari's camp in Jordan. 
(UNHCR / O. Laban-Mattei / June 2013) 

The nature of displacement in Syria entered a new critical phase following the intensification of 
the conflict in early 2012. The Syrian regime’s operations in Zabadani, Duma and Damascus in 
late January and its brutal crackdown on the city of Homs in February marked a major shift in 
the government’s counter-revolutionary strategy. This new shift –from targeted repression to the 
disproportionate use of military force against civilian populations – resulted in the use of 
increasingly heavy artillery and the systematic shelling of entire neighborhoods, such as Baba 
Amr, leaving countless Syrians homeless and leading to an exponential rise in the numbers of 
refugees and internally displaced (50,000 to 60,000 from Homs alone).35 Large influxes of 
Syrian refugees fleeing fighting in central and northern Syria were reported in Lebanon and 
Turkey. According to UNHCR, the number of refugees in neighboring countries had reached 
40,000 by March 2012. In response to the escalating humanitarian crisis, UNHCR, along with 
seven other UN agencies, issued an appeal for $84 million to help Syrian refugees, including a 
regional response plan setting out humanitarian needs for the region for a period of six months.36  

Meanwhile, the newly appointed UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan was garnering 
international and Syrian support for a six-point peace initiative involving a ceasefire between 
government troops and rebel forces. Fighting and levels of violence, however, increased 
dramatically in advance of the April 10 ceasefire set by the Annan plan. On April 5, over 2,800 
refugees crossed the Turkish-Syrian border on one day, the highest single-day figure ever 

                                                
33 “Syrian refugee flow to Turkey rises,” Financial Times, 13 June 2011, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b37e4c38-9446-
11e0-8768-00144feab49a.html#axzz2dFmIuN5E 
34 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), No safe haven - A country on the move, a nation on the brink, 
16 August 2012, www.internal-displacement.org   
35   ICG, Syria’s Metastasizing Conflicts, No.143, 27 June 2013, p. 6; IDMC, No safe haven - A country on the 
move, a nation on the brink, 16 August 2012. 
36 UN, Syria Regional Response Plan, March 2012, 2012, p. 4, www.unhcr.org/4f6c80a49.html 

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

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recorded. 37 On April 10, the UN reported that the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Turkey had jumped by 40 percent in the previous weeks and stood at about 55,000 
registered refugees, while 200,000 or more Syrians were now displaced in their own country.38 

Refugee numbers soared during the summer of 2012 following rebel offensives on the cities of 
Damascus and Aleppo. After a bomb attack that killed Assad's brother-in-law and other high-
ranking security officials in Damascus on July 18, up to 30,000 people were reported to have 
crossed the Masnaa border into Lebanon within 48 hours.39 Furthermore, intense warfare raging 
in Aleppo caused up to 200,000 to flee the city at the end of July, with thousands crossing over 
into Turkey. As the government stepped up its assault on the northern city, the UN reported that 
more than 100,000 Syrians fled their country in August 2012 – the highest monthly figure thus 
far – bringing the total number of refugees to 235,300 in the space of a month.40 These patterns 
of rapid displacement and major refugee movements are a stark warning of what could happen in 
the future if the central parts of Damascus (with an estimated population of 1.7 million),41 
become embroiled in major fighting. 

Since mid-2012, Syria’s refugee crisis has steadily climbed, increasing ten-fold in the last 12 
months. According to UNHCR in early September 2013, while roughly one million refugees left 
Syria during the first two years of the crisis, the second million fled the country in just the last 
six months.42 The numbers of those displaced internally are estimated at between 4.2 and 5.1 
million but, as discussed below, are much ‘softer’ than figures for refugees.  

Why are people leaving their communities? Most obviously, they are fleeing the brutal dynamics 
of armed conflict and atrocities committed on both sides of the conflict. As UN Special 
Rapporteur for the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Chaloka Beyani noted in his 
recent report to the UN General Assembly, “Gross violations of international human rights and 
international humanitarian law by Government forces and dissident armed groups continue to be 
key drivers of internal displacement.”43 The UN Human Rights Council’s Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (CoI) found that that war 
crimes and gross human rights violations continued to be perpetrated on an ever larger scale as 
the violence escalated, and found both government forces and affiliated militia and anti-
government armed groups were implicated in these crimes (although recognizing that more 

                                                
37 Adrian Blomfield, “Turkey warns UN over surge in Syrian refugees,” The Telegraph, 6 April 2012, 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9190822/Turkey-warns-UN-over-surge-in-Syrian-
refugees.html 
38 Reuters, “Syrian refugee exodus grows,” Chicago Tribune, 10 April 2012, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-10/business/sns-rt-syriarefugees-factboxl6e8fa2nd-20120410_1_syrian-
refugees-refugee-camp-hatay 
39 BBC News, “Syria crisis: Thousands of refugees flee violence,” BBC, 20 July 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-18929940 
40 BBC News, “Syria refugees reached record levels in August, says UN,” BBC 4 September 2012, 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19473478 
41 This is an estimate from 2011.   
42 Tom Miles, “Syrian refugee numbers reach two million in 'tragedy of century': U.N.,” Reuters 3 September 2013, 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-syria-crisis-refugees-idUSBRE9820I420130903 
43 Beyani further elaborated by drawing attention to the Commission of Inquiry’s findings; see UN General 
Assembly, 15 July 2013, A/67/931, para. 16, 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/idp/CB_GA_Report_Syria_July2013.pdf  

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atrocities have been committed from the government side).44 The shabiha, armed groups 
operating with the support of the Syrian government, have terrorized civilians.45 The CoI 
summarized its findings with regard to government forces and affiliated militia by explaining 
that:    

“Government forces and affiliated militia have committed murder, torture, rape, forcible 
displacement, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts. Many of these crimes 
were perpetrated as part of widespread or systematic attacks against civilian populations 
and constitute crimes against humanity. War crimes and gross violations of international 
human rights law – including summary execution, arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful 
attack, attacking protected objects, and pillaging and destruction of property – have also 
been committed.”46 

With respect to anti-government armed groups, the CoI found that:  

“Anti-Government armed groups have also committed war crimes, including murder, 
sentencing and execution without due process, torture, hostage-taking and pillage. They 
continue to endanger the civilian population by positioning military objectives in civilian 
areas. The violations and abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups did not, 
however, reach the intensity and scale of those committed by Government forces and 
affiliated militia.”47 

These findings were echoed in the CoI’s August 2013 report, which also found that Kurdish 
armed groups (in addition to anti-government armed groups, as also reported in its July report) 
have recruited and used child soldiers in hostilities.48  

Furthermore, according to the CoI’s June 2013 report, there were “reasonable grounds” that 
chemical agents had been used as weapons.49 In March 2013, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon appointed Swedish scientist Dr. Åke Sellström as head of the UN investigation into 
allegations of reported chemical weapons use in Syria, which was launched following a formal 
request from the Syrian government.50 Receiving much media coverage around the world was an 
attack on August 21 on Damascus suburbs that killed hundreds of people. This attack was the 
subject of further allegations of the use of chemical weapons. In its August report, the CoI noted 
that investigations into the use of chemical weapons were ongoing, stating that, “Allegations 

                                                
44 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, p.1. 
45 Ibid., p.1. 
46 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, Summary, p. 1.  
47 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, Summary, p.1. 
48 Reporting on its investigations conducted between 15 May and 15 July 2013, UN Human Rights Council, Report 
of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 
2013. 
49 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, Summary, p.1. 
50 UN News Centre, “Head of UN probe into chemical weapons use in Syria says preparatory work has begun,” UN 
News, 27 March 2013, 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44507&Cr=syria&Cr1=chemical&Kw1=syria&Kw2=chemical&Kw3=i
nspections 
 

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were received regarding the use of chemical weapons, predominantly by government forces. On 
the evidence currently available, it was not possible to reach a finding about the chemical agents 
used, their delivery systems or the perpetrators.”51 At the time of this writing, the UN chemical 
weapons team was completing its report.  

The Syrian military opposition includes an assortment of diverse groups, some under the nominal 
control of the Supreme Military Council, others more focused on community defense.52 In 
addition, some 5-10,000 foreign jihadists are estimated to be fighting in Syria.53 Further, the rise 
of radical extremist groups and their consolidating hold on rebel-held territories has proven a 
destabilizing factor for local populations, prompting many to leave their homes. In the last year, 
jihadi groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), 
affiliated with al-Qaeda, have established a number of local shariah courts and hard-line 
governance structures in their effort to administer “liberated” areas, such as Raqqa, and gradually 
lay the foundations for the creation of an Islamic state of Syria (or caliphate in some cases).54 
This forced imposition of shariah law, including the frequent cases of persecution and, in some 
cases killings by takfiri55 groups has prompted many moderate Syrians, and minorities in 
particular, to move away from the rule of al-Qaeda. A recent example of this phenomenon has 
been the large wave of Kurdish refugees flowing into Iraq from north-western Syria, some of 
whom were fleeing the latest attacks by ISIS on Kurdish-majority villages and towns during the 
summer of 2013.  

 

 

 

 

 

There are growing concerns about the increasing 

sectarian nature of the conflict; ethnic and sectarian 

conflicts tend to lead not only to large-scale but also 

protracted displacement. 

There are growing concerns about the increasing sectarian nature of the conflict; ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts tend to lead not only to large-scale but also protracted displacement. Syria is 
estimated to be 74 percent Sunni Muslim, 10-12 percent Alawi and 10 percent Christian, with 
smaller numbers of Druze and other minorities.56 The Alawi-dominated Assad regime has been 
particularly adept at playing minorities against each other and getting the message across to 
minorities, especially Alawis and Christians, that “the current regime alone stands between them 
and a Sunni Arab successor that might choose among options ranging from explicit sectarian rule 

                                                
51 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, A/HRC/24/46, 16 August 2013, para. 170. 
52 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Breaking the Stalemate: The Military Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War and Options for 
Limited U.S. Intervention, Middle East Memo No. 30,” Brookings Institution, August 2013, 
www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/08/09-military-syria-civil-war-us-intervention-pollack 
53Foreign Policy, “Making Sense of the Syrian Rebels' Order of Battle,” Foreign Policy, 6 September 2012, 
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/06/making_sense_of_the_syrian_rebels_order_of_battle 
54 Valerie Szybala, “Al-Qaeda Shows its True Colors in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, 1 August 2013, 
www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-shows-its-true-colors-syria 
55 Muslims who accuse other Muslims of apostasy 
56 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook: Syria, updated as of 13 August 2013, 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html; on the Alawi community, see Michael S. Doran 
and Salman Shaikh, “The Ghosts of Hama,” in Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman et al., The Arab Awakening: 
America and the Transformation of the Middle East (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011), p. 232. 

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to the application of Islamic law to expulsion and slaughter.”57 The regime has used the 
‘sectarian card’ to instill fear in Alawis and other minorities and that their future lies with the 
regime.58 Back in November 2011, ICG wrote that as repression escalated, “many Syrians have 
shifted from blaming elements of the regime, to blaming the regime as a whole and finally, to 
blaming the Alawi community itself.”59 The sectarian tensions have become starker and more 
violent over the past two years.   

In addition to repression and destruction carried out by the regime, violence at the hands of 
opposition armed groups, and prospects for even greater sectarian conflict, Syrians are also 
subject to growing criminal violence such as kidnappings and banditry. Moreover, the war has 
led to the breakdown of the economy and public services, which has made life unbearable for 
many Syrians and has led many to leave their communities and the country. 

Into this volatile situation, the evidence that chemical weapons were used in the outskirts of 
Damascus and threat of a US strike led to an escalation of the number of Syrians fleeing the 
country. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antònio Guterres warned at the end of August 
that Syria could be “on the verge of the abyss,” anticipating a likely increase in the nearly 2 
million refugees who have already fled the country's civil war.60 According to Lebanese 
immigration officials, roughly 10,000 Syrians have been crossing the border into Lebanon every 
day since the alleged gas attack on 21 August 2013, while thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, 
are stranded at the border with Jordan, unable to leave the country or return to their homes.61 
Given the likelihood of military escalation, especially in and around Damascus, and the unlikely 
achievement of a political solution any time soon, the humanitarian crisis in Syria is only set to 
deteriorate.  

The escalation of the conflict over the past two and a half years has led to a humanitarian crisis 
of mammoth proportions. The displacement crisis has reflected changes on the battlefield and 
created a dynamic, fluid situation which has complicated the efforts of humanitarian actors. As 
rebel forces seized control of towns in parts of the country and as front-lines shifted, sometimes 
on a daily or hourly basis, the challenge of accessing people in need of assistance became more 
difficult.     

 

                                                
57 Frederic Hof, “Syria 2013:  Will the Poison Pill of Sectarianism Work?” Atlantic Council, 3 January 2013, 
www.acus.org/viewpoint/syria-2013-will-poison-pill-sectarianism-work  
58 Ibid. 
59 ICG, Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, Middle East Briefing No. 31, 24 Nov 2011, p. 2, 
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/B031-uncharted-waters-
thinking-through-syrias-dynamics.aspx 
60 Adam Schreck, “UN: Syria Refugee Crisis 'On The Verge Of The Abyss' As Nearly 2 Million Have Already Fled 
Country,” Associated Press  in The Huffington Post, 27 August 2013, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/27/un-
syria-refugee-crisis_n_3825417.html 
61Aryn Baker, “The U.S. Weighs Syria Strikes: How Military Action Could Make Things Worse,” TIME, 29 August 
2013, http://world.time.com/2013/08/29/the-u-s-weighs-syria-strikes-how-military-action-could-make-things-worse/  
 Taylor Luck, “Thousands of Syrians who fled chemical attack remain stranded along border with Jordan,” 
Washington Post, 29 August 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/as-syrian-attack-survivors-mass-
along-jordan-border-area-residents-cite-humanitarian-crisis/2013/08/29/8a8d7530-10f2-11e3-b4cb-
fd7ce041d814_story.htm. Note that a recent article in the Telegraph cites 40,000 Syrians waiting at the border. 
David Blair and Holly Watt, “Tens of thousands of Syrian refugees stranded on Jordanian border,” The Telegraph, 
03 September 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10284503/Tens-of-thousands-of-
Syrian-refugees-stranded-on-Jordanian-border.html 

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T H E   H U M A N I T A R I A N   S I T U A T I O N  
I N S I D E   S Y R I A  

The figures change constantly, but as of 1 
September there were an estimated 4.2-5.1 million 
internally displaced persons and 2 million refugees. 
This means that more than 1 in 3 Syrians have been 
displaced while the number of Syrians who are 
considered to be in need of humanitarian assistance 
is far higher.  Given the difficulties in accessing 
many parts of the country, assessments of 
humanitarian need are incomplete. The Second 
Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria II (J-
RANS II) needs assessment in May 2013, for 
example, indicated that some 91 percent of the 
assessed population in the 7 northern 
governorates in Syria was at risk. When combined with the Aleppo assessment in March 2013, 
the estimated number of people at risk in these areas was 13 million.62 

The Talae'e IDP camp hosts in Hassakeh hosts 140 
families (800 individuals) who came from Deir Ezzor 4-5 
months ago. (UNHCR / B. Diab / November 2012) 

Often overlooked in discussions of displacement and humanitarian need in Syria is the plight of 
the foreigners who were living in Syria at the time the crisis erupted. The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that 120-150,000 migrant workers, of which 15,000 
would need evacuation assistance, were working in Syria before the crisis and notes that even 
before the war, they were vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.63 On top of this number are 
undocumented or irregular migrants whose estimates were as high as 700,000.64 With the 
outbreak of the crisis, many of the foreigners have undoubtedly left the country, but only a 
handful – nearly 650 as of August 2013 – have done so with international assistance.65 

Other groups of people displaced and otherwise affected by the conflict include Palestine 
refugees and Iraqi refugees.66 In January 2011, there were some 500,000 Palestine refugees 
registered in Syria with UNRWA, about 30 percent of whom lived in camps.67 UNRWA 
estimated at the end of August 2013 that approximately 50 percent of registered Palestine 
refugees in Syria had been displaced either in the country or to neighboring countries.68 Of the 

                                                
62 Assessment Working for Northern Syria, Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria II—Final Report, 22 May 
2013 , p. 6, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/joint-rapid-assessment-northern-syria-ii-final-report 
63 IOM, EMERGENCY APPEAL: SYRIA CRISIS, JANUARY – JUNE 2013, p.3, 
www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM_Syria_Crisis_Response_Appeal_January-June_2013.pdf 
64 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 5. 
65 IOM, IOM Regional Response to the Syria Crisis, 9 August 2012, p. 1, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-
republic/iom-regional-response-syria-crisis-update-9-august-2012 
66 Under the operational definition employed by the UN Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 
which provides assistance, protection and advocacy for some 5 million registered Palestine refugees in the Middle 
East, “Palestine refugees” are people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 
1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. 
67 See UNRWA, “UNRWA in Figures,” www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=253 
68 According to UNRWA, approximately 235,000 refugees were displaced in Syria with over 200,000 in Damascus, 
around 6600 in Aleppo, 4500 in Latakia, 3050 in Hama, 6450 in Homs and 13,100 in Dera’a. 8,732 PR from Syria 
(PRS) have registered with UNRWA for assistance in Jordan. UNRWA tracks reports of PRS in Egypt, Turkey, 
Gaza and UNHCR reports up to 1000 fled to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. UNRWA, Syria crisis Situation 
Update, Iss. No. 58, 26 August 2013, www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1860 

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235,000 displaced within Syria, nearly all (200,000) were seeking refuge in Damascus.69 
UNRWA reports that every Palestine refugee camp in Syria has been affected by the conflict and 
that their civilian character and neutrality are no longer respected.70 The destruction of homes in 
Palestine refugee camps, the violence, the loss of livelihoods and the exhaustion of savings and 
assets have forced many to flee their communities. Most Palestine refugees have become 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and have been turned back by border officials when seeking 
protection in neighboring states. The Lebanese government began, on 6 August 2013, to bar 
Palestinians from entering the country from Syria, leaving over 200 stranded at the border.71 

Less information is available about Iraqi refugees. As of May 2011, there were an estimated 
127,000 registered Iraqi refugees in Syria, although the actual number could have been as high as 
1 - 1.5 million, given that most Iraqis in Syria were not registered with the authorities.72 Many of 
the Iraqi refugees in Syria have begun to return home because of the conflict. In July 2012, the 
rate of return for Iraqi refugees living Syria rose significantly following an increase in violence; 
over 20,000 returned within a nine day period alone.73  

 

S Y R I A N S   O N   T H E   M O V E :    
I N T E R N A L   D I S P L A C E M E N T  

There have been periods in Syria’s recent history when large-scale displacement has occurred -- 
most notably in Hama in 1982 when 250,000 residents were displaced (and more than 25,000 
killed) when the government put down protests by the Muslim brotherhood74 and since 2006, 
displacement caused by devastating drought. But, historically, rates of rural-urban migration 
have been relatively low in Syria. 

Since March 2011, internal displacement has been widespread. As in other conflicts, 
displacement occurs for a number of reasons. Indiscriminate attacks against civilians have led 
many to flee the dangers of being caught in the crossfire or being deliberately targeted by armed 
actors. Many refugees in neighboring countries report that they fled their homes because of 
attacks, bombardments or fear of being the target of military action. But there are also 
indications of targeted human rights violations and particularly fears about the growing sectarian 
nature of the conflict. The CoI found that fear of sexual violence has been a trigger for 
displacement, stating that “…fear of rape is a driving motivation for families fleeing the 
violence.”75 The Commission also found that government forces systematically displaced people, 
including from sites where IDPs had sought refuge such as in Deir Atiyah in April 2013. The CoI 
concluded that these instances of forced displacement, together with indiscriminate 

                                                
69 UNRWA, Syria crisis Situation Update, iss. No. 58, 26 August 2013. 
70 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, A/67/ Slot no.31125, draft version, para. 55, on file with the authors.   
71 Human Rights Watch, “Lebanon: Palestinians Fleeing Syria Denied Entry,” 6 August 2013, 
www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/07/lebanon-palestinians-fleeing-syria-denied-entry  
72 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p 6. 
73 UNHCR, Iraqi Returnees and Syrian Refugees Enter Iraq, 9 August 2012, p.1, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Fact%2520sheet%2520on%2520Syrian%2520refugees-En.pdf  
74 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 9. 
75 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Advance Unedited Version, 4 June 2013, A/HRC/23/58, para 91. 

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bombardment of civilian locations, constituted a crime against humanity and a war crime.76 
There are also indications that displacement is being used as a tool of sectarian cleansing. As a 
November 2011 ICG report stated, “…communal instincts and, in certain instances, genuine 
threats, are inducing citizens to resettle in like-minded areas, producing a worrying pattern of 
sectarian segregation.”77 As in Bosnia and Iraq, displacement can not only be an unintended 
byproduct of conflict, but also a deliberate strategy. 

 

People are displaced not only because of direct attacks and other forms of violence, but also 
because they can no longer survive in their communities due to the effects of armed conflict. 
When people lose their jobs and cannot access basic services, they move to areas where they are 
able to survive, often first within the country and then later across a border. It is difficult to over-
estimate the impact of the armed conflict on life in Syria. The regular assessments by UN 
agencies of conditions inside Syria provide a gloomy picture of the consequences of the war – 
particularly considering the data represent a partial view of the situation, given the constraints of 
collecting data in the midst of conflict. The destruction of utilities and essential infrastructure, 
the unraveling of basic public services such as waste disposal, electricity, fuel, education and 
medical care have disrupted the functioning of life on all levels. Violence, the devaluation of the 
Syrian currency, mounting unemployment, decreases in cereal and livestock production, 
disruption of food supply networks and rising food prices, have increased food insecurity in the 
country. Year-on-year inflation rose by 50 percent since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, 
with food prices climbing up to 300 percent or more, as reported in Al Hassakeh, Hama and 

                                                
76UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab 
Republic, 4 June 2013, paras 149-151. 
77 ICG, Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, 2011, p. 6, 
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/B031%
20Uncharted%20Waters%20-%20Thinking%20Through%20Syrias%20Dynamics.pdf  

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Aleppo, according to the World Food Programme (WFP).78 All of this has resulted in a 
deteriorating nutritional situation for children under 5 and other vulnerable groups, such as 
lactating women.79 International agencies have stepped up their assistance programs, but their 
efforts are hampered by the security situation on the ground. In July 2013, WFP reduced its 
rations in Syria due in part to inadequate resourcing and in August, was only able to provide food 
to 2.4 million people in the country – short of its goal of feeding three million people per month 
– as a result of the deteriorating security situation.80 By early September 2013, WFP was aiming 
to feed three million people inside Syria every month and up to 6.5 million Syrians by the end of 
the year, a figure which includes 4 million people inside Syria – on both sides of the front lines – 
and 2.5 million refugees in neighboring countries.81  

The country’s GDP has decreased by 40-60 percent since the crisis began and an estimated 50 
percent of the population have lost their jobs. Those who do still have jobs are often unable to 
get to work because of insecurity and the large number of checkpoints. The public sector – which 
employs 30 percent of the country’s workforce – has been less affected and these salaries are 
important to the economy as a whole. Because of disruptions in internet connectivity and damage 
to ATMs, banks are often unable to provide any services to their customers or salaries for 
workers paid through these banks.82   

Health care, once a strong sector in Syria, has seriously deteriorated as a result of the conflict and 
the resulting displacement. Health care personnel and health facilities have been targeted by 
parties to the conflict as “a tactic of war,” which in some areas has driven healthcare 
underground, in clandestine and makeshift locales.83 Many Syrian doctors and other medical 
personnel have fled the country, are internally displaced, have perished in the conflict, or have 
been arrested, imprisoned, tortured or killed by the regime as they are deemed ‘enemies of the 
regime’ for providing medical assistance to the injured.84 In Aleppo, the number of physicians 
has reportedly fallen from some 2,000 to an estimated 35-100 who were working at or near the 
                                                
78 WFP, “WFP Appeals For More Access To People In Need Inside Syria As Refugees Hit The Two Million Mark,” 
3 September 2013, www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-appeals-more-access-people-need-inside-syria-refugees-
hit-two-million-mark  
79 Save the Children, Childhood under Fire, 13 March 2013, pp. v, 14-15, 
www.savethechildren.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=8rKLIXMGIpI4E&b=8486803&ct=13020737  
80 WFP, WFP Syria Crisis Response: Situation Update Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt, 28 June-16 
July 2013, July 2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20Syria%20Crisis%20Situation%20Update%2016%20J
uly%202013.pdf  
81 WFP, “Syria Emergency,” www.wfp.org/crisis/syria; WFP, “WFP Appeals For More Access To People In Need 
Inside Syria As Refugees Hit The Two Million Mark,” 3 September 2013.  
82 Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP), Regional Analysis Syria: Part I – Syria, 31 July 2013, p. 17. 
83 Citation from UN Human Rights Council, Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
on the Syrian Arab Republic, 11 March 2013, para. 10, A/HRC/22/CRP.1, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/PeriodicUpdate11March2013_en.pdf. See also, UN 
General Assembly, UN Security Council, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 15 May 
2013, A/67/845–S/2013/245, para. 159; MSF, Syria Two Years On - The Failure of International Aid, March 2013; 
ICRC, “Syria: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement calls for the urgent protection of health 
care personnel and aid workers,” ICRC Statement, 25 March 2013, 
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/03-25-syria-rcrc-movement-statement.htm. 
84 Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) January - December 2013, 7 June 2013, p. 49, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/revised-syria-humanitarian-assistance-response-plan-sharp-january;  
MSF, Syria Two Years On: The Failure of International Aid , 6 March 2013.  

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front lines, and half of the 12 government hospitals had closed. By June 2013, at least 57 percent 
of public hospitals were considered affected and the majority of the country’s ambulances were 
no longer functioning.85 Local production of medicines has fallen by 90 percent and blood banks 
have been damaged or compromised.86 There are fears that the breakdown of the water supply 
system will result in increased health risks, a risk exacerbated by the low immunization coverage 
and the disruption of solid waste collection and disposal. In addition, there have been outbreaks 
of communicable diseases such as cutaneous leishmaniasis and typhoid fever.87 In some areas, 
births by caesarean section are 3-5 times higher than in normal conditions as women fear that 
they won’t be able to reach a hospital or clinic because of the roadblocks and conflict.88 Those 
with chronic diseases, such as diabetes and heart ailments, find it difficult to access needed 
medicines and care.89 

Water availability per capita in Syria has decreased by one-third of the levels before the conflict. 
Most of the country’s public water systems are either not functional or subject to significant 
service disruptions. Shortages of water treatment chemicals such as chlorine have increased 
levels of discharge of untreated waste water, contaminating ground and surface water and 
affecting the availability of drinking water. The government estimates that 35 percent of the 
country’s water treatment plants have been damaged.90 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Given both the direct and indirect effects of the 

conflict, millions of Syrians have left their 

communities in search of safety and survival and 

continue to move in search of security. 

Given both the direct and indirect effects of the conflict, millions of Syrians have left their 
communities in search of safety and survival and continue to move in search of security. 
Displacement in Syria, as elsewhere, is a dynamic process. People return to their homes to check 
on property and relatives, they go to stay with relatives in areas perceived as safer and then move 
on when either conditions deteriorate or when they perceive it is no longer safe. As a Jordanian 

                                                
85 Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and OCHA, Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 
January - December 2013, 7 June 2013, pp. 24, 49.  
86 Neil Macfarquhar and Hala Droubi, “In Syria’s Civil War, Doctors Find Themselves in Cross Hairs,” 23 March 
2013, The New York Times, www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/world/middleeast/aleppo-residents-battered-by-war-
struggle-to-survive.html?pagewanted=all; IRIN, “Syria: Healthcare system crumbling,” 11 December 2012, 
www.irinnews.org/report/97011/syria-healthcare-system-crumbling; On the difficulties in storing blood and in 
providing blood transfusions, see for example, MSF, Syria Two Years On - The Failure of International Aid so far, 6 
March 2013.   
87 Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, OCHA, Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 
January - December 2013, 7 June 2013, p. 50; MSF, Syria Two Years On - The Failure of International Aid so far, 
March 2013, p. 10.  
88 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 14. 
89 Ron Waldman, “Another Casualty of Syria's War: Its Medical System,”5 September 2013, 
www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/09/05/the-breakdown-of-syrias-medical-system-amid-civil-war 
90 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 3. 

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Foreign Ministry official stated, “Jordan is typically the fourth stop for Syrians; most of the 
refugees arriving have been previously displaced at least three times inside Syria.”91 

For those displaced within Syria, shelter is an immediate and serious concern. The overwhelming 
majority of IDPs (85 percent) stay with relatives or friends or rent accommodations in the 
communities where they arrive.92 But when resources run out, or when IDPs have no relatives or 
friends to stay with, they seek alternative accommodations. IDPs living in makeshift collective 
centers endure overcrowded conditions and lack access to clean water, electricity and waste 
management.93 A May 2013 Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria report concluded 
that IDPs in collective shelters were the group facing the biggest risks across all assessed 
sectors.94 However, given the lack of any systematic information about IDPs living dispersed in 
the community, it is hard to draw conclusions about groups that are particularly vulnerable. 

In comparison with refugees, those displaced within Syria are probably more vulnerable (as they 
are closer to the violence), less likely to be assessed and counted, less likely to be able to access 
international assistance, and perhaps more vulnerable than groups that have made it out of the 
country. Older people, for example, may be less able to travel. While people over 65 made up 
some 6 percent of Syria’s pre-war population, they account for only 1.6 percent of registered 
refugees.95   

IDPs face serious protection needs related to the ongoing conflict. Families have been separated, 
there is a heightened risk of sexual violence, and children experience trauma. Both IDP and 
refugee women report increased domestic violence and pressure to adopt negative coping 
methods such as early marriage and prostitution.96 IDPs living in makeshift camps near the 
Turkish border have been attacked.97 The proliferation of small arms and reported widespread 
presence of mines and unexploded ordinance pose a particular threat for children. In Syria, 
children have been used as human shields and recruited into armed forces in particular by armed 
opposition groups, while in Lebanon some have reportedly engaged in armed hostilities.98 There 
are concerns that IDPs may not have registered their newborns because of their displacement, 
disruption of the registration system and the fear that they would be identified as coming from 
the anti-government communities if they try to register in their place of displacement. IDPs also 
                                                
91 Interview with E. Ferris, 4 June 2013. 
92 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, A/67/ Slot no.31125, draft version, para. 31, on file with the authors; WHO, “WHO warns of increased 
risk of disease epidemics in Syria and in neighbouring countries as summer approaches,” 3 June 2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/who-warns-increased-risk-disease-epidemics-syria-and-neighboring. 
93 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, draft version, para. 31. 
94 Assessment Working Group for Northern Syria, Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria II: Final Report, 22 
May 2013, p. 7.  
95 As of September 2013; see the age break-down in refugee figures listed at UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee 
Response Regional Overview,” Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 2013, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
96 Global Protection Cluster, War in Syria: The hidden costs of gender-based violence, April 2013, pp 1-2, 
http://gbvaor.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/GBV-AoR-Advocacy-Note_Syria_July.pdf 
97 On 30 April 2013, artillery bombs reportedly hit a makeshift IDP camp near Bab Al-Hawa on the Turkish border, 
resulting in a least 50 persons wounded and five killed, UNDSS Information, 30 April 2013. See also: Khaled 
Yacoub Oweis, “Syrian air strike on Turkish border kills at least five,” Reuters, 30 April 2013, 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-syria-crisis-turkey-idUSBRE93T0QQ20130430 
98UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 15 
May 2013, A/67/845–S/2013/245, paras 77, 151-60. 

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face protection risks because of the loss of social networks which can protect people in conflict 
situations by providing trusted guidance on security issues.   

Many internally displaced children have no access to education due to the lack of security and 
financial resources. Parents may be reluctant to allow their children to travel to schools or lack 
funds for supplies or transport.99 Schools in Syria have been reportedly used, targeted and 
damaged by parties to the conflict.100 Over 20 percent of Syria’s 22,000 schools are no longer 
functioning because they are damaged or destroyed or are serving as shelters for IDPs.101 Many 
are occupied by parties to the conflict.102 The Second Joint Rapid Assessment in Northern Syria 
(J-RANS II) survey found that only 43 percent of schools in seven northern governorates were 
functional and being used for educational purposes.103 Anecdotal reports indicate that nearly half 
of all IDP children have dropped out of school and some children have already lost two years of 
schooling.104 

 

 

 

 

 

An increasing number of humanitarian workers and UN staff members 

have been killed, injured or kidnapped and attacks on goods and 

facilities including UN vehicles have multiplied.  

Provision of international humanitarian assistance to IDPs within Syria has been particularly 
difficult. The UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs 
have worked through local partnerships, particularly with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society 
and have established humanitarian hubs in Homs and Tartous. There have also been inter-agency 
cross-line convoys into areas which had previously been inaccessible. Security-related 
impediments to access include active fighting and military operations, closure of key access 
routes and formal and informal checkpoints. In addition, an increasing number of humanitarian 
workers and UN staff members have been killed, injured or kidnapped and attacks on goods and 
facilities including UN vehicles have multiplied.105 The World Food Programme was unable to 
access its warehouses in Damascus for a month due to fighting in the area.106 There are reports 
that many local humanitarian workers are unable to reach their offices and sometimes are trapped 

                                                
99 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, draft version, para. 40. 
100 UN General Assembly, UN Security Council, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 15 
May 2013, A/67/845–S/2013/245, paras 157-158. 
101 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, draft version, para. 40; Office of SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, Statement by Leila Zerrougui 
to the Security Council, 18 April 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/security-council-must-ensure-
end-violence-against-children-syria 
102 An estimated 2500 educational facilities have been damaged or destroyed while approximately 2000 schools are 
being used as shelters for IDPs, according to, Office of SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict, Statement by Leila 
Zerrougui to the Security Council, 18 April 2013.  
103 J-RANS II, May 2013, p. 13. 
104 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, 15 
July 2013, draft version, para. 40. 
105 See Valerie Amos, Security Council Briefing 18 April 2013, p. 3, 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6949.pdf  
106 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 6. 

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in them by explosions and gunfire.107 Diversion of aid by both opposition and government forces 
reportedly is a frequent occurrence. Twenty UNRWA vehicles, for example, had been stolen 
and, as of late July 2013, were unaccounted for.108 

Bureaucratic obstacles have also increased since January 2013. The government-approved list of 
NGOs has been reduced and approvals of international NGOs to operate in the country have 
been painstakingly slow. Aid workers also report visa restrictions for UN and INGO staff, 
restrictions on importing equipment and vehicles, excessive administrative procedures for 
humanitarian missions and special restrictions on the delivery of medical equipment and supplies 
to opposition-held areas.109 At the end of June 2013 in an effort to penalize cross-border 
operations, the Syrian government promulgated a new law which imposes a prison sentence and 
a fine of up to $50,000 for anyone entering the country illegally.110 

One of the tactics used in the war has been besiegement and areas under siege, such as Aleppo 
and Homs, have little or no access to aid. Indeed both the government of Syria and opposition 
groups have cut off movement to and from certain areas.111 In addition, humanitarian assistance 
is restricted by the limited availability of fuel, damaged infrastructure, and the lack of drivers and 
transportation companies willing to operate in certain areas of the country. The May 2013 report 
on needs assessment in northern Syria found that 79 percent of sub-districts reported problems 
with humanitarian access, both for humanitarian actors trying to deliver goods and affected 
populations trying to access relief. The report also found that governorates closest to the Turkish 
border receive more assistance than those further from the border.112 This suggests a common 
paradox in humanitarian assistance: those most in need of aid tend to be found in the areas most 
difficult for international organizations to access.  

Finally, the ability to provide assistance to those displaced within Syria is also limited by 
financial constraints. By mid-August 2013, the $1.41 billion requested for humanitarian 
assistance inside Syria under the SHARP was funded at only 48 percent.113 WFP announced that 
after cutting rations in Syria in July, there would be a complete halt to food distribution by mid-
August.114 Although food distribution was not completely cut, WFP was unable to reach its goal 
of three million people during the month of August, falling short by 600,000, due to lack of 
funding and security concerns.115   

 

 

                                                
107 Ibid., p. 7. 
108 Ibid.,, p. 7. 
109 See Valerie Amos, Briefing to Security Council, 16 July 2013, 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Security%20Council%20Briefing%20on%20Syria%2016Jul
2013.pdf  
110 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 6. 
111 Ibid.,p. 5. 
112 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, 30 May 2013 p. 6. 
113 Financial Tracking Service, “Syrian Arab Republic Civil Unrest, 2013 Humanitarian Funding : Actual,”  20 
August 2013, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0AusGu5uwbtt-
dEp0eHRzcWdVd2hBQmpBVWwxUHRjcUE&single=true&gid=0&output=html  
114 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, July 2013, p. 6. 
115 WFP, “WFP Appeals for More Access to People in Need Inside Syria as Refugees Hit the Two Million Mark,” 3 
September 2013, www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2013/07/wfp-fears-funding-shortfall-will-impede-delivery-
of-food-and-hope-in-syria/  

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The case of Kurdish displacement inside Syria 

The widespread internal displacement in Syria is affecting patterns of sectarian settlement in the 
country. When people are displaced, they tend to move to areas where their ethnic group or sect 
is in a majority (as was the case in Iraq and Bosnia). The case of the Syrian Kurds is particularly 
interesting in this regard as it demonstrates the relationship between displacement, ethnic and 
sectarian divisions, the military struggle and perhaps some of the future political consequences of 
displacement.   

Syria’s Kurdish population lives near the Turkish and Iraqi borders though there are also 
substantial Kurdish populations in Syria’s large cities. But, unlike Iraq, the territory of Kurdish 
settlement is not contiguous and does not have the mountains in which an armed insurgency 
against central rule can be organized. Over the years, the Syrian Kurds were partly coopted by 
the regime where their political activities – vis à vis Turkey – and their smuggling was tolerated 
by the Syrian government. However, they have also seethed under systematic discrimination and 
repression. Traditional Kurdish political parties feared reprisals if they actively joined the 
opposition even though many young Kurds did so. And the regime for the most part left the 
Kurds alone.116 The largest and most influential of the Syrian Kurdish political parties, the 
Democratic Union Party (Kurdish: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), was perceived as a Syrian-
Kurdish offshoot of the Turkish Kurdish group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  

With the present conflict and the ensuring displacement, the situation has changed as Kurds 
previously displaced from the region returned to Syria’s Kurdish regions in the north; as of 
October 2012, half of Syria’s Kurdish regions were controlled by local Kurdish leaders, 
including at border points with Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous region.117 By mid-2012 the PYD took 
advantage of the partial withdrawal of regime forces form Kurdish areas to firmly establish its 
political and security presence and openly asserted itself as the authority in charge of state 
institutions in most predominantly Kurdish towns. The only Kurdish political rival to the PYD is 
a coalition of Kurdish parties aligned with the KRG in Iraq. But Kurdish factions compete not 
only with each other but also with non-Kurdish opposition groups and most are alienated from 
the Islamist and Arab nationalist opposition groups ( in part because of the dependence of these 
groups on Turkey and Gulf-based conservative sponsors). Sectarian and ethnic tensions are 
building up as evidenced by clashes between the PYD fighters and the FSA.118 In recent months, 
clashes have occurred and escalated between Kurdish militia and JAN in Syria's northern 
provinces. There have been reports that Kurdish refugees arriving in northern Iraq in late August 
2013 were, in fact, being driven out by the PYD which has been increasingly engaged in fighting 
Nusra fighters. There are also indications that tribes in the area are also joining the fight against 
the PYD and reports of fighting between the FSA and JAN/ISIS in a number of areas. In the 
areas under opposition control, a ‘triangular’ conflict seems to be developing, with serious 
implications for displacement and humanitarian action. As discussed further below, the 
displacement of Syrian Kurds has particular implications for Turkey, which has significantly 
improved relations with the KRG in recent years and is trying to keep a peace process with the 
PKK alive against all odds.     

                                                
116 ICG, Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle, Middle East report no. 136, 2 January 2013, p. i, 
www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/syria/136-syrias-kurds-a-struggle-
within-a-struggle.aspx  
117 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 11.  
118 ICG, Syria’s Kurds: A Struggle within a Struggle, January 2013, p. ii. 

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The displacement of Kurds to their historical homeland and the establishment of Kurdish parties’ 
control of these areas offer the possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish homeland – an 
outcome obviously feared by the Turkish government which is concerned about the impact of 
such an outcome on its own Kurdish population.119 In the meantime, the Turkish government and 
the head of KRG, Masoud Barzani, appear to be concerned about the rise of PYD influence in 
Syria at the expense of other Kurdish groups including the Kurdish Democratic Party.  

Displacement inside Syria thus has direct implications for the future of Kurds in Syria and the 
region. Internal displacement inside Syria is also linked to the movement of refugees across all of 
Syria’s borders120 – a phenomenon that could also have long-range consequences for the region.  

 

 

                                                
119 Ibid., p. iii. 
120 The exception is Israel, which has kept its borders closed to Syrians. But even in Israel, there are reports of 
Syrians being allowed to enter the country for medical treatment; see Isabel Kershner, “Across Forbidden Border, 
Doctors in Israel Quietly Tend to Syria’s Wounded,” The New York Times, 5 August 2013, 
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/world/middleeast/across-forbidden-border-doctors-in-israel-quietly-tend-to-syrias-
wounded.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0  

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S Y R I A N S   O N   T H E   M O V E :   R E F U G E E S   I N  
N E I G H B O R I N G   C O U N T R I E S  

It is important to emphasize that current refugee 
flows in the region are superimposed on long-
standing patterns of migration. Syrians regularly 
went to Lebanon and Turkey to work, often in 
seasonal agricultural work or in construction. In 
Lebanon, for example, an estimated 300-500,000 
Syrians were working in the country at any given 
time.121 Often this migration was circular; men 
would work in Lebanon for a few months while 
their families remained at home. One of the 

difficulties with the new flow of refugees is 
the legal status of these seasonal migrants who 
are now not returning to Syria but rather are 
often now bringing their families to 
Lebanon.122 

Zahle Waffa, 6, fled Syria with her mother and sister.  Since 
her arrival in Lebanon five months ago, she has barely 
spoken, and she won't engage with the other children, her 
mother says (UNHCR/E.Dorfman / May 22, 2013) 

Since 2011 and particularly since 2012, the flow of refugees from Syria into neighboring 
countries has been both massive and rapid. In the space of 18 months, the number of refugees 
has increased from 40,000 in March 2012 to two million in September 2013. And this figure 
refers only to those who are registered or are known to be waiting to register.123 In addition to 
those who are in the registration process, there are also Syrians living in all of these countries 
who are not in the registration process –either because they were present beforehand as 
undocumented workers or because they have chosen not to identify themselves to authorities. 
The graph below presents the best documented estimates of the number of refugees although 
governments in the region assess the figures as much higher. In both Turkey and Lebanon, for 
example, government officials refer to half a million Syrians in each country outside the 
registration process in addition to the large number of Syrians in the official registration process. 
While these Syrians are considered ‘undocumented’ in the case of Lebanon, in Turkey many 
Syrians entered the country legally with their passports (as Turkey does not require a visa for 
Syrians) but some may have overstayed or not obtained residence permits. 

                                                
121 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 8. 
122 These Syrians would be considered ‘refugees sur place’ under international refugee law, but as Lebanon has not 
signed the Convention, the government has to date refused to recognize them as such.    
123 Given the pace of arrivals, UNHCR is not able to keep up with registering people who arrive in urban areas and 
so there is a backlog of refugees waiting to be formally registered. At times over the past year the backlog was 
several months and refugees were given appointments to return to the office and register then. 

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Table 1. Total Population and Estimated Numbers of Syrian Refugees, Sept. 2013 

Host country 

Total national 
population 
(millions) 

Number of 
registered 
refugees  

Persons awaiting 
registration 

 

Lebanon 

Turkey 

Egypt 

Jordan 

Iraq 

4.1 

80.7 

85.3 

6.5 

31.8 

636,000 

450,584 

99,712 

492,526 

est. 200,000 

103,823 

13,301 

17,758 

27,150 

24,734 

Source: Population data are estimates from US Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook, July 2013, www.cia.gov; 
Refugee data from UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, 12 September 2013, 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php  

The current influx of Syrian refugees comes on top of earlier influxes of Palestinian and Iraqi 
refugees, as shown in Table 2, below. Response to the current influx of Syrians is shaped, at least 
in Jordan and Lebanon, by those countries’ experiences with earlier Palestinian arrivals. In both 
Jordan and Lebanon, government officials are careful to emphasize that the presence of Syrians 
is a temporary phenomenon and have resisted any efforts or programs which would imply that 
the Syrians will be staying for more than a temporary sojourn. For example, both the Jordanian 
and Lebanese authorities have prohibited any programs on livelihoods or vocational training or, 
in the case of Lebanon, construction of permanent sites. 

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Table 2. Palestine and Iraqi refugees, 2013, by Host Country 

Country 

Iraq 

Syria 

Jordan 

Turkey 

Lebanon 

Egypt 

 

Number of Iraqi 
refugees (as of Dec. 
2012)124 

Number of Palestine 
refugees (as of Jan. 
2013)125 

Number of displaced 
Palestine refugees 
(as of March 2013)126 

----  

62,700  

63,000 

9,500 

6,500 

5,700 

11,740 

499,189 

2,034,641 

unknown 

441,543 

unknown 

unknown 

235,000 (Aug. 2013) 

4,794 

unknown 

33,500 

unknown 

More than 90 percent of the refugees fleeing Syria into neighboring countries identify 
themselves as Sunni Muslims with very few religious minorities registering with UNHCR. 
Particularly in Lebanon, there may be religious minorities, particularly Christians, who have 
entered the country but who choose not to register, perhaps because they fear negative 
repercussions from Sunni refugees of identifying with the regime. They also fear that if they 
return to Syria, the Syrian government will view them as disloyal for having sought safe haven in 
a neighboring country.127 In Turkey, a separate camp has been established for Turkmen refugees 
and in Jordan, UN officials make sure that Alawi refugees are not put in Za’atari refugee camp 
but settle in urban areas, often through sponsorship by local Jordanians. 

The Syrian refugees, particularly in the three countries with the highest numbers, all have an 
impact on political dynamics within their host countries. Except for Egypt, Israel and Yemen, 
none of the countries in the Middle East is a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. 
While Turkey has signed the Convention, it maintains the geographic exclusion which limits 
refugee status to Europeans but has formally extended temporary protection to Syrians since the 
end of 2011. While signatories to the Convention are obliged to allow those recognized as 
refugees to work and to access public services such as health care and education, the 

                                                
124 According to UNHCR, the numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria have dwindled due to insecurity in Syria; see 
UNHCR, UNHCR Global Report 2012 - Syrian Arab Republic, 1 June 2013, p. 1, www.unhcr.org/51b1d63cb.html. 
The refugee figure of some 63,000 Iraqis in Jordan is a Government estimate; some 27,800 are assisted by UNHCR, 
see: UNHCR, UNHCR Global Report 2012 - Jordan, 1 June 2013, p. 2, www.unhcr.org/51b1d63bd.html; UNHCR, 
UNHCR Global Report 2012 - Turkey, 1 June 2013, p. 3, www.unhcr.org/51b1d643b.html; UNHCR, UNHCR 
Global Report 2012 - Lebanon, 1 June 2013, p. 2, www.unhcr.org/51b1d63c0.html; UNHCR, UNHCR Global 
Report 2012 - Egypt, 1 June 2013, p. 2, www.unhcr.org/51b1d63816.html. 
125 Except for Iraq figures, data reflects those Palestine refugees registered with United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA); see UNWRA, UNRWA in Figures, January 2013, 
www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2013042435340.pdf. Iraq figures are UNHCR estimates for January 2013; see UNHCR, 
“UNHCR 2013 planning figures for Iraq,” 2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Iraq, 
www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html.  
126 UNRWA, Regional Analysis Syria, 28 March 2013, p. 3, 
www.mapaction.org/component/mapcat/download/2929.html?fmt=pdf  
127 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), Factsheet Syria, July 2013, p. 2, 
www.uscirf.gov/images/Syria%20Factsheet%20-%20July%2018.pdf 

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governments hosting the Syrians have extended limited rights to the refugees, as spelled out in 
the table below. 
Table 3. Official Entry and Employment Requirements for Syrians128  

Country 

Lebanon  

 

Jordan  

 

Entry  

Employment 

Work permit required for all 
Syrians. Most who work do so 
illegally.   

 

Work permit required, but not 
granted in practice, to Syrians.  

160,000 Syrians are working 
illegally in Jordan, mostly in 
informal jobs and subject to 
exploitation and exposure to 
hazards.  

 

Has maintained open borders 
during the conflict.  

 

In early August 2013, Lebanese 
authorities began requiring 
Syrians to provide valid 
identification and explain their 
reason for arrival. Syrians with 
damaged identity documents are 
no longer allowed to enter 
Lebanon.129 

Jordanian authorities have 
reportedly blocked for days or 
weeks the entry of Syrians130.  

 

By 20 August 2013, Jordanian 
authorities were denying entry to 
Syrians with valid identity 
documents, stamping them with 
“return in one month.”131  

 

By early September 2013, 
thousands of Syrians were 
reportedly stranded on the Syrian 
side of the border, unable to cross 
into Jordan.  

                                                
128 For further details about border closures, see: Human Rights Watch, “Iraq/Jordan/Turkey: Syrians Blocked from 
Fleeing War,” 1 July 2013, www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/01/iraqjordanturkey-syrians-blocked-fleeing-war; Human 
Rights Watch, “Iraq/Turkey: Open Borders to All Syrian Refugees,” 12 December 2012, 
www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/14/iraqturkey-open-borders-all-syrian-refugees-0. For further information on access to 
employment, see: SNAP, Legal status of individuals fleeing Syria, June 2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/legal_status_of_individuals_fleeing_syria.pdf.  
129 The Daily Star, “UNHCR says helping 677,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon,” 10 August 2013, 
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Aug-10/226876-unhcr-says-helping-677000-syrian-refugees-in-
lebanon.ashx#ixzz2cjdkjcWD  
130 For reports on the closing of the Jordanian border to Syrian refugees, see: David Blair and Holly Watt, “Tens of 
thousands of Syrian refugees stranded on Jordanian border,” 3 September 2013, The Telegraph, 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10284503/Tens-of-thousands-of-Syrian-refugees-stranded-
on-Jordanian-border.html. 
131 The Daily Star, “Jordan urged not to deny entry to Syria refugees,” August 20 2013, 
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2013/Aug-20/227986-jordan-urged-not-to-deny-entry-to-syria-
refugees.ashx#ixzz2cjaDtiRU  

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Turkey  

 

Work permit required but 
difficult to obtain. Many who 
work do so illegally.  

 

Officially has an open-door 
policy for Syrians; Syrians with 
passports can cross the border 
freely without an entry visa. 
However, there are reports that in 
practice the government has 
limited the number of Syrians 
crossing the border in an effort to 
manage the influx. Official 
crossings controlled by the 
Syrian Kurdish Forces have 
either been closed or subject to 
strict controls. 

Iraq and KRG 

 

Iraqi and KRG authorities have 
either closed border crossings 
entirely or allowed only limited 
numbers of Syrians to cross.  

In the KRG, those with residency 
permits can work legally. 
Elsewhere, those in camps cannot 
work.  

 

 

According to aid agencies on 20 
August 2013, the KRG had set a 
daily quota of 3,000 refugees to 
cope with a sudden influx of 
35,000 Syrian refugees.132 

Under President Morsi, Syrians 
were allowed to enter the country 
without any visa requirements. 
Shortly after Morsi's ouster, 
however, authorities began 
requiring Syrians to obtain paid 
visas and prior security 
clearance. In July 2013, 
authorities stated that the visa 
fees would be waived. 

 

By late July 2013, Egyptian 
authorities were reportedly 
arbitrarily detaining Syrians and 
threatening to deport them.133 

Work permit required but 
difficult to obtain, as employer 
must prove that no Egyptian 
national is available to do the 
work.  

 

Egypt  

 

 

 

                                                
132 Murad Talaat, “Syrian Kurds' flight drags Iraq deeper into neighbor's war,” Reuters, 20 August 2013,  
www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/20/us-syria-crisis-iraq-idUSBRE97J0OY20130820  
133 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Arrests of Syrians Raise Deportation Fears,” 25 July 2013, 
www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/25/egypt-arrests-syrians-raise-deportation-fears  

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R E F U G E E S   I N   T H E   R E G I O N  

Throughout the region, the large-scale and 
rapid influx of refugees has challenged 
governments to provide needed services to 
the refugees and to local communities 
which have been impacted by the influx. 
While all host governments face financial 
pressures and all are concerned about the 
impact of the refugees on national security, 
they have adopted different policies. 
Turkey has built camps where about half of 
the Syrian refugees live. Jordan has one 
large camp, Za’atari, housing over 100,000 
refugees (with several hundred refugees 
living in two smaller camps) while most of the 
refugees live dispersed within broader urban 
communities. Lebanon has resisted establishing camps and the refugees live dispersed 
throughout the country in various housing alternatives.  

A young mother crosses the border from Syria into Jordan 
and becomes a refugee. In her arms she carries her one 
month old son Hamid. (UNHCR / S. Rich / April 2013) 

Jordan: Hospitality under pressure 

Jordanians and US leaders fear that Jordan’s stability will be threatened by the Syrian conflict. 
King Abdullah has long walked a political tightrope at home as well as within the region. As a 
result of increased domestic pressures from the Arab Spring, Jordan had embarked on a number 
of economic and political reforms. But these reforms were seen differently by the wide range of 
political actors in Jordan.  

There are also economic challenges that threaten the country. Late last year, Jordan sought an 
emergency International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan of $2 billion to deal with a desperate cash 
flow crisis but one of the conditions was the elimination of fuel subsidies responsible for much 
of the budget deficit. Cutting these subsidies led to a 50 percent rise in fuel prices and 
widespread protests, which brought into sharp relief the challenges facing the Kingdom.134 Given 
the economic costs of hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees, humanitarian workers in the 
region question the timing of the conditions imposed by this loan.135 

In this context, the Syrian conflict is seen as posing serious threats to the stability of the 
Jordanian government and the region. It is important to recognize that distances between Syria, 
Jordan and Lebanon are very short. Damascus is less than 200 kilometers from Amman and the 
fighting in Dara’a is just across the Jordanian border. The sounds of the shelling in Syria can be 
heard from Jordanian border towns. The conflict in Syria is affecting Jordan’s stability and 
security in a number of ways, most immediately in the dramatic and massive influx of refugees 
and the growing importance of the Jordanian-Syrian border in terms of the movement of 
weapons and fighters, including jihadists, into Syria.   

                                                
134 Tony Karon, “Jordan is living Dangerously as Syria Burns,” Time, 16 January 2013, 
http://world.time.com/2013/01/16/jordan-is-living-dangerously-as-syria-burns/  
135 E. Ferris, interviews with humanitarian officials in Jordan, June 2013. 

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In November 2011, King Abdullah called on Assad to step down but since then concerns have 
grown over the potential implications for Jordan of a rebel victory. The Jordanian security forces 
have been working overtime to ensure that Syrian Islamists, including the terrorist-designated 
Jabhat al-Nusra,(JAN) are no longer using Jordan as a rear guard for staging support for the 
rebellion in the south. In particular, they have sought to halt foreign fighters, including jihadists, 
from crossing the Jordan-Syria border to support the rebels.136 There are concerns about the 
impact of the return of these battle-hardened Islamists to Jordan and the threat they may pose to 
the regime.137 

Jordan has also stepped up its diplomatic efforts, with bilateral talks with Iran, Russia, Turkey, 
the United States and the European Union and has been particularly active with the UN and other 
multilateral organizations. It has brought the issue of Syrian refugees and their impact on Jordan 
to the UN Security Council in an attempt to raise awareness of the significant costs the refugees 
pose and to enhance burden-sharing.   

Jordan’s policy toward the Syrian refugees has been shaped by its long tradition of welcoming 
Palestinian refugees. Indeed this tradition of hospitality has led the Jordanian government to 
accept numbers of refugees far beyond what any western government would contemplate. Jordan 
was also a primary destination of Iraqis fleeing the violence in their country – although estimates 
of the number of Iraqis have long been a source of contention (32,000 were registered by 
UNHCR, though governmental estimates ranged as high as 450,000.)138 These experiences have 
shaped Jordanian policies toward Syrian refugees arriving on its territory. 

Syrian refugees began crossing into Jordan in significant numbers in the first half of 2012. Like 
refugees throughout the region, they initially moved in with family members or friends or rented 
accommodations in the towns and cities. But as the number of arrivals began to increase 
dramatically, in July 2012, the Jordanian government established the Za’atari refugee camp 
which by October 2012 housed 20,000 refugees. As of September 2013, the camp’s population 
stood at over 122,000 139 and construction had begun to open another camp, at Ashraq (slated for 
September 2013), as numbers continue to increase. 

Jordan, not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, has nonetheless allowed the vast 
majority of Syrians arriving at its border to enter, with the notable exceptions of Palestine 
refugees, single young men traveling on their own, and others deemed to be a security risk. 
Arriving Syrians are considered to be asylum-seekers, rather than formally recognized as 
refugees. When Syrians arrive at the border, they are transported to Za’atari refugee camp where 
they are registered by UN officials and given accommodation. Refugees can legally move out of 
the camp if they are sponsored – or ‘bailed out’ – by a Jordanian citizen, which involves both a 
statement of responsibility on the part of the sponsor and a financial guarantee. But in fact, the 

                                                
136 See: Nicolas Pelham, “Jordan’s Syria Problem,” The New York Review of Books, 10 January 2013, 
www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/jan/10/jordans-syria-
problem/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+nybooks+%28The+New+York
+Review+of+Books%29; Tony Karon, “Jordan is Living Dangerously as Syria Burns,” Time, 16 January 2013.  
137 Tony Karon, “Jordan is Living Dangerously as Syria Burns,” Time, 16 January 2013. 
138 IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 14. 
139 2012 figures from: IOM, Syria Crisis: A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p. 14; 2013 
figures from UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter agency Information, “Jordan: Mafraq Governorate: 
Za’atari refugee camp,” 2 September 2013,  
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=176&country=107&region=77 

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borders between the camp and the community are porous and there is constant movement in and 
out of the camp. By late 2012, some 4,000 Syrians were crossing into Jordan every day, leading 
to pressures to restrict entry. By mid-2013 the number of daily arrivals had fallen dramatically.   
Living conditions in the camp are mixed.140 The refugees are generally safe and have access to 
food and medical care (and to a much lesser extent, to education). The entrepreneurial spirit is 
alive and well in Za’atari as evidenced by the abundance of shops, cafes and cell phone stores. 
But it has been difficult for the international agencies to set up systems to control what goes on 
in Za’atari and several donors have set up their own sub-sections of the camp, in which “lucky” 
refugees are housed in containers in lieu of tents. This has created some resentment as refugees 
perceive a bias in deciding who gets to live in a tent or a container (known as caravans in the 
camp.) It is no secret that the Free Syrian Army uses Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan for 
recruitment, medical care and R&R for its soldiers.141 Nor is it a secret that criminal gangs 
exercise powerful influence over the camp’s economic life142 and that camp residents sometimes 
threaten staff. A recent report noted that even the Jordanian teachers don’t feel safe in Za’atari 
classrooms.143 Za’atari has become a ‘mini-Syria.’ Money that is earned in the camp is re-
injected into Syria to fund the rebellion and there is an unspoken alliance between many of the 
refugees in Za’atari and the FSA fighters.   

As of June 2013, there were 60,000 children in 
the camp, half of whom are of school-age, but 
less than 25 percent were attending school.144 
This reflects the lack of educational opportunities 
in the camp, but also raises concerns about the 
increased vulnerability of children for 
recruitment into the armed opposition groups. 
While security remains a major concern in 
Za’atari, recent reports indicate that the situation 
may be improving as a result of efforts to 
establish defined administrative zones within the 
camp and the increased presence of Jordanian 
security forces. 

Children play outside their tent in Za’atari refugee camp 
in Jordan (UNHCR / M. Abu Asaker / October 9, 2012) 

While much international attention has focused on Syrian refugees in the Za’atari camp, the vast 
majority of Syrian refugees in Jordan continue to live dispersed in communities. As their savings 
run out, they face increasing problems in paying rent and consequently face eviction. Moreover, 
the large numbers of Syrians living in Jordanian communities are triggering a backlash against 
the government’s policies, and the refugees themselves. In parts of northern Jordan, Syrian 

                                                
140 Matthew Hall, “The Syrian Crisis in Jordan,” Middle East Research and Information Project, 24 June 2013, 
www.merip.org/mero/mero062413?ip_login_no_cache=90e237cff14bc92b3879ce43867264e4 
141 Given difficulties facing young men traveling alone to cross into Jordan, refugee families are reportedly traveling 
back to Syria to accompany their young male family members. E. Ferris, interview, Za’atari refugee camp, June 
2013. 
142 Alia Allana, “Desert Refuge,” Fountain Ink, June 4 2013, http://fountainink.in/?p=3600  
143 The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Regional Analysis Syria: Part II – Host countries, 26 June 2013, 
www.acaps.org/img/documents/r-regional-analysis-for-syria---part-ii-host-countries-june-2013.pdf  
144 Allia Allana, “Desert Refuge,” Fountain Ink, 4 June 2013, http://fountainink.in/?p=3600 

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refugees make up more than half of the local population.145 Popular resentment against the 
Syrian refugees is growing as Jordanians blame the Syrians for shortages of goods, rising prices, 
increasing rental costs, and increasing unemployment.146 There are particular concerns about 
shortages of water which has long been an issue in the country. While it is important to note that 
some Jordanians have profited immensely from the presence of the refugees (and the aid workers 
who have poured into Amman), many working-class Jordanians feel threatened by the presence 
of the refugees – which has political consequences as well. 

In terms of the impact of the refugees on domestic political life in Jordan, the tribal Bedouin 
support base for the Hashemite kingdom has already long been threatened by the Palestinian 
refugee population that now constitutes a majority of Jordan’s citizens. The arrival of large 
numbers of Syrian refugees raises concerns that Bedouin interests will become an even smaller 
minority in the future. 147 

By mid-2013, the number of Syrian arrivals in Jordan had decreased considerably with no clear 
explanation as to the reasons for the decline. The Jordanian government maintained that arrivals 
had declined because of developments on the Syrian side of the border. The Syrian government, 
the argument goes, controls areas closest to Jordanian border and both their restrictions and the 
increased fighting in the region is the main reason that fewer people are seeking to cross into 
Jordan. Other observers maintain that the Jordanian government is becoming much more 
selective about allowing people to enter and there are reports that many Syrians are waiting on 
the Syrian side of the Jordanian border to cross into Jordan, living in homes abandoned by other 
refugees.148  

Like the situation of internally displaced Syrians, the situation of Syrian refugees in Jordan is not 
static. People are moving constantly, from the camp to the towns, sometimes returning to the 
camp when they cannot pay rent. And thousands of Syrian refugees have returned to Syria – 
some to fight, some to check their homes, some because they’ve heard it is now safer. To date, 
the Jordanian government has not sent refugees back to Syria. 

While the Jordanian government’s hospitality to the sudden arrival of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees is admirable,149 if borders are to remain open, continued international support will be 
necessary. 

Lebanon: On the frontline 

While all countries in the region have been affected by the influx of refugees, no country has 
been more impacted than Lebanon. This is partly due to the sheer scale of arrivals – over 
720,000 at the time of this writing—in addition to perhaps 500,000 Syrian migrants working in 
the country at the time of the crisis. Lebanese officials refer to the present number of Syrians as 

                                                
145 Marc Pierini, “Helping Jordan Weather the Syrian Storm,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 May 
2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/27/helping-jordan-weather-syrian-storm/g6p3  
146 Rana Sweis, “Resentment Grows Against Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” The New York Times, 9 May 2013,  
 www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/world/middleeast/09iht-m09-jordan-syria.html?pagewanted=all 
147 Tony Karon, “Jordan is Living Dangerously as Syria Burns,” Time, 16 January 2013, 
http://world.time.com/2013/01/16/jordan-is-living-dangerously-as-syria-burns/ 
148 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria, 26 June 2013, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/r-regional-
analysis-for-syria---crisis-overview-june-2013.pdf 
149 Megan Bradley, “Hospitality in Crisis: Reflections on Jordan’s Role in Responding to Syrian Displacement,” 27 
August 2013, Brookings Up Front Blog, www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/08/27-syrian-refugees-
jordan-bradley  

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1-1.2 million. The country is expected to host 1 million Syrian refugees by the end of the year. 
Lebanon, a country with a population of 4 million people, has also hosted Palestine refugees for 
decades. In addition, some 30,000 Lebanese have returned from Syria and reportedly face 
difficulties finding jobs, housing and social support. There were 442,000 Palestine refugees in 
Lebanon in January 2013 and approximately 45,000 Palestine Refugees from Syria were in 
Lebanon by early September, most of whom are living in Palestine refugee camps.150 A United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 
assessment found that 73 percent of the newly arrived Palestine refugees reported that they were 
fleeing armed conflict in Syria and 24 percent the destruction of their homes.151   

 

 

 

 

 

 

Lebanon, which has a population of 4 million, is expected to host one 

million Syrian refugees by the end of the year and has also hosted 

Palestine refugees for decades. 

When the Arab Spring broke out, the Lebanese government declared a policy of ‘dissociation’ – 
trying to keep the country out of the conflicts swirling around it. But the presence of the refugees 
is drawing Lebanon into the conflict and the conflict is playing out on Lebanese streets in 
Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut.152 

The Lebanese government is in a particularly weak position. Parliamentary elections were 
supposed to take place in mid-June 2013 but on 31 May the parliament voted to extend its own 
mandate for 17 months after rival political parties failed to reach agreement on a new electoral 
law – a condition of holding elections. Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salaam has been 
struggling to put together a new government and is reluctant to take decisions without a clear 
consensus among the parties – and in the absence of such a consensus, there is no clear policy. 
Political parties in Lebanon include those allied with the Syrian government (e.g. Hezbollah) as 
well as those allied with the opposition. The General Security Office in Lebanon which is 
responsible for border management has historically had close ties with the Syrian government. 

Lebanon and Syria have a long and tortured history. On the one hand, there are many close 
family relationships and even before the crisis 15 percent of Syria’s workforce was in Lebanon. 
But Syria largely occupied Lebanon for decades until forced to leave in 2006, following the 
assassination of President Hariri, protests by over a million Lebanese (out of a population of 4 
million) and the concerted action of the US and France. The increasing involvement of 
Hezbollah – a major political party in Lebanon and US-designated terrorist organization – in 
Syria is a major concern. 

                                                
150 UNRWA, UNRWA in Figures, 1 January 2013, www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/2013042435340.pdf; 
UNRWA, Syria crisis situation update, issue 59, 6 September 2013, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-
republic/syria-crisis-situation-update-issue-59-6-september-2013  
151 SNAP, Regional Analysis Syria: Part II – Host Countries, 26 June 2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/a-annex---information-products-overview-june-2013.pdf 
152 Loveday Morris and Suzan Haidamous, “Beirut car bomb kills at least 21,”The Washington Post, 15 August 2013 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-15/world/41412483_1_car-bomb-hezbollah-blast-site 

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Hezbollah has offered the Assad regime all-out support. For its Shi’a rank-and-file, there are 
fears that if Sunnis dominate a new Syrian regime, they will be caught between it and Lebanon’s 
own Sunni community. And here the international dimension comes in as well. In the US, Israel 
and Saudi Arabia, toppling Assad is seen as a critical step toward crippling Hezbollah and 
isolating Iran.153 The more Hezbollah “and Tehran perceive the Syrian crisis as an existential 
struggle designed to deal them a decisive blow, the greater the risk that they would choose to go 
for broke.”154 If and when the Syrian regime collapses, it could reignite a bloody domestic 
conflict. Lebanese Sunnis have been supporting the Syrian opposition. But even if Assad is 
overthrown, the Lebanese Shi’as would remain by far the most powerful Lebanese actor with 
strong popular support among Shi’as and Christians.155 

The border remains open though arriving refugees report difficulties with security checks, bribes 
and landmines on the Syrian side of the border. 89 percent of registered Syrian refugees cross 
into Lebanon through official border entry posts and are given a six month residency permit 
(including the right to work) which is renewable for another six months. The refugees then must 
pay a fee of LBP 300,000 ($200) per person for renewal – a fee which is prohibitive for many. 
For those who cross into Lebanon through non-official channels, the process of regularization 
has proven difficult. For non-Syrian refugees, there is still a high risk of detention and 
deportation and UNHCR continues to work to resettle them. At the same time the Syrian 
government has been very reluctant to permit resettlement of Syrians – it is hard to get exit 
permits from the General Security Office for Syrians accepted for resettlement – reportedly 
because of close ties between the Syrian government and the General Security Office.   

The Lebanese government has openly declared that its border will remain open and assured that 
Syrians will not be returned, but there is no legal framework for receiving refugees in Lebanon. 
The government has not ratified the 1951 Convention on refugees and its agreement with 
UNHCR consists of an MOU which dates back to 2003 – a time when the number of refugees 
entering the country was a fraction of the present number. Before the crisis, Lebanon was not a 
country of asylum. If UNHCR couldn’t resettle refugees to a third country, then those illegally in 
the country would be detained and deported. At the time those were the risks facing the 10,000 
or so, mostly Iraqi refugees. The Lebanese government has opposed the creation of refugee 
camps and opposes any policies or programs which might give rise to an impression that the 
refugees’ stay will be anything but temporary. 

The combined economic impact of the war in Syria on Lebanon, the presence of the refugees, 
and Lebanese political instability, is serious. Tourism has plummeted, investment is slowing, 
there is a fall-off in construction, hourly wages are falling, unemployment is increasing and 
crime rates are reportedly up by 30-40 percent over recent years.156 Trade has been seriously 

                                                
153 ICG, Uncharted Waters: Thinking through Syria’s Dynamics, no. 31, 24 November 2011, p. 4.  
154 Ibid., p. 5.  
155 Ibid., p. 5.  
156 The World Bank, Lebanon Economic Monitor: Growing Tensions In A Resilient Economy, Spring 2013, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/LEBANONEXTN/Resources/Mashreq_News_Spring2013.pdf?resourceurlname=
Mashreq_News_Spring2013.pdf; Elizabeth Ferris, “From Za’atari Refugee Camp in Jordan to Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley: Trip Report on Syrian Refugees,” 10 July 2013, www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/07/10-syria-
lebanon-jordan-ferris 

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affected as routes through Syria have been cut.157 In all such cases, there are both winners and 
losers; as in Jordan, some of the economic ‘winners’ are landlords. 

Refugees in Lebanon – as is the case for refugees throughout the region – are renting 
accommodations or living with friends and families. Tensions are rising as the refugees’ savings 
run out. Housing is a major issue for refugees in Lebanon. As other alternatives have dried up, 
they increasingly began to construct ‘informal tented settlements’ – a euphemism for makeshift 
tents or plastic/cardboard shacks – which are scattered around the country. As of mid-2013, there 
were over 1400 of these settlements, some consisting of only a few tents while others had 
hundreds of inhabitants. More settlements were sprouting up every day. Even in these informal 
settlements the refugees need to pay rent – and funds for rent are hard to come by. There are very 
few opportunities for employment and the Lebanese government has cracked down on Syrians 
opening small businesses because of competition with Lebanese nationals.158   

As in Jordan, educational opportunities for Syrian refugee children are limited. About 30,000 of 
an estimated 100,000 Syrian school-aged children were enrolled in Lebanese schools as of mid-
2013. While Syrian refugee children formally have access to education, the practical barriers to 
accessing education are many. For example, the physical capacity of existing schools is limited 
and many Syrian children are still on waiting lists. The language of instruction in Lebanon is 
English and French while in Syria it is Arabic. Transportation costs are high and some families 
are reluctant to send their daughters to mixed schools (in Syria, schools are segregated by 
gender). The fact that many, perhaps most, Syrian refugee children had already missed one or 
two years of schooling back in Syria coupled with the trauma experienced by many children pose 
additional difficulties for their continued education in exile. UNHCR reports that while 38 
percent of school-aged children are in primary school, just 2 percent of secondary-school aged 
children are attending school.159 

Health services are overstretched and in many places hospitals have reached capacity. While 
agreements have been worked out with primary health care centers to care for refugees, reports 
are that clinics suffer from shortages of essential medicines, reduced health care staff and limited 
hours. UNHCR support for secondary health care focuses on life-saving emergency care. 

A poll in late May 2013 found that 52 percent of Lebanese respondents believed that Syrian 
refugees pose a threat to national security and stability and more than 90 percent said that the 
Syrian conflict has had a negative impact on the Lebanese government’s capacity to protect 
Lebanese citizens and to govern. Two-thirds of those polled said the UN should open camps in 
Lebanon for Syrian refugees.160 

There have been increasing security incidents in Lebanon – rockets have been fired into 
Hezbollah areas, there is fighting in Tripoli and Sidon, the recent car bomb in South Beirut 

                                                
157 Ibid. 
158 See, Jeremy Loveless, “Crisis in Lebanon: camps for Syrian refugees?” Forced Migration Review, no. 43, May 
2013, p. 66-68, www.fmreview.org/en/fragilestates/loveless.pdf 
159 ACAPS, Regional Analysis Syria: Part II – Host countries, 26 June 2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/a-annex---information-products-overview-june-2013.pdf 
160 Fafo, Local response to Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Summary of Poll Findings, May 2013, 
www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/lebanon/91369-syrian-refugees.html  

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apparently directed at Hezbollah has triggered fears of a ‘dark era’ for Lebanon.161 Internal 
conflict in Lebanon has led to secondary and tertiary displacement of Syrian refugees. The 
refugees are engaging in more negative coping behavior, including activities such as child labor, 
early marriage, theft, smuggling and survival sex. Restrictions on entry of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan, Iraq and Turkey are expected to lead to more pressure on Lebanon.162 

But it is the fear of the spillover of violence that is causing major concern. The increased 
engagement of Hezbollah fighters in Syria is a concern while there are Salafist warnings of war 
within Lebanon if Hezbollah doesn’t disengage. The fact that most of the refugees are Sunni and 
that many are settling in the Hezbollah-controlled Bekaa valley raises fears of increased sectarian 
violence.163 The minority Christian community feels particularly threatened, especially as the 
already delicate ethnic and social balance of the country tilts further towards a Muslim-
dominated majority. 

Turkey: Refugees and politics 

The influx of large numbers of Syrians into Turkey raises a series of questions for Turkey about 
its relations with Syria and the broader region as well as about domestic ethnic-sectarian 
relations within the country. Furthermore, the crisis is also impacting on Turkey’s long-standing 
Kurdish problem. Lastly, the government is also facing growing challenges with respect to 
managing an ever expanding refugee population in and outside camps. 

Turkey and Syria have been closely linked historically. Indeed, the province of Hatay was 
originally part of French-mandated Syria and voted in a referendum in 1939 to join Turkey. For a 
long time Syria refused to recognize Hatay’s incorporation into Turkey and today there are still 
residual claims by Syria, especially in Baathist circles, of the province (known as Alexandretta 
by Syria.) During the Cold War, relations between the two countries were very tense as Turkey 
was aligned with the West and Syria with the Soviet Union. The border was heavily secured as 
well as mined. Relations were also aggravated by disputes over the sharing of the waters of the 
Euphrates River and Syrian support for the separatist Kurdish group the PKK. In October 1998 
this support for the PKK led to Turkey threatening to invade Syria. But after Damascus expelled 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey and Syria entered a process of reconciliation when the 
then-Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, attended the funeral of Hafiz Assad in June 2000. 
Relations warmed up dramatically after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to 
power in November 2002, encouraged by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish minister of foreign affairs, 
famous “zero problems with neighbors policy.”164 This policy encouraged greater economic 
integration between Turkey and the Middle East and introduced visa-free travel for the nationals 
of both countries. Turkey very quickly became a major trading and diplomatic partner of Syria, 
accompanied by the development of a close and intimate relationship between Turkish prime 
                                                
161 Loveday Morris and Suzan Haidamous, “Blast seen as omen of ‘dark era’ for Lebanon,” The Washington Post, 
16 August 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/beirut-blast-seen-as-omen-of-dark-era-for-
lebanon/2013/08/16/a5ddc3ee-06ac-11e3-bfc5-406b928603b2_story.html   
162 ACAPS, Regional Analysis Syria: Part II – Host countries, 26 June 2013.  
163 Antoine Ghattas Saab and Wassim Mroueh, “Militant cells planning more attacks,” The Daily Star, July 12 2013, 
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Jul-12/223392-militant-cells-planning-more-
attacks.ashx#axzz2djo2r6YA 
164 Ahmet Davutoglu, ‘Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy’,  Foreign Policy, 20 May 2010,  
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Zero Problems in a 
New Era,” Foreign Policy, 21 March 2013, 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/zero_problems_in_a_new_era_turkey 

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minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. At one point, this close 
relationship even permitted Erdoğan to initiate indirect mediation talks between Syria and Israel. 
However, the Syrian crisis has completely undermined this relationship. Instead, it appears that a 
very porous 911 kilometer-long border and the intensifying war in Syria are poised to continue to 
affect Turkey deeply. 

When the conflict broke out, Erdoğan pressed Assad on a number of occasions to reform. As the 
situation deteriorated, especially during Ramadan in the summer of 2011, he dispatched 
Davutoğlu to Damascus. But the mission failed and Turkey adopted a complete U-turn in its 
policy towards Syria.165  In September 2011 Erdoğan called unequivocally for Assad to go and 
recognized the Syrian National Council as the official representative of the Syrian opposition 
two months later. Both sides withdrew their diplomatic representations and the free trade 
agreement between the two sides was put on hold.166 In June 2012, a Turkish jet crashed in 
Syrian waters and Syria said it shot down the plane.167 There were also a number of occasions 
when artillery shells fell into Turkey and Turkish civilians were killed or injured by gun fire 
coming from the Syrian side. In January 2013, US and European missile batteries were stationed 
along the border in response to a Turkish request to NATO for support. In February, a car bomb 
at a border crossing and then another one in May in the city of Reyhanlı led to dozens of deaths 
and reminded Turks that the violence next door directly impacts their own security.168 

Since the break with the Syrian government in August 2011, Turkey has become deeply involved 
in the crisis in Syria. Politically, Turkey openly supports the opposition in Syria and is now 
aligned with conservative Sunni Muslim partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.169 Syrian 
rebels receive arms through Turkey as well as logistical support.170 There are also growing 
allegations that Turkey provides support for radical salafist groups such as JAN.171 This level of 
involvement in the Syrian crisis has deeply undermined Turkey’s “zero problems with 
neighbors” policy.172 In the Middle East, the cornerstone of this policy was Turkey’s ability to 

                                                
165  Nada Bakri,“Turkish Minster and Other Envoys Press Syrian Leader,” New York Times, August 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/world/middleeast/10syria.html?_r=0 
166 Erol Cebeci and Kadir Ustun, “The Syrian Quagmire: What is Holding Back Turkey?” Insight Turkey, Spring 
2012, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight-turkey_vol_14_no_2_2012_cebeci_ustun.pdf 
167 BBC, “Turkish f-4 Warplane ‘Shot Down’ Near Syrian Border,” 22 June 2012, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-18554246 
168 Matthew Weaver, “Turkey blames Syria over Reyhanli bombings,” The Guardian, May 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/12/turkey-blames-syria-reyhanli-bombings 
169 Sebnem Arsu and Tim Arango, “Turks Grant Recognition to Coalition of Syrians,” New York Times, 15 
November 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/turkey-recognizes-new-syrian-rebel-group-as-
legitimate-leader-of-syria.html; Muhittin Ataman, “Turkey and Saudi Arabia: Newly Discovered Partners?” Seta, 
no. 57, July 2012,  http://setav.org/en/turkey-and-saudi-arabia-newly-discovered-partners/policy-brief/1233 
170 Justin Vela, “The Syrian Supply Chain” Foreign Policy, 22 June 2013, 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/22/the_syrian_supply_chain_turkey_arms_rebels; Ernesto Londoño and 
Greg Miller, “U.S. weapons  reaching Syrian rebels,” The Washington Post, September 11 2013,  
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-begins-weapons-delivery-to-syrian-
rebels/2013/09/11/9fcf2ed8-1b0c-11e3-a628-7e6dde8f889d_story.html 
171 Soner Cagaptay and Aaron Zelin, “Turkey’s Jihadi Dilemma,” Global Public Square CNN, 5 August 2013, 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/05/turkeys-jihadi-dilemma/  
172 Piotr Zalewski, “How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ to Zero Friends,” Foreign Policy, 22 August 2013, 
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/21/how_turkey_foreign_policy_went_from_zero_problems_to_zero_frien
ds 

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improve its relations with neighboring countries and to talk to all parties involved in the region’s 
disputes.  

However, Turkey’s current alignment with the opposition movement in Syria has dramatically 
altered Turkey’s position and influence in the region. The government has faced growing 
criticism that its policy has put Turkey in conflict with Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah as well as with 
Russia. Furthermore, the government is also criticized for having moved Turkey’s position from 
one of an impartial soft power in the region enjoying considerable influence to a position of 
inflaming sectarian divisions and undermining Turkey’s interests, especially economic ones. As 
a result, many Turkish and international commentators have come to characterize this dramatic 
transformation in Turkish foreign policy since the worsening of the Syrian crisis as “zero 
neighbors without problems.”173 At home, only 33 percent of the population supports the 
government’s Syria policy with 44 percent supporting a Turkish policy of neutrality in the Syrian 
civil war. 174 A poll by Transatlantic Trends in June 2013 in Turkey found that 72 percent of the 
respondents said that their country should stay out of Syria, up 15 percent from 2012.175 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The ever growing presence of mostly Sunni refugees together with the 

presence of Syrian opposition fighters have created tensions in Hatay 

and there have been occasional attacks against Syrian refugees. 

There are also concerns about the impact of the largely Sunni refugees on inter-ethnic relations 
in Turkey. Syrian Alawis are known in Turkey as Nusayris and are distinct from the larger 
Turkish Alevi minority in Turkey as discussed further below.176 Hatay, the Turkish region along 
the Syrian border is in many ways a microcosm of Syria, populated by Sunni Turks, Sunni 
Arabs, Kurds as well as Nusayris especially in the Hatay region and very small Christian 
communities. The ever growing presence of mostly Sunni refugees together with the presence of 
Syrian opposition fighters have created tensions in Hatay and there have been occasional attacks 
against Syrian refugees.177 These developments are of particular concern because this region in 

                                                
173 Joost Lagendijk, “Zero neighbors without problems,” Today’s Zaman,1 November 2011, 
www.todayszaman.com/columnists-261591-zero-neighbors-without-problems.html 
174 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p.29.  
175 Transatlantic Trends, Survey: U.S., European, and Turkish Publics Oppose Intervention in Syrian Conflict, Favor 
Democracy over Stability in MENA Region,6 September  2013 http://trends.gmfus.org/survey-u-s-european-and-
turkish-publics-oppose-intervention-in-syrian-conflict-favor-democracy-over-stability-in-mena-region/; Kadri 
Gursel, “Turks Oppose War in Syria”Al-Monitor,7 September 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/turksopposewarsyria.html 
176 Soner Cagaptay, “Are Syrian Alawites and Turkish Alevis the same?” CNN Global Public Square, 17 April 
2012, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/17/are-syrian-alawites-and-turkish-alevis-the-same/; Cengiz 
Çandar, “Suriye ‘Kerbela’mı? ‘Aleviler’mi? ‘Nusayriler’mi?”, Radikal, September 2009, 
www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/cengiz_candar/suriye_kerbela_mi_aleviler_mi_nusayriler_mi-1099700; Emma 
Lundgren Jörum, “Ethnicity, religion and foreign policy: Turkish-Syrian relations since the 1980s” in Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Özlem Tür (Ed.), Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity,Ashgate Publishing, May 
2013. 
177 Mazlumder, Hatay/Reyhanlı Ön İnceleme Raporu, May 2013, www.mazlumder.org/yayinlar/detay/yurt-ici-
raporlar/3/mazlumder-hatay-reyhanli-on-inceleme-raporu/1084  

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Turkey had historically been recognized as a region where different ethnic and religious groups 
lived in harmony. While Hatay has experienced public protests against Erdoğan’s anti-Assad 
policy,178 so far the government and community leaders have succeeded in preventing these 
tensions from spilling into conflicts between Turkish citizens. The government has introduced 
strict rules limiting the activities and movements of foreign fighters. Even though the region has 
lost significant income from Syrian tourism and trade, paradoxically the presence of refugees has 
also generated a mini economic boom which may have helped to prevent the escalation of ethnic 
and political tensions.179   

There is another dimension to this situation. In addition to the Nusayris, who are ethnically Arab, 
Turkey also has a large Alevi minority of ethnic Turks and Kurds which may comprise more 
than 10 percent of Turkey’s 75 million people.180 Although these two sects share some religious 
similarities, they have traditionally been seen as very separate from each other. However, the 
conflict in Syria and the Turkish government’s approach to the Syrian crisis has led to greater 
identification between the Nusayris in Turkey and the Syrian Alawis on the one hand and the 
Alevis on the other. This comes at a time when the Turkish government is being criticized for 
emphasizing the Sunni aspect of Turkish identity.181 The situation was further aggravated when 
the prime minister in June referred to the people who were killed by the Reyhanlı bombing as 
“my 53 Sunni citizens”182 which was inappropriate in part because the victims were in the multi-
ethnic region of Hatay, in part also because it is seen as unusual and divisive to emphasize the 
Sunni identity of citizenship. The prime minister also accused Alevis in Turkey of supporting or 
sympathizing with the Assad regime in Syria.183 These developments raise concerns that the 
crisis in Syria and the Turkish government response could complicate minority Alevi and 
majority Sunni relations within Turkey.184  

Another Turkish domestic issue affected by developments in Syria is the Kurdish question. Over 
the past decade, Turkey has taken a number of reforms to uphold the rights of Kurds, but these 
efforts have been challenged by the Assad regime’s efforts to point to its close relations with the 
PYD which undermined Turkey’s grander strategy of encouraging unity within the Syrian 
opposition. An additional complication also arose from Turkey’s concerns that the rise of the 
PYD and its domination of the northeastern parts of Syrian could undermine Turkey’s 
increasingly warm relations with the KRG. Hence, initially, Kurdish-speaking Syrians were not 
allowed to cross into Turkey and the border to Kurdish areas in Syria was closed to humanitarian 

                                                
178 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p.22.  
179 Didem Collinsworth, “Hatay: The Syrian Crisis and a Case of Turkish Economic Resilience,”” Turkish Policy 
Quarterly, Spring 2013, Vol. 12, No. 1 p. 119-124; Idil Bilgic Alpaslan, “Suriye Krizi Turkiye Ekonomisini Nasil 
Etkiler?” TEPAV, August 2012, www.tepav.org.tr/tr/yayin/s/555 
180 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p.19,  
181 Fehim Taştekin, “Turkey’s Sunni Identity Test”, Al Monitor, 21 June 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/turkey-sunnism-sectarian-rhetoric.html; US Department of State:Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2012: Turkey, 
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper 
182 Kadri Gürsel, “Erdoğan’ın Sorunu Nedir?” Al-Monitor, 17 June 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/opinion/2013/06/erdogan-turkey-protests-strategy.html  
183 Stephen Schwartz, “Erdogan, Iran, Syrian Alawites, and Turkish Alevis,” The Weekly Standard, 29 March 2012, 
www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/erdogan-iran-syrian-alawites-and-turkish-alevis_634834.html 
184  Robert Koptaş, “Alevi-Sünni gerginliği korkutuyor,” Agos, 16 May 2013, 
www.agos.com.tr/haber.php?seo=rober-koptas-yazdi-alevisunni-gerginligi-korkutuyor&haberid=5082 

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aid. Instead, almost all Syrian Kurds went to Iraqi Kurdistan.185 However, in the course of the 
last few months this situation has also changed as the leader of PYD, Salih Muslim, has been 
invited to Turkey to meet with Turkish officials on a number of occasions.186 There have also 
been promises of greater trilateral cooperation between Turkey, PYD and KRG, including the 
extension of humanitarian assistance from Turkey to Kurdish-populated areas in Syria. 
Nevertheless, Turkish officials remain concerned about the impact of developments in PYD-held 
parts of Syria on Turkish governmental efforts to reach a political deal with the PKK at home as 
well as its efforts to encourage and nurture unity within the Syrian opposition against the Assad 
regime.187 Clearly, the crisis in Syria will continue to bear heavily on Turkey’s Kurdish problem 
for a while to come.    

Finally, the most visible manifestation of the crisis in Syria results from the arrival of an ever 
growing number of Syrian refugees into Turkey.188 Turkey’s open door policy to the Syrian 
refugees received a legal basis when, in October 2011, Turkey extended ‘temporary protection’ 
to Syrian refugees inspired by the European Union’s July 2001 directive.189 The policy calls for 
registration of refugees, including those living in camps as well as outside of camps. In April 
2013 Turkey adopted its long awaited law on ‘Foreigners and International Protection.’ The law 
provides for ‘temporary protection’ and also creates a new migration management body that will 
be responsible for the registration and processing of refugees. However, this new body and the 
law will take effect only in April 2014. In the meantime the Turkish Red Crescent and the 
Turkish Disaster Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) are responsible for management 
of the camps. 190    

At present, there are some 200,000 Syrian refugees living in 21 camps, where they benefit from 
health and educational facilities and where they are encouraged to participate in the management 
of these camps.191 The provision of services ranges from psychological assistance to television 
rooms and the quality of accommodation has led the International Crisis Group to refer to these 
refugee camps as the “best refugee camps ever seen.”192 However, there are problems, beginning 
with the financial burden on the Turkish government. According to Davutoğlu, the government 
has already spent around two billion dollars on the refugees from the national budget, not 
including include funds spent by Turkish NGOs and local governments. Turkish officials raise 
questions about the sustainability of continuing to care for the refugees in the absence of 
                                                
185 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p.25,  
186 Hemin Khoshanaw, “Salih Muslim’s Ankara Visit Marks Major Policy Change,” Rudaw, 27 July 2013, 
http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/29072013 
187 David Pollock says that Kurds are united among themselves, but not with opposition. See: Hemin Khoshanaw, 
“Salih Muslim’s Ankara Visit Marks Major Policy Change,” Rudaw, 27 July 2013.   
188 Mehmet Güçer, Sema Karaca, and O. Bahadır Dinçer, Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriye’li Mülteciler, 
USAK Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, May 2013, 
www.usak.org.tr/images_upload/files/suriyeli%20m%C3%BClteciler%20film%20nete.pdf 
189 UN News Centre, “Turkish law on protection of foreigners wins UN praise,” 12 April 2013, 
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44637  
190 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013,; Mehmet Güçer, Sema Karaca, and O. 
Bahadır Dinçer, Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriye’li Mülteciler, USAK Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, May 
2013.  
191 Inter-Agency Regional Response for Syrian Refugees: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, 5  - 11 September 
2013, 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Inter-
Agency%20Regional%20Response%20-%20Syrian%20Refugees%2020130911.pdf  
192  International Crisis Group (ICG), Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, no.225, 30 April 
2013, p.8.  

September 

12 

2013, 

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international burden sharing.193 Davutoğlu also complained about the fact that Turkey had 
received so far only $133 million from bilateral and multilateral contributions. Another difficulty 
stems from the refugee registration process, as there is no sharing of information between camps 
which means that a refugee could return to Syria and then re-enter Turkey and go to another 
camp.194 However, considerable progress has recently been achieved in improving the 
registration of refugees in camps. Still, another problem related to the camps is that by mid-April 
only three international NGOs had been fully registered – in part because of administrative 
obstacles. The Turkish government strictly limits access to the camps;195 neither UNHCR nor the 
EU has yet a permanent presence.196 However, there are some 37 international NGOs working 
along Turkey’s southern border and inside Northern Syria.197 As in Jordan, there are also 
concerns that Syrian opposition fighters, largely Sunni Muslim, use camps in Turkey and areas 
around them as off-duty resting places “to visit their families, receive medical services and 
purchase supplies.”198 This has caused considerable tension with local populations, especially in 
the Hatay region where a significant percentage of the population is Nusayri. Finally, local 
communities complain that the services provided to refugees living in camps are greater than 
those they receive.199 

Much less is known about Syrian refugees living outside camps. The government instituted a 
policy allowing Syrian nationals who enter the country with passports to acquire residence 
permits. Davutoğlu, in his September 2013 address to UNHCR, put the number of Syrians living 
outside camps at more than 300,000.200 In fact, this number is likely to be much higher as many 
Syrians simply cross the border without proper papers.201 Syrians living outside of camps have 
mostly lived off of savings, remittances sent from abroad and odd jobs. There are efforts to 
mount a campaign to register those living outside of camps to enable them to access health and 
educational services. While there is little systematic information about the problems faced by 
refugees living outside camps, the Turkish media have reported problems ranging from 
exploitation of refugees’ labor by unscrupulous employers, cases of rape and of young girls and 
women being forced into prostitution as well as tragedies resulting from the sinking of boats in 
the Aegean Sea carrying Syrian refugees into Greece.202 

                                                
193 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013; Mehmet Güçer, Sema Karaca, and O. 
Bahadır Dinçer, Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriye’li Mülteciler, USAK Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, May 
2013, p. 64; Kemal Kirişci,“Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Limits of an Open Door Policy,” The Brookings 
Institution, 27 June 2013,  www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/27-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-kirisci 
194 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, no.225, 30 April 2013, p.10, 
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-risks-for-
turkey.ashx;  Mehmet Güçer, Sema Karaca, and O. Bahadır Dinçer, Sınırlar Arasında Yaşam Savaşı: Suriye’li 
Mülteciler, USAK Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, May 2013,  p. 2. 
195 ICG, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p. 15. 
196 Ibid., p 16. 
197,Ibid., p. 17. 
198 Ibid., p.1.  
199 Sema Karaca, “Savaş Coğrafyasında Daimi Mülteci Döngüsü,” Analist, May 2013, 
www.usakanalist.com/detail.php?id=541 
200 Today’s Zaman, “Davutoğlu: Syrian refugee influx to continue if chemical attack ignored,” 5 September 2013, 
www.todayszaman.com/news-325490-davutoglu-syrian-refugee-influx-to-continue-if-chemical-attack-ignored.html  
201 ICG, Blurring the Borders:  Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013, p. 11. 
202 Yilmaz Ozdil,“Insani heyelan,” Hurriyet, 1 September 2013. 

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As the number of arrivals on the Turkish border mounted, the government instituted a policy of 
limiting the number allowed to enter until space became available.203 This has led to a buildup of 
Syrians on the Syrian side of the Turkish border and the emergence of makeshift IDP camps. 
There is very little information about the location of these camps and their numbers are put at 
more than 100,000 according to AFAD. The IDPs in these camps live in precarious conditions 
and suffer from serious security threats as evidenced in the November 2012 bombing by Syrian 
forces of the Atmeh camp area inside Syria.204 There are also reports that these IDPs face rough 
treatment by both opposition forces and criminals.205 In an effort to address the wider 
humanitarian crisis prevailing in northern Syria, Turkey has also implemented a policy of ‘zero 
point border delivery system’ in which humanitarian assistance is brought by the Turkish Red 
Crescent to the border where it is turned over to Syrian opposition groups for distribution inside 
Syria.206 So far, Turkey has delivered humanitarian assistance across the border in the range of 
$200 million.207     

 

 

 

 

 

 

For Turkey, the recent chemical weapons attacks and the resulting 

tense climate has increased the number of arrivals of refugees from 

Syria including of Alawis. 

Syrian refugees are likely to remain in Turkey for some time and the UN projects that the 
number of refugees in Turkey may well reach one million by December 2013. 208 The potential 
of an even greater increase in refugee number raises serious questions about Turkey’s ability to 
pay for their management and protection. Indeed, Davutoğlu has called for the need of greater 
burden sharing and increased contributions, in particular to the UN’s plans: the Syria Regional 
Response Plan (RRP) and the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP).209 The 
recent chemical weapons attacks and the resulting tense climate has seen an increase in the 
number of arrivals of refugees from Syria including of Alawis. Interestingly, as the situation for 
Syrian refugees in Egypt has become more difficult as a result of the overthrow of the Morsi 
government, and as the number of refugees in Jordan and Lebanon has climbed, secondary 
movements of Syrian refugees into Turkey are being reported. In the meantime, Turkish security 
authorities are increasingly concerned that they are losing control over Turkey’s border with 

                                                
203 ICG, Blurring the Borders:  Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013,  p. 9; Sema Karaca, “Suriyeli 
Mülteciler İçin Çetin Sınırlar,” Analist, August 2013, www.usakanalist.com/detail.php?id=673  
204 ICG, Blurring the Borders:  Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, April 2013,  p. 32. 
205 Mona Chalabi, “Syria’s hidden emergencies,” The Guardian, 25 July 2013, 
www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jul/25/syria-emergencies 
206 Sevil Erkuş, “Refugee limit 400,000 despite economic woes,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 2012, 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?pageID=238&nid=32586 
207 According to Suphi Atan, a spokesman for the Turkish Foreign Ministry, cited in Stephen Franklin, “Syrians 
Stream Across the Turkish Border,”Address by his excellency Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Turkey, Ministerial Meeting of the Syria Bordering Countries, 4 September 2013, UNHCR Headquarters, Geneva. 
208 UN, Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan: June to December 2013, June 2013, p. 212. 
209 Address by his excellency Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of  Foreign Affairs of Turkey,  Ministerial Meeting of the 
Syria Bordering Countries, 4 September 2013, UNHCR Headquarters, Geneva 

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Syria and fear for the undermining of Turkey’s security.210 Furthermore, there are questions 
being raised about the long term consequences of the presence of ever growing number of 
refugees and the impact that this could have on the economic, social and political fabric of the 
country.  

While the vast majority of Syrian refugees are arriving in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, 
significant numbers have also crossed into Iraq and have traveled to Egypt. 

Iraq: An August Influx 

Until the Syrian crisis of 2013, Iraq had produced more displacement – both refugees and IDPs – 
than any other Middle Eastern situation since the Palestinian exodus of 1948. From 2003-2009, 
the number of Iraqi refugees was estimated at 2 million with another 2.5 million displaced 
internally by the violence. However, the issue of Iraqi displacement faded from the international 
agenda211 and it appeared that most of the Iraqi refugees in the region were either getting by or 
were waiting for resettlement. Meanwhile, the past year has witnessed an increase in violence 
inside Iraq, which, like all the countries in the region, has been affected in unique ways by the 
arrival of Syrian refugees.212 

Terrorism and sectarian violence have surged in Iraq in recent months, “at levels unseen since 
2008,” according to the US State Department.213 It is increasingly hard to deny that the increased 
violence in Iraq is linked to the war in Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has 
acknowledged as much. Following a spate of bombings targeting predominantly Shi’a areas of 
Baghdad in late August 2013, al-Maliki said, “The internal situation in Syria is playing a major 
role with what’s happening in Iraq.”214 Al-Maliki had previously warned that a victory by the 
Syrian opposition would lead to a sectarian war in Iraq.215 Yet, while Iraq has publicly tried to 
maintain its neutrality in the conflict, the Obama administration has criticized the Iraqi prime 

                                                
210 Tolga Şardan, “El Muhaberat ve PKK da geliyor,” 12 September 2013, http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/el-
muhaberat-ve-pkk-da-geliyor-/gundem/detay/1759594/default.htm; Cumali Önal, “Serious flaws along Syrian 
border increase security risks,”Today’s Zaman, 8 September 2013, www.todayszaman.com/news-325791-serious-
flaws-along-syrian-border-increase-security-risks.html; Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey’s Syria border crossings 
uncontrolled, says governor’s office,”6 September, 2013  
 www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-syria-border-crossings-uncontrolled-says-governors-
office.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53982&NewsCatID=341 
211 For a discussion of the current status of Iraqi displacement, see: Elizabeth Ferris, “Remembering Iraq’s 
Displaced,” Brookings Institution, 18 March 2013, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/03/18-iraq-displaced-
ferris 
212 See for example, International Rescue Committee, Hidden but Hopeful: Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian 
Refugees in Northern Iraq, August 2013, p. 8. www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/resource-
file/Policy%20Brief%20Syrian%20Refugees%20in%20Iraq.pdf   
213 According to the U.S. State Department’s update of its travel warning to Americans. see: U.S. Department of 
State, “Travel Warning: Iraq,” 5 September 2013,  
 http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_6063.html. According to a senior U.S. official, in 2011 and 2012, 
suicide bombings in Iraq averaged 5 to 10 a month, but in the 90 days previous to mid-August 2013, the number 
surged to about 30 a month; see Michael R. Gordon and Tim Arango, “Syrian War Fueling Attacks by Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, Officials Say,” The New York Times, 15 August 2013,  
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/world/middleeast/syrian-war-fueling-attacks-by-al-qaeda-in-iraq-officials-say.html 
214 Tom Peter, “Where Iraq's Maliki pins the blame for Baghdad bombings,” Christian Science Monitor, 28 August 
2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0828/Where-Iraq-s-Maliki-pins-the-blame-for-Baghdad-
bombings-video  
215Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “AP Interview: Iraq PM Warns Syria War Could Spread,” Associated 
Press, 27 February 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-interview-iraq-premier-syria-war-could-spread 

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minister, alleging that Iraq has aided arms transfers to Syria by granting Iran access to its 
airspace. Al-Maliki has denied this: "Not to the regime and not to the opposition. No weapon is 
being transferred through Iraqi skies, territories or waters,'' he reportedly said.216 Furthermore, 
Iraqi fighters have fled to fight in Syria, and according to the State Department, Syria is serving 
as a sanctuary for the leader of Al Qaeda’s Iraq affiliate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other senior 
members of the group, who are orchestrating attacks in Baghdad and other cities.217  

Out of security concerns, the Iraqi government and the KRG authorities have periodically closed 
and reopened numerous official border crossings throughout the crisis.218 Of the present 150,000 
or so registered Syrian refugees in Iraq, 94 percent are in KRG while around 7,000 live in and 
around al Qai’im in Anbar governorate. The number of new arrivals has more than doubled in 
the past year and half with 800-1000 arriving each day in April-May 2013. While 40 percent of 
the refugees are living in camps, 60 percent are living dispersed throughout communities.  

The first camp was built in Al-Waleed just outside al-Qaim, but violence spilled over from the 
Syrian side of border and reports of infiltration by rebel groups led to the border closing in 
September 2012. However, Syrian (mostly Kurdish) refugees are still entering into Northern Iraq 
through Duhok. As in other countries in the region, the number of Syrian arrivals mushroomed 
from 335 reported in March 2012, to 36,500 in October 2012 to 67,000 in December 2012. As of 
mid- September 2013, in light of the August influx, the total estimated number of refugees in 
Iraq stood at 200,000, according to UNHCR.219  

There are differences in the legal status of those living in and outside camps. Until April 2013, 
Syrian refugees in KRG were registered with UNHCR and government offices in the 
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah and issued with an asylum seeker certificate 
valid for a year; the registration process facilitated the issuance of six-month residency permits. 
However, in April the governorates of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah suspended issuing residency 
permits to new arrivals. Refugees in Al Qa’im are not issued residency permits.220  

At the time of writing, there were several camps in Iraq but the camps are over-crowded. In 
Domiz camp, some 3,500 families do not have their own tents because of lack of land. Efforts 
were underway to build new camps in Dohuk Governorate to decongest Domiz camp although 
reports are that the new arrivals in August 2013 were occupying the semi-built camp.  

 

 

                                                
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid.  
218 See: SNAP , Syrian border crossings, September 2013, http://acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project; Duraid 
Adnan and Rod Nordland, "Syrians are Stung by Hostile Reception in Iraq,” 29 July 2012, 
www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/world/middleeast/syrian-refugees-stung-by-hostile-reception-in-
iraq.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Mushreq Abbas, “Iraq's Border Becomes New Fault Line in Syrian War,” Al-
Monitor:Iraq Pulse, 5 March 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/iraq-syria-border-
skirmishes.html#ixzz2epIZO1k0; Human Rights Watch, “Iraq/Jordan/Turkey: Syrians Blocked from Fleeing War,” 
1 July 2013; Isabel Coles, “Iraq shuts border post after Syrian rebels seize frontier,” Reuters, 3 March 2013, 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-iraq-syria-border-idUSBRE92206U20130303   
219 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing 
Portal, 12 September 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
220 UNHCR, Syria regional response plan – January to December 2013, June 2013, p. 256. 

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On August 15 2013, the Peshkhabour pontoon 
bridge was opened, north of Saleha, prompting 
more than 40,000 Syrians to cross into Iraqi 
Kurdistan during the last two weeks of the month 
– possibly, the largest cross-border migration 
since the start of the Syrian conflict.221 The 
overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees in 
Iraq are of Kurdish origin, seeking respite from 
the economic difficulties and deteriorating 
security conditions afflicting many Kurdish areas 
in north-western Syria. To lessen the burden on 
host communities, the Kurdistan Regional 
Government was planning as of August 2013 to 
open three new camps in Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Dohuk governorates.  

Hundreds of Syrian refugees cross into Iraq at the 
Peshkhabour border crossing in Dohuk Governorate 
on August 15, 2013. (UNHCR / G. Gubaeva) 

According to one report, increasing numbers of Kurdish Syrian children and youth do not have 
access to education, with many having missed more than a year of school.222 An estimated one-
third of the August 2013 arrivals in KRG are school-aged children. The KRG has taken great 
strides to accommodate the education of refugees in Domiz camp and others under construction, 
including by committing its own resources, but the education system simply cannot cope with 
the influx, including in terms of the fact that there are not enough Arabic-language schools in 
existence.223 There is virtually no information about access of Syrian refugee children to 
educational facilities outside of camps, while there are significant shortcomings in the provision 
of education to refugees in camps.224  

But presently, the main political impact of the arrival of Syrian refugees is in Kurdistan. In early 
August, Iraq’s regional president Massud Barzani threatened intervention in Syria if the plight of 
the Syrian Kurds did not improve.225 If "it appears that innocent Kurdish citizens and women and 
children are under threat of death and terrorism, the Iraqi Kurdistan region will... be prepared to 
defend" them, Barzani reportedly stated.226 The presence and influx of Syrian Kurds into the 
KRG has led the president of the autonomous Kurdish territory, Barzani, to push a pro-Kurdish 
agenda in the region, as a leader for the Kurdish people. He has “…lately sought to position 
himself as not just the leader of Iraq’s Kurds, but someone who can unite all Kurds as they push 
for more independence and more democratic rights.”227 Following the influx of refugees who 

                                                
221 Sylvia Westall and Murad Jambaz,“Syrian Kurds trek to Iraq over parched hills,” 26 August 2013, 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-syria-crisis-iraq-idUSBRE97P09G20130826 
222 International Rescue Committee, Hidden but Hopeful: Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian Refugees in Northern 
Iraq, August 2013, p. 8.   
223 Ibid., p. 8.  
224 UNHCR, Syria regional response plan – January to December 2013, June 2013, p. 279. On the efforts of, and 
constraints facing, the KRG authorities to support access to education, see: International Rescue Committee, Hidden 
but Hopeful: Life Beyond the Camp for Syrian Refugees in Northern Iraq, August 2013.  
225 Bangkok Post, “Hungry and scared, Syrian refugees flood Iraq,” 19 August 3013, 
www.bangkokpost.com/news/world/365242/hungry-and-scared-syrian-refugees-flood-iraq   
226 Daily News, “Iraqi Kurds ready to defend Syrian Kurds: Barzani,” 10 August 2013, 
www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iraqi-kurds-ready-to-defend-syrian-kurds-barzani.aspx?pageID=238&nid=52303  
227 Tim Arango, “Syrian Kurds Find More Than a Refuge in Northern Iraq,” The New York Times, 23 August 2013, 
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/world/middleeast/syrian-kurds-find-more-than-a-refuge-in-iraqi-
kurdistan.html?pagewanted=all  

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crossed the pontoon bridge at Peshkhabour over the Tigris River when it was opened in mid-
August 2013, Barzani welcomed his Syrian Kurd “brothers,” but called on Kurds still in 
“Western Kurdistan” to "stay and defend their land and try to attain their legitimate rights,” 
because “we do not want Western Kurdistan to be emptied of its Kurdish residents…”228 Barzani 
has asserted his leadership even further by threatening to send the peshmerga to defend Kurds in 
Syria, and by recently hosting a regional Kurdish conference in Erbil, in which the Syrian 
Kurdish factions united against President Bashar al-Assad.229  

In addition to the influx of Syrian refugees, UNHCR reported that over 68,000 Iraqis had 
returned from Syria since July 2012, according to the latest reported data as of January 2013.230 
Moreover, it is important to underscore that Iraq still has 1.3 million IDPs – those returning from 
outside Iraq are considered as returnees, not as IDPs, even when they do not return to their place 
of origin.231   

Egypt: No longer welcomed 

In 2012, the Egyptian government announced a change in policy, allowing Syrians to enter Egypt 
without a visa and to access public education and health services on an equal footing with 
Egyptians. Syrians are given 3 month visitor visas upon arrival which can be regularized by 
extending their residency permits every six months. However, work permits are difficult to 
obtain as the employer must certify that no Egyptian national is available and qualified to do the 
work. As there are no refugee camps in Egypt, all refugees live with families, friends or in rented 
accommodations, primarily in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. As of 18 July 2013 UNHCR 
reported more than 92,000 refugees in Egypt and projected the number to reach 200,000 by the 
end of the year. Many Syrian refugees have not registered with UNHCR – as there is a certain 
stigma against being registered as a refugee among the Syrian community -- and some have 
chosen to regularize their stay via normal immigration channels. The refugees come to Egypt 
directly by air from Syria (with flights from Damascus fully booked weeks in advance) or from 
Lebanon and Jordan, as the number of refugees in those countries has reached very high levels. 
UNHCR reports that while Syrian refugees arriving in 2012 came with sufficient savings to tide 
them over for a few months, those arriving in 2013 had significantly fewer resources. 

While Syrian refugee children had access to education, they faced particular difficulties as 
schools are overcrowded, difficulties in adjusting to the Egyptian dialect and curriculum,232 and 
especially for girls, sexual harassment. While the government also granted Syrians access to the 
public health system, these facilities are also often insufficient and further support is needed. 

                                                
228 Sherzad Shekhani, “Barzani calls on Syrian Kurds to stay and fight,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 19 August 2013, 
www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55314096; Ali Kurdistani, “A Fine Balance: Can Barzani Help Syrian Kurds?” Al-
Monitor, 13 April 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/a-fine-balance-can-barzani-help.html 
229 Hazal Ates, “Barzani Unites Syrian Kurds Against Assad,” Al-Monitor, 13 July 2012, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/07/barzani-grabs-assads-kurdish-car.html  
230 This number includes returnees who are registered with Syria as refugees and those who are not. It also includes 
individuals who cross the border for their private related reasons on a daily basis. UNHCR, Syria Situation Bi-
Monthly Update, no. 34, January 2013, pp. 9 – 22. 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria%20Situation%20Bi-
Monthly%20Update%20No.34%2C%209%20-%2022%20January%202013.pdf  
231 IOM, Syria Crisis:  A Migration Perspective: A Working Paper, December 2012, p.18. 
232 UNHCR, Syria regional response plan – January to December 2013, June 2013, p. 321. 

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The political turmoil following the ouster of Muhammad Morsi has had serious repercussions on 
Syrians in Egypt. At the time of writing, Syrians were subject to a full-fledged state media 
campaign against them, violence, destruction of Syrian-owned businesses, and increased 
arbitrary detentions, including of asylum seekers and legal residents.233 Syrians have been 
accused of joining sides or even taking up arms with the Egyptian Muslims Brotherhood in 
Egypt’s political unrest. A former member of Parliament called for Syrians and other foreigners 
to be executed.234 In early July 2013, Egypt’s transitional government began what it called a 
temporary security measure by requiring all Syrians to have a visa and security clearance to enter 
the country.235 Clearly, the transitional government is concerned about the security implications 
of continuing to allow large numbers of Syrians to enter the country.   

This expansive backlash against Syrians stands, meanwhile, to impact not only their personal 
prospects in terms of their safety and where they seek refugee – many have fled reportedly 
further afield to the Gulf, Europe, or closer to home in Turkey – but also the fragile Egyptian 
economy. A Coalition of Syrian Businessmen in Egypt issued a statement halting its investments 
in Egyptian businesses, estimated at $700 million.236Arrests and the persecution of Syrian 
refugees are likely to continue if El-Sisi’s military backed regime remains in power. It comes as 
no surprise, then, that many Syrians have reportedly returned to Damascus in light of the recent 
violence in Cairo. 237 

While recognizing its security concerns, the Egyptian government should be encouraged to adopt 
less restrictive policies toward the Syrian refugees and to take steps to diminish the hostility they 
are currently experiencing. In this context, support by the Gulf states for Syrian refugees could 
play a useful role. 

                                                
233 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Arrests of Syrians Raise Deportation Fears,” 25 July 2013, 
www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/25/egypt-arrests-syrians-raise-deportation-fears ; UNHCR, “UNHCR concerned at 
arbitrary detention of Syrian refugees in Egypt,” News Stories, 26 July 2013, www.unhcr.org/51f27733540.html; 
Peter Schwartzstein,“Egypt's Latest Conspiracy Theories Target the Country's Syrian Refugees,” The Atlantic, 12 
September 2013, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/egypts-latest-conspiracy-theories-target-the-
countrys-syrian-refugees/279585/; Sam Kimball, “Egypt’s Military-Backed Government Cracks down on Syrian 
Refugees,” Time, 24 August 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/08/24/egypts-military-backed-government-cracks-
down-on-syrian-refugees/  
234 Sarah Mousa and Kareem Fahim, “In Egypt, a Welcome for Syrian Refugees Turns Bitter,”The New York Times, 
7 September 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/world/middleeast/in-egypt-a-welcome-for-refugees-turns-
bitter.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Sam Kimball, “Egypt’s Military-Backed Government Cracks down on Syrian 
Refugees,” Time, 24 August 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/08/24/egypts-military-backed-government-cracks-
down-on-syrian-refugees/ 
235 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Arrests of Syrians Raise Deportation Fears,” 25 July 2013, 
www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/25/egypt-arrests-syrians-raise-deportation-fears  
236 Daria Solovieva, “US Syria Bombing: Syrian Refugees In Egypt Face Increasing Hostility Due to Crackdown On 
Islamists, While Their Numbers Grow,” International Business Times, 7 September 2013, www.ibtimes.com/us-
syria-bombing-syrian-refugees-egypt-face-increasing-hostility-due-crackdown-islamists-while-their  
237 Maggie Fick, “Egyptian welcome mat pulled out from under Syrian refugees,” Reuters, 12 September 2013, 
www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-syria-crisis-egypt-refugees-idUSBRE98B0OE20130912  

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C O N C L U S I O N   A N D   R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S  

People the world over do not flee their homes, communities and countries unless they perceive 
that they have no alternatives. The massive and rapid displacement of over 2 million Syrians 
over an 18 month period reflects failure: the failure of the Syrian regime to resolve internal 
conflicts and to respect the basic rights of its people; the failure of both sides of the conflict to 
respect international humanitarian law; and the failure of the international community to prevent 
the atrocities and widespread human rights violations which have forced a third of the country’s 
population to leave their homes. Of course, there are different and legitimate arguments about 
what could and should have been done early in the Syrian conflict. Perhaps a more robust 
diplomatic effort earlier in 2011-2012 or earlier and more direct support for the opposition to the 
Assad regime could have prevented the escalation of the conflict and its current stalemate. But 
regardless of the roads not taken, the fact that so many of Syria’s people have been displaced is 
an indication of the inability of the international community to prevent the large-scale violence 
that has wreaked havoc with millions of lives. 

Syrian displacement, both internal and cross-border, will continue as long as the war does. Few 
expect a rapid end of the war. Their choice of destinations will depend on their physical ability to 
move elsewhere and the openness of borders. The UN’s Consolidated Appeal for 2013 uses as a 
planning figure 3.45 million Syrian refugees by the end of 2013;238 all present indications are 
consistent with this target being met. It should be noted that those who are displaced may not be 
the individuals most in need in Syria. In fact, it is likely that those who are unable to leave their 
homes – because they are elderly, disabled or simply lack the resources to move – are the most 
vulnerable. Those who are displaced, however, do have certain identifiable needs, such as 
shelter, and require targeted assistance.  

Displacement in and from Syria is dynamic. There seems to be a direct relationship between 
those displaced inside Syria and refugee movements into neighboring countries. Many of those 
turning up as refugees in Jordan and Lebanon report having been displaced multiple times within 
Syria before making it across a border. There are also reports of Syrians returning to Syria from 
other countries – either because of a perception that security in their home community has 
improved, because of a need to care for family members or protect property or because 
conditions as refugees are so bad. Even in periods when fighting has escalated, some Syrians 
have gone back to their communities.   

The initial response of governments in the region – Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt – 
was one of generosity and solidarity to the two million registered refugees arriving on their 
borders. With the passage of time and the increase in numbers of arrivals, there are signs that the 
welcome is wearing thin. While all of the governments have imposed restrictions on entry of one 
kind or another, they deserve recognition and appreciation for their policies of openness and 
welcome to refugees. They also deserve the financial support of the international community. It 
is hard to imagine Western countries responding with similar generosity should a comparable 
number of refugees have arrived on their borders.    

Governments in the region need support to defray some of the economic, social and political 
costs they have born in allowing the refugees to enter and in providing for at least some of their 

                                                
238 See: UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal,  
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php;  UN, Syria Regional Response Plan: January to December 2013, 
June 2013. 

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basic necessities. But they also deserve support because their actions affirm the international 
system of refugee protection. This refugee regime which has evolved since 1951 is based on the 
idea that countries offer protection and assistance to arriving refugees on behalf of the 
international community. While notions of burden-sharing have been hotly debated almost since 
the beginning of the refugee regime, the idea that responding to refugees is a shared international 
responsibility – and not only the responsibility of the country on whose border they happen to 
have arrived – is a precious international norm which deserves to be upheld. As governments in 
Europe, North America and Australia have tightened up their borders, it is significant that 
countries with far fewer resources have shown breathtaking levels of hospitality, and a principled 
commitment to protecting civilians.   

Recommendations 

We now turn to a series of policy recommendations to address the grim humanitarian situation 
inside Syria and to improve the protection of and assistance to the IDPs, refugees and asylum-
seekers that the armed conflict has caused.   

Inside Syria 

1.  All parties to the armed conflict – including the Syrian government, 

paramilitary forces and the many opposition groups – should comply with the 
basic principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) and uphold basic, 
internationally-recognized human rights. Under IHL, states and non-state armed 
actors have the obligation to ensure assistance to and protection of people within their 
jurisdiction. The Syrian government and opposition movements therefore need to 
understand and respect international humanitarian law and to uphold the rights of all 
individuals under their jurisdiction, including the internally displaced. There is a 
critical need for training on IHL and humanitarian principles for parties to the conflict 
and participation in such training should be a condition of any support by the US 
government to the opposition. The failure to consider the protection of all civilians, 
regardless of which side they support, will result in the undermining of hopes for any 
coalition government. Steps to protect minorities are particularly important – not only 
for the needed protection of vulnerable groups – but in affecting the course of the 
country’s political future. There is a particular need to equitably protect and assist 
Palestinian refugees who had been living in Syria and are now either displaced 
internally or turned back at borders of neighboring states.   

2.  The humanitarian community should develop and maintain better statistics and 

assessments on internal displacement inside Syria. The present UN estimates of 
4.25 million IDPs date from 22 April 2013 and have remained unchanged even as the 
number of Syrian refugees has increased significantly. Given the restrictions on 
access inside Syria and the fluid nature of displacement, it is obviously more difficult 
to estimate the number of IDPs than refugees living in neighboring countries; 
nonetheless, more clarity is needed. It would be helpful for OCHA, which is 
responsible for compiling figures on IDPs, to be more transparent in its methodology. 
While assessments such as the Joint Rapid Assessment of Northern Syria 

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assessments, the Syria Needs Analysis Project and data collected by individual NGOs 
provide very useful information on humanitarian conditions, there is a need for better 
coordination of efforts and regular joint compilation and review of gathered data.   

3.  The Syrian government should remove obstacles to increasing humanitarian 

assistance inside Syria. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent, UN, International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), international NGOs and civil society 
organizations have all been working hard to access populations in need and yet both 
the bureaucratic and security obstacles are formidable. The Syrian government has a 
responsibility to enable the humanitarian action of international agencies, as set forth 
in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which reflect international 
law and international human rights standards.239 The Syrian government should be 
pressed by the concerted action of the UN Security Council to exercise its 
responsibility to enable the humanitarian action of international agencies. As UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, stated to the UN Security Council in 
April and again in July 2013, these obstacles include long procedures for renewing 
visas, importing vehicles and medical supplies, restrictions on movement within the 
country, etc. These bureaucratic obstacles need to be removed. 

4.  International agencies must continue to affirm the humanitarian and non-

political nature of assistance. In accordance with basic humanitarian principles and 
the UN Guiding Principles, humanitarian action inside Syria should be carried out 
solely on the basis of need, respecting impartiality and humanity, not on the basis of 
political objectives, and without discrimination. Assumptions should not be made that 
all those living in government or opposition-controlled areas are supportive of armed 
actors controlling those areas. The ICRC’s Professional Standards for Protection 
Work should be applied by all parties offering assistance in Syria.240 International 
organizations working with these actors should provide opportunities for basic 
training in IHL and in professional standards for humanitarian operations. 

5.  The UN Security Council should develop strongly-worded resolutions to support 

the necessary access for humanitarian assistance operations. In April 2013, 
following a briefing by Valerie Amos, the UN Security Council issued a statement 
(not a resolution) calling on all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to 

                                                
239 As the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state, “International humanitarian organizations and other 
appropriate actors have the right to offer their services in support of the internally displaced. Such an offer shall not 
be regarded as an unfriendly act or an interference in a State’s internal affairs and shall be considered in good faith. 
Consent thereto shall not be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to 
provide the required humanitarian assistance.” United Nations, UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
1999, Principle 25, para. 2, www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/idp/GPEnglish.pdf; see also, Walter Kalin, The 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations (2nd Edition), The American Society of International 
Law and the Brookings Institution, 2008, www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/05/spring-guiding-principles. 
240 ICRC, Professional Standards for Protection Work Carried out by Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in 
Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 2013, www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0999.pdf 

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cooperate fully with the UN and relevant humanitarian organizations and urged all 
parties to “assure safe and unimpeded access.”241 This is much weaker than the many 
Security Council resolutions referencing humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.242 Other efforts to address issues of humanitarian access in Syria have 
been blocked within the Security Council.   

6.  Cross-border operations for assisting IDPs and others affected by conflict should 

be continued and expanded. Given the desperate condition of internally displaced 
Syrians and the difficulties international agencies face in accessing IDPs and other 
affected communities in parts of the country, these operations are needed to ensure 
the protection and assistance of vulnerable civilians. While cross-border operations 
are presently taking place, these need to be expanded and their legitimacy recognized 
through Security Council resolutions. Establishing any UN cross-border humanitarian 
aid operation will be tremendously challenging both politically and logistically, but 
there are precedents that can and should be used. 

7.  International agencies, with the support of the United Nations, should consider 

the use of humanitarian ‘corridors’ and humanitarian ‘pauses’ to increase 
humanitarian assistance. While some have suggested the establishment of safe 
zones,243 it seems that the necessary international support for this is limited. For 
example, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s idea of an internationally 
imposed safe zone or haven was met with silence or even disapproval from UNHCR 
and major powers when he presented it at the UN General assembly in August 
2012.244 There are precedents, however, for the use of more limited ceasefires to 
enable the evacuation of wounded and the vaccination of children. Humanitarian 
corridors have been used occasionally by humanitarian actors in situations as diverse 
as Angola, the occupied Palestinian Territory and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
While these precedents were far from perfect, they do offer suggestions for ways of 
improving assistance in the midst of armed conflict. In this regard, a research project 
to systematically evaluate the conditions and processes of past efforts and their 
relevance to Syria could be useful.  

8.  If the Security Council is unable to act on issues of humanitarian corridors, 
humanitarian pauses or cross-border operations, the UN General Assembly 

                                                
241 See UN Security Council, “Top UN Official Says Situation in Syria ‘Humanitarian Catastrophe,’ Calls on 
Security Council to Take Actions Needed to End ‘Brutal Conflict,’” 18 April 2013, SC/10981, 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10981.doc.htm  
242 UN Security Council, Resolution 819: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16 April 1993, S/RES/819. 
243 Diane Paul has written a persuasive article on how safe areas, protected by no-fly zones, can be used in Syria: 
“State of play in Syria: Rising human costs and the danger of Assad’s ‘Samson Button’,” Professionals in 
Humanitarian Assistance and Protection , 7 June 2013, http://phap.org/articles/state-play-syria-rising-human-costs-
and-danger-assad%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98samson-button%E2%80%99. 
244 International Crisis Group (ICG), Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, no.225, 30 April 2013, 
p.39, www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/225-blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-
risks-for-turkey.ashx. 

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(GA) should mobilize action. As noted above, the record of the UN Security Council 
in either ending the conflict or strongly asserting humanitarian principles in the case 
of Syria has been disappointing.245 By substantial majorities, the GA has adopted 
resolutions deploring the Security Council’s inability to find a political solution 
(August 2012) and calling for an end to indiscriminate violence in Syria (May 2013). 
Perhaps it is time for the GA to engage more forcefully on issues of respect for 
international humanitarian law, displacement and basic principles of humanitarian 
assistance. In particular, this is an issue where the BRICS (Brazil, India, and South 
Africa in particular) and the 120 strong Non-Aligned Movement can and should 
assert greater leadership. In this regard, we suggest that exploratory meetings be held 
in New York to consider ways of strengthening GA action on humanitarian issues.  

IDPs, Refugees and Asylum  

9.  Collaboration and coordination of humanitarian response should be 

strengthened, particularly with respect to non-traditional actors. A wide array of 
local and regional actors is presently working on humanitarian issues, both inside and 
outside Syria. In fact, most of the assistance being provided inside Syria is being 
delivered by local Syrian and regional NGOs. Many of these actors are not part of 
traditional coordination mechanisms and are acting independently in support of 
humanitarian – and sometimes, political – objectives. The UN and other international 
organizations have a responsibility to reach out to and support these actors by joining 
forces with other Syrian, Arab, and Islamic NGOs. At a minimum, those NGOs have 
a responsibility to share information on their activities with international agencies 
mandated to coordinate humanitarian efforts.    

10. Governments should be supported to preserve asylum space in the region. Being 
able to seek protection in other countries is a basic human right – governments in the 
region need to be affirmed and financially supported to allow refugees to enter. 
Presently, the UN consolidated appeal for the regional response for June-December 
2013 is just under 50 percent funded. Interestingly, for the first time ever, the 
consolidated appeal included funds to support the governments of Lebanon and 
Jordan. Turkey, however, has received disproportionately less international assistance 
than other host governments and the limits of its capacity to shelter and provide 
services to refugees may be being reached. If host governments do not receive the 
support they need, it is likely that the living conditions for refugees will deteriorate, 
resulting in public health hazards for the host communities as well as the refugees. 
The security of humanitarian workers could be compromised, refugees could turn to 
violent protests, refugees might be returned to Syria and/or deterred from arriving in 
host countries or might seek protection elsewhere.  

                                                
245 See for example, Security Council Report, Chronology of Events: Syria, revised 29 August 2013, 
www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/syria.php.  

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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11. Support to refugees and IDPs in urban areas should be improved and increased. 

While it is perhaps understandable that international attention has focused on the 
large visible refugee camps in Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, the fact is that far more 
attention needs to be directed toward those living outside of camps. The issue of 
urban refugees has received significant attention from international bodies for more 
than ten years but there is still a great deal that is not known. For example, what are 
the pros and cons of targeting refugees and IDPs when host populations are also 
needy? What are good models of working with local governments and service-
providers? Should international agencies be making contributions to the on-going 
work of such authorities? If so, should there be a requirement that a certain 
percentage of beneficiaries are refugees or IDPs? The sheer scale of Syrian 
displacement in non-camp settings suggests the need for much more attention to the 
practicalities of providing assistance to host communities and the displaced. In this 
respect, it would be helpful for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee to review its 
past efforts to address the needs of non-camp refugees and IDPs in order to provide 
concrete guidance to agencies and donors about effective models of assistance.  

12.  Gender perspectives should be incorporated into all humanitarian and 

development programs. While there has been some much-needed attention to sexual 
and gender-based violence among Syrian refugees, there needs to be a recognition 
that during crises such as these gender roles can be transformed. Support should be 
given for Syrian women to participate actively in consultative mechanisms and 
leadership structures that emerge among refugees in both camp and non-camp 
settings. Issues to address livelihood issues and documentation are especially 
important for Syrian women and their children. Birth registrations of babies born to 
refugees are particularly difficult when women do not have documentation of their 
citizenship or marriage. 

13. Education must receive priority attention from governments in the region, 

international agencies and civil society groups. The fact that many Syrian children, 
whether internally displaced or refugees, do not have access to education is a major 
human rights issue with long-term implications for the future of the country. As this 
report highlights, the fact that most refugee children in Jordan and Syria are not 
attending school should be a cause for alarm – not only for over-stretched 
humanitarian agencies but also for development actors and advocacy groups.    

14.  Host countries must increase their efforts to guarantee the security of Syrian 
refugees. In the last year, there have been violent attacks against Syrians in Egypt, 
kidnappings and assassinations in Lebanon and on-going security incidents in the 
Za’atari camp of Jordan. Young men and increasingly children have been recruited 
into armed groups. Unsafe security conditions will often prompt Syrians to return to 
their homes before conditions warrant, further increasing their security risks.  

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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15. Assistance to refugees should be increased. This could include the possibility of 

introducing or expanding cash assistance to refugees. Except for those living in 
camps in Jordan and Turkey, refugees throughout the region struggle to pay rent; 
most of the refugees arrived came with meager financial resources and those that did 
come with cash have found their reserves depleted. This leads them to be at further 
risk for protection concerns by going into debt, returning to their homes despite 
ongoing violence, moving elsewhere, reducing their consumption of food, or 
resorting to early marriage or survival sex or child labor. In this respect, more 
attention needs to be given to supporting refugee livelihoods. Host countries have 
been resistant to allowing refugees to be involved in microfinance or vocational 
training programs, but since displacement is likely to be protracted, this kind of 
support is needed to enable refugees to become more self-sufficient and to contribute 
to the economies of the host country. 

Long-Term Thinking 

16. Initiatives need to be carried out now to think about the long-term future of 
Syria’s IDPs and refugee. While it has become commonplace for international 
agencies to call for thinking about solutions to displacement early in the process, in 
fact it is extraordinarily hard to do when faced with overwhelming demands for 
emergency assistance. It is perhaps natural that those most knowledgeable and 
involved in humanitarian response are caught up in the intense demands of the day. 
But, surely with the international community asked to raise $5 billion to support 
refugees and IDPs over the next six months, more thought is needed now about how 
the situation will play out in the long-term.246 For example, what are the options – for 
the region and the international community – if the Syrian refugees cannot return 
home this year – or in the next five years? It is difficult to predict how the conflict 
will unfold, of course, but it is unlikely that the war will be over soon. And when the 
conflict does end, it is also unlikely that the 6 million+ refugees and IDPs will 
immediately pack up their belongings, go back home and resume their lives. The 
issue of returns is a complex issue, raising issues not only of reconstruction, but also 
issues of legal assistance with property claims and transitional justice. While there are 
ongoing initiatives to plan for transition in Syria, these have largely focused on the 
political, military and economic future of the country.247 Equal attention needs to be 

                                                
246 In June 2013, the United Nations launched a $4.4 billion humanitarian appeal – the largest aid request in its 
history – to assist those affected by the crisis in Syria. The appeal was revised from $1.5 billion in January and 
covers relief activities for the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) and the Regional Response 
Plan (RRP). Of the $4.4 billion, $1.4 billion will go to SHARP, assisting Syrians inside Syria, and $3 billion to 
RRP, which provides life-saving aid and protection to refugees in the immediate surrounding region. In addition to 
this, the governments of Lebanon and Jordan are seeking $450 million and $380 million, respectively, to support the 
efforts to provide education, health and other services to the refugees who are now in their countries. 
247 For example, US Institute of Peace, “The Day After Project,” August 2012, www.usip.org/programs/projects/the-
day-after-project  

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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paid to the long-term future of Syrian refugees and IDPs. As we have pointed out in 
this analysis, Syrian displacement is the most recent case of the region’s long history 
of displacements occurring since 1948, few of which can be said to have been 
resolved. The Middle East risks becoming a “region of the permanently displaced.” In 
this regard, we suggest that key donors support a research project which examines 
lessons learned from other on-going and persistent cases of displacement in the 
Middle East and which examines the particular strains caused by recurrent 
displacement.  

17. Development actors should become fully engaged in addressing both the needs of 
the displaced and the communities which host them and in seeking solutions. As 
displacement becomes protracted, issues of livelihoods, provision of basic services, 
infrastructure development, local economies and environmental impact become more 
important. In addition, there is the need to address land tenure issues before any 
sustainable return can occur. These are all development issues. And yet, as long as 
this is seen as a ‘refugee’ emergency or a ‘humanitarian’ crisis, development actors 
will be reluctant to invest their scarce resources in what is seen to be the 
responsibility of the humanitarian community. While some development actors, such 
as the World Bank, have taken important steps to incorporate displacement concerns 
in their long-term planning, they need to be supported and other multilateral and 
bilateral development agencies need to play a more active role. We specifically 
suggest that states explore setting up an Arab States Stabilization Fund to mitigate the 
financial and service provision burdens of key countries in the region as a result of 
the Syria conflict. Such a fund should be administered by the World Bank and could 
perhaps help draw in the Gulf states to work with other international donors in a 
constructive way.  

18. Plans need to be made now for the likelihood that displacement will be 

protracted, including in terms of addressing likely increase in numbers of 
refugees seeking asylum outside of the region. In 2012 according to UNHCR, Syria 
became the second highest-ranking source country of asylum seekers among the 44 
industrialized countries, up from 15th place a year earlier.248 Most fled in the second 
half of the year due to the sharp intensification of the armed conflict. There are also 
reports of increasing number of irregular Syrian arrivals. While the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees affirmed in July 2013 that the number of Syrian asylum 

                                                
248 In 2012, more than half of the Syrian asylum seekers requested refugee status in Sweden (7,800 claims) and 
Germany (6,200 claims). In Sweden, the figure increased twelve-fold (650 claims in 2011), while in Germany it 
more than doubled (2,600 claims in 2011). Other important destination countries were the United Kingdom (1,300 
claims), Switzerland (1,400 claims) and Austria (920 claims). See UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in 
Industrialized Countries – 2012, 2013, p. 16, www.unhcr.org/5149b81e9.html; in this report, UNHCR notes that in 
virtually all 44 countries, the number of Syrian asylum-seekers went up in 2012, with the exception of Greece. A 
growing number of Syrian nationals were recorded irregularly entering or present in Greece but asylum claim 
numbers from this group remained low. 

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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claims in EU countries “remains manageable…,” if displacement drags on and 
international assistance is inadequate, this will change.249 European governments, in 
particular, should prioritize thinking about a collective response to Syrian asylum-
seekers which upholds their rights and shares responsibility for response. 

19. Focus should be placed on the appropriate role for resettlement of refugees 

outside the region. So far, Germany has agreed to resettle on a temporary basis some 
5,000 vulnerable Syrians and Sweden has announced that it will give asylum to all 
Syrian refugees who apply.  The Obama administration recently announced a new 
target of 2,000 Syrians for resettlement, an increase from the 90 or so Syrian refugees 
who have been permanently admitted to the US in the last two years. These are 
positive signals, but they are just a drop in the bucket in terms of the millions of 
Syrians who have been displaced by the violence. Resettlement programs do not just 
offer solutions to individual refugees but can also play an important role in 
demonstrating responsibility-sharing with regional governments hosting large 
numbers of refugees. Bold, creative, strategic thinking on resettlement is needed. For 
example, could present cumbersome US procedures to process refugees be revised to 
expedite and expand an eventual Syrian refugee resettlement program? Could 
countries which are relatively new to resettlement, such as Brazil, be encouraged to 
resettle more refugees from Syria? Could temporary resettlement mechanisms, such 
as the Humanitarian Evacuation program from Kosovo serve as models for new 
thinking about the role of resettlement in Syria?  

20. Discussions should be started now about the eventual establishment of an 

international mechanism to support solutions for displacement in Syria. 
International processes have, in the past, served as vehicles for creative multilateral 
approaches to resolving long-standing crises, for example in Central America and in 
Southeast Asia. Thought should be given now about what future mechanisms or 
processes could be used to resolve Syrian displacement when circumstances allow. 
For example, the role of regional organizations, Gulf states, UN agencies and donor 
governments should be considered. Ministerial-level meetings with governments of 
host countries are currently being held to discuss the challenges of humanitarian 
response. These could be important opportunities for informal consultations about 
long-term future efforts. Even when the international system seems blocked and weak 
in bringing about an end to the violence, creative steps can and should be taken – 
steps which could be implemented to bring about an end to long-term displacement 
and the suffering it has caused.  

 

 

                                                
249 UNHCR, “UN's High Commissioner for Refugees urges Europe to do more for Syrian asylum-seekers,” 18 July 
2013, www.unhcr.org/51e7ecc56.html  

S y r i a n   C r i s i s :   M a s s i v e   D i s p l a c e m e n t ,   D i r e   N e e d s   a n d   a   S h o r t a g e   o f   S o l u t i o n s  

 

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