[FOM] Fwd: Workshop on Logical Correctness (WoLC), 21-26 June 2018

[Fabien Schang]

*Last Call for Papers*


Dear colleagues,


You are invited to submit abstracts to the following workshop on Logical
Correctness at the 6t World Congress on Universal Logic (Vichy, France),
June 21-26 (+ 16-21 June for the schools), 2018.
http://www.uni-log.org/start6.html

Organizers: Fabien SCHANG (Universidade Estadual de Maringá, Brazil) & James
TRAFFORD (UCA Epsom, UK)
Keynote speaker: Ole Hjortland (University of Bergen, Norway)

Typically, logical correctness is taken to concern whether or not an
argument or proof follows a logical path from premises to conclusions. In
recent years, however, such a view has been complicated by the
proliferation of logics, approaches to logic, and uses of logic. In this
workshop, we intend to discuss the philosophical and logical consequences
of these changes with regard to how, or if, there is any sort of criteria
by which a logical structure could be deemed correct, and whether or not
those criteria are context-relevant in some specifiable manner.
In a broader sense of the word, correctness can also be understood in at
least three different senses:
•       meta-logical: a logical system or calculus is correct iff all
provable statements in it are true (Related word: soundness.)
•       logical:  a statement is correct iff it refers to an implicitly or
explicitly rule system. (Related word: accuracy)
•       moral: an action is correct iff it obeys given norms of behavior.
(Related word: political correctness)
There seems to be connections between all these three readings of
correctness, to be centered around the criterion of a norm. But, while in
the metalogical concept of correctness-as-soundness truth is something that
is attributed or denied to sentences, with the logical concept of
correctness-as-accuracy it deals with actions (also verbal actings) and
allows gradations. As to the moral correctness, it refers to social norms
and departs from the criterion of truth. A special emphasis is to be made
on Dummett's inferentialist explication of the concept “Boche”, in this
respect: does such a logical explanation succeed in affording the meaning
of such non-logical concepts?

We invite abstracts for papers dealing with any of the below topics (though
not necessarily limited to them):
•       Anti-exceptionalism about logic
•       A priorism about logic
•       Logical foundationalism
•       The connection between logic and reasoning
•       Logic and argumentation
•       Different uses for logic (argument / computer science / scientific
reasoning etc.)
•       Contextual logics
•       Logical pluralism
•       Political correctness (semantics of slurs / norms of language and
common decency)

Please send your abstracts to the following address: schangfabien at gmail.com

Deadline: 5th October 2017
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