[FOM] CfP: Consequence and Paradox between Truth and Proof, 2-3 March 2017, Tübingen

Luca Tranchini luca.tranchini at gmail.com
Sun Nov 6 16:36:07 EST 2016

                Consequence and Paradox
                 between Truth and Proof

                 2-3 March 2017 in Tübingen, Germany


The notion of logical consequence has been traditionally analysed as
necessary truth-preservation, and such an analysis is at the core of
contemporary model-theoretic approaches to semantics. An alternative
approach to semantics is inferentialism, according to which the notions of
inference and proof should play a more fundamental role than those of
reference, truth and satisfaction in the construction of a semantic theory.

Inferentialism has mostly been developed in opposition to the more
traditional semantic approach. However, the tight relationships between the
basic concepts involved in the two approaches suggest a more complex
interplay than mere opposition. Examples of this interplay are the
investigations using proof-theoretic techniques of the notion of truth, or
current research in the proof-theory of non-classical logic based on
uniform methods of recasting model-theoretic techniques (e.g. Kripke-style
semantics) in a purely syntactic fashion. More generally, many of the
central notions (e.g. admissibility) and results (e.g. interpolation) in
logic usually have both a model-theoretic and a proof-theoretic dimension.
Moreover, the notions of truth and proof, when conceived as the central
notions of a theory of meaning, share many of their core features (for
instance for sufficiently strong theories, neither truth nor informal
provability can be exhaustively characterized in terms of derivability in
any formal system).

This complex interplay between truth and proof can be found in current
debates on paradoxes as well. Solutions to paradoxes are motivated
sometimes by traditional semantic considerations, sometimes by
considerations about the structural features of our inferential
practices. Plausibly, a thorough understanding of paradoxes requires
resources coming from both model-theoretic and inferential conceptions
of language and meaning.

The aim of the workshop is to bring together researchers working on
different aspects of logical consequence and paradoxes to exchange
ideas and methods and discuss recent results.

Pablo Cobreros (Navarra)
Volker Halbach (Oxford)
Marianna Antonutti Marfori (Munich)
Sara Negri (Helsinki)
Paolo Pistone (Roma 3)

If you would like to contribute a talk (30-45 minutes), then please
send a one-page abstract to Luca Tranchini at
cptp-cfp at informatik.uni-tuebingen.de. The deadline for submission is
15 December 2016. We will notify you by 15 January 2017 of acceptance
or rejection.

Submission deadline: 15 December
of acceptance: 15 January
Workshop: 2-3 March 2017

The workshop is organized by Luca Tranchini (Tübingen) as part of the
DFG project Logical Consequence and Paradoxical Reasoning.

The invited speakers and the organizer

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