[FOM] SEP Entry on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems

[Antonino Drago]

Why the reductive title:
6.2 Self-evident and analytical truths
instead of: Which kind of a theory organization? or: Is it sufficient an 
axiomatic organization? i.e. the question underlined by Beth even in 
Foundation of Mathematics 1959, van Heijenoort in Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
Macmillan, and Hintikka in Phil. Topics vol 17 and answered in the negative?

Maybe the above title is also misleading: why the alternative to analytic 
truths is "self-evident" truths? The two terms of the celebrated polemics 
Poincaré-Hilbert were "intuitive" and "formal".
Best regards
Anonino Drago


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Panu Raatikainen" <panu.raatikainen at helsinki.fi>
To: "Foundations of Mathematics" <fom at cs.nyu.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, November 19, 2013 7:07 AM
Subject: [FOM] SEP Entry on Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems


> My longish entry on Gödel's incompleteness theorems, in The Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  is finally out:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/
>
>
> All the Best
>
> Panu Raatikainen
>
>
> -- 
> Panu Raatikainen
>
> Ph.D., Adjunct Professor in Theoretical Philosophy
>
> Theoretical Philosophy
> Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies
> P.O. Box 24  (Unioninkatu 38 A)
> FIN-00014 University of Helsinki
> Finland
>
> E-mail: panu.raatikainen at helsinki.fi
>
> http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/praatika/
>
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