[FOM] Physical Theories and Hypercomputation

[Dmytro Taranovsky]

On 03/10/2012 11:12 AM, Vaughan Pratt wrote:
> In response to Dmytro Taranovsky I would say simply that any 
> speculation about the computational capability of nature that ignores 
> the implications of quantum mechanics is dead on arrival.
I was writing in general terms that are applicable to both classical and 
quantum physics.  In both cases, key to recursiveness is the finite and 
approximate nature of observations (which in quantum mechanics is 
reinforced by the uncertainty principle).  In both cases, singularities 
form a potential loophole.

In quantum mechanics, under the multiverse interpretation, time 
evolution is exact and deterministic, like in a classical system.  
However, to relate the theory to our experience, the theory is commonly 
presented in terms of a classical observer interacting with a quantum 
system.  Some states that make sense classically, such as a particle 
with an exact position and exact momentum, do not exist in a quantum 
system, which is where the uncertainty principle comes from.

For some classical theories, a source of hypercomputation is a computer 
with infinitely-self-shrinking parts, which is ruled out by ordinary 
quantum physics.  However, some quantum theories have their own issues 
(as in potential divergences), such as contribution of states with 
arbitrarily high energy to the result.  For quantum field theories, 
convergence is a major open question, and renormalizability only 
partially addresses it.  If the absence of divergences is proved (which 
is far from certain), then one might be able to show that (ignoring 
potential nonrecursiveness of physical constants) under appropriate 
assumptions, effective time evolution under the Standard Model is in BQP.

Vaughan Pratt also makes an intuitive argument about limited precision 
of observations.  One correction is that 34 digits of precision is for 
an observer with about 1 Joule of energy and 1 second of time; potential 
precision increases linearly with E*t (and hence the number of digits of 
precision increases logarithmically).  An interesting problem would be 
to formalize the argument and to prove -- or refute -- that for certain 
quantum theories, the fine structure constant (or some other constant) 
cannot be computed to 100 decimal places in a reasonable amount of 
time.  One question here is how sensitive a many-particle system can be 
to the precise value of the constants.

Sincerely,
Dmytro Taranovsky