[FOM] Kripke's outline of a theory of truth

[Harry Deutsch]

Godel emphasizes that a proposition undecidable at a certain level is decidable at a "later" level, presumably one with a truth predicate applying to the earlier level.  What are the problems with this?  Does it have to do with the definition of satisfaction?
On Feb 20, 2012, at 1:35 PM, Timothy Y. Chow wrote:

> I know I have asked this question before, but I don't remember whether it 
> was on FOM, and more importantly, I can't seem to find where I stashed the 
> answer in my own files.
> 
> In Kripke's "Outline of a Theory of Truth," he makes the following 
> comment, "To my surprise, I have found that the problem of defining the 
> languages of transfinite level presents substantial technical difficulties 
> which have never seriously been investigated."  He then goes on to say 
> that he has some partial results but doesn't go into detail.
> 
> What difficulties was Kripke talking about and have they been surmounted 
> by subsequent researchers?
> 
> Tim
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