[FOM] Richard Epstein's view

[Timothy Y. Chow]

On Thu, 5 Apr 2012, Sara L. Uckelman wrote:
> I took the point of your earlier message as to be giving a theory of
> truth which would be able to encompass a particular view about the truth
> of mathematical statements, in which case being able to deal with
> possibility is a necessary component.

This last part is what I don't see.  Why is being able to deal with 
possibility a necessary component of any account of mathematical truth?  
We could easily fulfill the dream of the QED project and create a complete 
formalized repository of all mathematical theorems (in set theory or type 
theory, say) without ever having to consider necessity/possibility.

Possible truth of mathematical theorems arises only informally, as in my 
example of "the Riemann hypothesis might be true," and nobody thinks of 
these as strictly *mathematical* statements.

Tim