[FOM] Truth and existence
aa at tau.ac.il
Wed Jul 13 14:11:37 EDT 2011
Am 12.07.11 22:18, schrieb Roger Bishop Jones:
>It does not require any metaphysical position at all. Acceptance
>that "all possible subsets" is meaningful, like acceptance that
>the concept of natural number is meaningful, is well within the
>normal standards of mathematics, and is independent of
>metaphysical ontology. (it is true that philosophers do sometimes
>refer to the acceptance of the objectivity of truth in some domain
>as realism, but then some philosophers are unable to accept that
>one can believe in the objective truth of arithmetic without also
>believing in the existence of numbers. On that latter point I can
>assure them as a matter of empirical fact that it is possible).
I am sorry, but I do not see the difference between the claim that
one can believe in the objective truth of arithmetic without also
believing in the existence of numbers, and the claim that
one can believe in the objective truth of the stories of the Greek
mythology without also believing in the (past) existence of the Greek gods.
I certainly miss something here.
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