[FOM] On Myhill on Gödel on paradoxes

[Frode Bjørdal]

The opening sentence of Roger Myhill's *Paradoxes, *Synthese 60 (1984),
129-143, is: “Gödel said to me more than once "There never were any
set-theoretic paradoxes, but the property-theoretic paradoxes are still
unresolved"; and he may well have said the same thing in print.”

This remark seems to have had influence in that some later authors have used
the term "property-theory" for theories which seek to account for more
type-free accounts that approximate naive abstraction in dealing with the
paradoxes.

Can someone at this stage fill in with more information concerning what
Gödel may have said or written concerning this? What is the earlies use of
the term "property-theory" in the area?
-- 


Frode Bjørdal
Professor i filosofi
IFIKK, Universitetet i Oslowww.hf.uio.no/ifikk/personer/vit/fbjordal/index.html
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