[FOM] Paradoxes and Platonism

[praatika@mappi.helsinki.fi]

Lainaus laureano luna <laureanoluna at yahoo.es>:
 
> Have set theoretic paradoxes ever been regarded as simply disproving
> Platonism?

Perhaps this is relevant: early Russell and Moore advocated a sort of 
ultra-realism (or -platonism), according to which corresponding to any 
meaningful expression, predicate or whatever, there must exist some 
enitity which is its referent (typically an abstract object). But 
Russell's paradox demonstrates that this cannot be right. I think Russell 
himself took this to be the moral.

All the Best, Panu



Panu Raatikainen

Ph.D., Academy Research Fellow,
Docent in Theoretical Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
University of Helsinki
Finland


E-mail: panu.raatikainen at helsinki.fi

http://www.mv.helsinki.fi/home/praatika/