[FOM] BLC 5TH SUMMER ANNOUNCEMENT

[John Corcoran]

BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 
2008 THIRTY-NINTH YEAR
FIFTH SUMMER ANNOUNCEMENT
QUOTE OF THE MONTH 
NABRASA ON WITTGENSTEIN ON CONSEQUENCE: If one proposition follows from
another, the latter says more than the former, and the former less than the
latter.  —Ludwig Wittgenstein 1921, 5.14. This seems to imply that every
proposition says more than it says and also less than it says. Maybe there
are surprises in logic after all. — Frango Nabrasa 2001, 1.01.
 
FIFTH MEETING:
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
12:00-1:30 PM.
141 Park Hall
 
SPEAKER: John Corcoran, Philosophy, University of Buffalo.
TITLE: Frege’s Thoughts
ABSTRACT: After his retirement in 1918, Frege published a number of
important articles, "Der Gedanke" ("The Thought", 1918), "Die Verneinung"
("Negation", 1918), and "Gedankengefüge" ("Compound Thoughts", 1923). “The
Thought” is one of the main influences on the theory of sentences and
propositions in Church’s 1956 INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. John
Corcoran will read and discuss passages from Frege’s “The Thought” and lead
an open discussion of it. There are two translations; one by A. and M.
Quinton is in MIND 1956. Copies of the paper will be available at the
meeting. The presentation and discussion will not presuppose prior
acquaintance with the article or with the issues treated.

For a PDF reprint of the Quinton translation, email corcoran at buffalo.edu
with THOUGHT in the subject line.
 
 
SIXTH MEETING:
Tuesday, August 19, 2008
12:00-1:30 PM.
141 Park Hall
 
SPEAKER: George Boger, Chair, Philosophy, Canisius College.
TITLE: Paradoxes: to be or to be perceived?
ABSTRACT: On page 21 of his 1989 paper “Argumentations and Logic”, John
Corcoran wrote the following.
 
“An argumentation that seems to deduce a conclusion thought to be false from
premises thought to be true is called a paradox.  The phrases ‘seems to
deduce’, ‘thought to be false’ and ‘thought to be true’ make tacit
elliptical reference to a participant.  One and the same argumentation that
is a paradox for one participant may seem to another participant to be a
proof that its conclusion is true and it may seem to another participant to
be a proof that a certain one of its premises is false and to yet another
participant it may seem to involve fallacious reasoning.  Perhaps the most
important point here is that an argumentation that actually is a paradox for
a given participant at a given time can fail to be a paradox for the same
participant at a later time.  It goes without saying that the converse is
also true, viz. that an argumentation that is not a paradox for a given
participant at one time may become a paradox for the same participant at a
later time.” 
 
Assuming Corcoran’s claims for purposes of discussion, Boger will examine
the ontological status of paradoxes. 

For a PDF reprint of the Corcoran paper, email corcoran at buffalo.edu with AL
in the subject line.
 
Future Speakers: David Braun (University of Buffalo), William Demopoulos
(University of Western Ontario), David DeVidi (University of Waterloo),
David Hitchcock (McMaster University) , Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State
University), Barry Smith (University of Buffalo), Leonard Jacuzzo (Canisius
College and Fredonia University), Frango Nabrasa (Manatee Institute), Thomas
Reber (Canisius College).
 
THESE ARE BROWN-BAG MEETINGS. COME WHEN YOU ARE FREE. BRING LUNCH. LEAVE
WHEN YOU HAVE TO. ALL ARE WELCOME

To receive this via email, please send your full name and email address to
John Corcoran. For further information, to report glitches, suggest a talk,
unsubscribe, or make suggestions, please email: John Corcoran:
corcoran at buffalo.edu
 
 
 
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