[FOM] Definition of "philosophy"

[Charles Silver]

On Mar 12, 2007, at 6:41 PM, Joseph Vidal-Rosset wrote:

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> Le Mon, 12 Mar 2007 13:15:15 -0500,
> Charles Silver <silver_1 at mindspring.com> a écrit :
>
>> 	(Another thing I believe is that "real philosophy" is not
>> often done in departments of philosophy.  So, a good definition, at
>> least in my view, should reflect this.)
>
> It is maybe useful to distinguish "philosophy" as activity and
> philosophical systems which are sometimes the result of a great
> philosophical activity.
>
> Wittgenstein in his Tractatus (4.112) gives a nice definition of
> philosophy as activity. In my opinion it is hard to disagree with his
> definition of what *should* be the philosophical activity. But it is a
> fact that there are also philosophical theories and philosophical
> systems.

	Damn!  You could have included his definition.   I had to hunt down  
the _Tractatus_ to find it (Okay, so I'm lazy!):

4.112  	 "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.
		Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
		A philosophical work consists of essentially of elucidations.
		Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions, but  
rather in the clarification of propositions.
		Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct:  
its task is to make them clear and to give 	them sharp boundaries."

	The above does not seem to allow for "philosophical theories," or  
one might say: any philosophic views whatever.  This to me might make  
philosophy empty.   Somebody's got to say something to start the ball  
rolling.  I'm not indicting W's views here, but they could lead to  
more of those in philosophy who've made their whole reputation as  
counter-example men (or women).   Having nothing to say in a positive  
light, they find fault with others' views--often very slyly and  
cleverly, which is highly amusing to students, who try to emulate  
this.   To me, a notion, an idea, a view, etc. is something to be  
nurtured, not criticized in its very inception.   When one comes up  
with an idea, it's usually not correct as it stands and typically  
admits counter-examples, which can just shoot down the idea before it  
has a change to simmer and grow, so one can find out whether it  
really leads to something or just falls flat.   Mulling over a notion  
that's popped into someone's head in order to find out where it  
leads, what's right and what's wrong with it, seems a prelude for any  
attempt at clarifying it.  To me, (something worth the honorific  
term) "an idea" shouldn't be clarified immediately; one should just  
turn it over in his or her head.

	As an aside, those of you out there trying to arrive at new results  
in math, logic, computer science (and probably a number of other  
fields) seem to me to *really* have ideas.   I don't see how you  
could arrive at something new without an idea or maybe several of  
them lying at the bottom of your results.   If you spent your time  
arguing with colleagues and others, I cannot see that you'd get  
anywhere.   Progress would come to a standstill.


>
> Jules Vuillemin in his book "What are philosophical systems?" (CUP,
> 1986) proposes an interesting theory and a classification of
> philosophical systems (but unfortunately not well-known). His theory
> tries to explain why philosophy is basically polemical.

	In my very cynical view, philosophy is polemical because  
philosophers have a paucity of ideas and a desire to pull oneself up  
a couple of rungs up on the status ladder by devastating another's  
view.  It's sort of like chess: if an 1800 player loses to someone  
with a 1700 ranking, the winner climbs up and the loser drops some  
points.  I have to add that in my much-too-many-years studying  
philosophy, I have *never* encountered a professor who encouraged me  
to develop an idea that could possibly be worthwhile.   One learns  
never to expose oneself with a speculation, for it just encourages  
the ladder-climbers to make try to make you look foolish.   There's a  
site called something like "philosophy as a blood sport" that's  
interesting to look at.


>
> Quine, in his famous paper "On what there is" gives also a
> classification of philosophies of mathematics based on the respective
> ontological commitments of such or such philosophical system.

	Thanks to Quine, many philosophers spend a lot of time on  
"ontological" (or "ontic") commitment, which to me is a bogus  
enterprise.   One does not, as Qune says, create "an ontological  
slum" (don't know if this quote is accurate) by merely having a  
theory with a number of, acc. to Quine, unwanted entities. (What I  
mean is that a viewpoint with numerous entities doesn't have any  
effect on the world. They're only in the head  Where's the slum?   
What about all those strange entities in physics.  Are they in the  
slum too?   Seems too reductionist.   Smacks of a kind of Puritanism  
to me.  Apply it to computer science: create a new data structure.   
Whoops!  There goes the neighborhood.)

> So, why "real philosophy" is not often done in department of
> philosophy? For many reasons. Firstly because philosophers already
> disagree about the nature of the "real philosophy" itself.

	??


> Secondly
> because it is very hard to understand the different philosophical
> positions on one classical philosophical problem, and also find  
> crucial
> arguments to defend one's own theory.

	Again: Don't understand.

> Do not forget that Plato himself
> begins with aporetical dialogs.

	I don't believe this.  His Socratic protagonist is smug and certain,  
while feigning ignorance, often pretending that his opponent is an  
expert and that poor, ignorant Socrates wants to query him to just to  
learn something--then Soc. lowers the boom.   One reads the dialogs  
with the expectation that Socrates through his tricks will eventually  
make his opponents look foolish.  It's like waiting for one of those  
unrealistic detective dramas on TV get their man by the appointed  
hour.   Plato fills the dialogs with fallacies by Socrates's  
opponents, so Socrates can clean his opponent's clock.   And  
Socrates's own arguments are larded with fallacies as well.  All we  
really find out in the end is that Socrates kicked ass.
	This, I think set the stage for modern philosophy, where someone  
licks his chops at someone else's view, trying to figure out how he/ 
she can set him up with appearing just to ask questions, hoping to be  
able to ridicule.   If Plato laid out his views straightforwardly,  
they'd look bad, whereas kicking ass makes him look good.
	A True Story: I was once in a seminar in which a prominent  
philosopher took a student, call him S, to task for his views.   The  
philosophy prof was relentless, providing several counter-examples,  
grinning happily while the poor student, who was fair of face, turned  
beet red.   This went on for quite a while.  I thought to myself:  
"Okay, you've made S look like an ass, why don't you let up?"   The  
very next week (it met once a week, every Wednesday), the prof had  
arrived at more devastating, embarrassing, humiliating criticisms of  
the grad student.   To me, it was sheer sadism.
	There's a follow-up:  a couple years later, the prof approached me  
and asked what I thought of a particular philosophical view.  I  
thought for a minute and then said I didn't think it could be true  
and gave several reasons why I thought that.   The philosopher nodded  
vigorously.  Then he said that S, who was now an ABD and was teaching  
at a good school, had made that view the centerpiece of his whole  
dissertation.   The prof walked away, saying he'd now have to inform  
S that he'd have to demolish his whole dissertation.   To me, this  
was just plain mean.   Had I known that the question had such  
terrible consequences, I'd never have answered as I did.   And I  
thought that it was  disreputable for the prof to come up to me with  
his "innocent" question.  And it was decidedly unprofessional  for  
him to tell me that the view was in S's  dissertation and that the  
prof. was going to tell him to start from scratch.   That's just one  
instance of meanness by philosophers masquerading their nastiness as  
philosophical criticism.  I'm sure this kind of thing happens in  
other fields.   But philosophy, going back to Plato, is made up of  
this sort of behavior. (Again,  check out "philosophy as a blood  
sport".)
	

> Last but not least, because real
> invention (or discovery) in rational philosophy is maybe more  
> difficult
> than in others domains (because of the burden of the history of
> philosophy, which exists, and which can be denied only by ignorants  
> and
> naive "thinkers").

	I think I follow, and agree.  (¿The point is that one has to fight  
through canonical viewpoints that have been established through  
centuries of tradition--is that right?)

> That is only an attempt of clarification, not a definition...

	But maybe enough clarifications can lead to something approximating  
a definition.  Seems as if, as Isaac Malitz said, these very  
exchanges help.

Charlie Silver