[FOM] "Progress" in philosophy
Robbie Lindauer
rlindauer at gmail.com
Sun Mar 11 17:54:03 EDT 2007
On Mar 10, 2007, at 8:15 AM, Charles Silver wrote:
> On the positive side, how about if "we" *define* what we mean by
> philosophy. (I'd like Harvey to tell us what he means by it.)
It would certainly help some philosophical programs in mathematics
along if we could define away philosophy altogether. Philosophy
could be just a variety of logic, and we could have axioms in
philosophy and correct dissenters by reference to those axioms.
But before we decide to do this, it's worth remembering the
philosophical justifications in which almost all of the "great
mathematicians" indulged, connecting their mathematical work with
philosophical problems. Cantor, for instance, regarded his own work
as existing for the sake of these metaphysical problems. Cantor's
mathematical work was an extension in a way of his theology; in many
ways this theological foundation continues today in the notions of
Oracle or Super Computer or Super-Advanced Aliens that provide the
epistemological and ontological foundations when no "real present"
one can be found. (Perhaps we are all Santayanists when it comes to
mathematics, though we "know" no super-decider can exist for the
mathematical theories we like, its useful to carry on as though one
does.)
As a result of a refusal to address the epistemological and
ontological problems facing mathematics head on Philosophically (what
really qualifies something as an axiom? what makes a mathematical
statement true? what makes anyone think we can have the kind of
knowledge which mathematicians appear to claim to have? what
constitutes that as knowledge rather than something else? Of what
value is mathematics?) the only reasonable position left is some kind
of mathematical agnosticism. That said, the only way, I think, to
make the program of FOM, for instance, relevant (that is, have
"general interest"...) is to address the traditional epistemological
and ontological problems head on and on their native ground -
philosophically. Refusal to do this just makes FOM irrelevant for
those problems of the most general interest (as H. Freidmann put it).
One can make claims of progress in mathematics, then, as long as one
remains agnostic about results therein having any bearing on these
overarching epistemic, ontological, political and religious
questions. But this kind of agnosticism is itself a philosophical
position, even the refusal to call it such is an old saw,
philosophically speaking.
Somewhat relatedly, the question of progress is relative to purpose.
Progress towards what? One culture called the advance of the
Americans across the continent "Progress" in the form of "manifest
destiny". Another culture now calls what happened (and continues to
happen sometimes) "ethnicidal". Progress is a value-term and what is
valuable is usually relative to a stated or non-stated purpose. Some
forms of mathematics have obvious purpose - one can regard SQL as the
economic justification of set theory, in a way. Studies in
decidability have applications to artificial intelligence, one can
regard work in that direction as progress if one regards Artificial
Intelligence as Progress (as I think many people do). The ability to
produce a nuclear weapon or nuclear energy depends in a sense on some
aspects of higher mathematics, and one can regard military
applications as one of the core justifiers of mathematical research
and calling what is found there "progress". If there is an "absolute
standard of value" and if Mathematics fits under it I have no idea.
But a decision on that matter will have to be a philosophical
problem, mathematics is not equipped to deal with this question I
think. Certainly putting in place some axioms and working out their
consequences won't help.
But relative to other problems, the standard "beauty-queen problems"
in our world, these issues of how to most accurately represent
financial and personnel data in computers and how to make computers
"think" like humans and how to destroy civilizations in fell swoop,
have to be regarded as very low on the importance scale. (Unless, I
guess, one is an "Singulitarian" ala R. Kurzweil.) And if we defined
progress as "creating a world in which there is social and economic
justice, peace and prosperity" I doubt that the progress that
mathematics is making toward being able to more accurately predict
trends in the stock market and create even more powerful super-
weapons, etc., would be counted as progress in that regard. Whereas,
for instance, the work of the (decidedly not mathematical)
philosopher E. Levinas could certainly be so regarded.
Best Wishes,
Robbie Lindauer
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