[FOM] PA and recursive saturation

[Neil Tennant]

On Mon, 20 Mar 2006 A.S.Virdi at lse.ac.uk wrote:

> To get what the deflationist wants (***namely the ability of truth to
> prove soundness/reflection principles***), we need a theory of truth
> that does not conservatively extend the base theory. [Emphasis added.]

Why should the deflationist want what you claim she wants?
Can you cite an expression of her alleged want?
And even if you can, might she not be confused in wanting that
much?---that is, might she not be failing to hold faith with her own main
claim(s) about the essential point of our use of the truth predicate?

Also, what is "substantial" or non-deflationist about being willing to say
such things as that the conjunction of two propositions is true just in
case each conjunct is true?

Neil Tennant