[FOM] FOM BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 3RD SUMMER NOTICE

[John Corcoran]

BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM 
http://www.philosophy.buffalo.edu/EVENTS/blc.htm
2006-7 THIRTY-SEVENTH YEAR
THIRD SUMMER ANNOUNCEMENT
QUOTE OF THE MONTH:  INFERENCE AND DEDUCTION: In the sense to be
recommended, the verb 'infer' is used for the epistemic activity of [a
person] judging a proposition to be true by determining that it is a
consequence of given propositions known to be true.  The verb 'deduce'
is used for the epistemic activity of determining that a proposition is
a consequence of given propositions. Aristotle discovered that the same
process of deduction used inferentially to draw a conclusion from
premises known to be true is also used non-inferentially to draw a
conclusion from premises whose truth or falsity is unknown, or even from
premises known to be false. Applying his grasp of this point in the
first few pages of Prior Analytics, he distinguished demonstrative from
non-demonstrative deductions.  He wrote: "Every demonstration is a
deduction but not every deduction is a demonstration." He could just as
easily have said: "Every inference includes a deduction but not every
deduction is part of an inference." - John Corcoran, BSL 2006, 353-4.


THIRD MEETING
Wednesday, July 12, 2006	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall

SPEAKER: John Kearns, Philosophy, University of Buffalo.
TITLE: The Epistemic Character of Deduction: A Speech-Act Approach.
ABSTRACT: Historically, the subject matter logic has had both an
epistemic and an ontic or ontological dimension. From the time of
Aristotle until the mid-nineteenth century, the focus was primarily
epistemic. Logic dealt with arguments, deductions, and proofs. Following
the work of Boole and Frege, logic took an ontic turn. The move toward
ontology was a genuine advance for logic, and both broadened and
deepened the subject. But this advance should not lead to the
abandonment of the epistemic dimension of logic. Frege and others may
have confused a concern for epistemology with the psychologism which
they hold in contempt. That is simply a mistake.
	Illocutionary logic, which is the logic of speech acts, or
language acts, comes closer to giving equal time, or equal
consideration, to both the ontic and the epistemic. This talk will
sketch a simple system of illocutionary logic, and comment on some of
the issues that are clarified, and some of the puzzles that are solved
or dissolved with the help of illocutionary logic. 


FOURTH MEETING
Wednesday, July 19, 2006	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall

TENTATIVE SPEAKER: Frango Nabrasa, Mathematical Sciences, Manatee
Institute, Coquina Beach, FL.
TITLE: Universal Import.
ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of existential import of universal propositions
has received much attention both before and after Keynes gave it its
name in the late 1800s.  However, the equally fundamental phenomenon of
universal import of existential propositions has been totally ignored -
perhaps because it does not occur in Aristotle's logic or in Boole's.
An existential proposition has general universal import (GUI) if it
implies the corresponding universal.  An existentialized conjunction has
conditional (or relative) universal import (CUI) if it implies the
corresponding universalized conditional.  It had been conjectured that,
aside from trivialities such as tautologies and contradictions, no
existentials have universal import of either kind.  But for standard
(one-sorted first-order) logic the conjecture was quickly refuted by
citing number-theoretic propositions: "some number x is such that every
number y is x" has general universal import and "some number x is such
that x is different from zero and every number is either x or zero",
which implies "every number x is such that if x is different from zero
then every number is either x or zero", has conditional universal
import.  The question then arises as to which (standard) existentials
have GUI general universal import and which existentialized conjunctions
have CUI conditional universal import.  Instead of attacking this
question directly we asked the closely related question: which universal
propositions are logically equivalent (LE) to existentials having GUI
and which universalized conditionals are LE to existentialized
conjunctions having CUI.  The main results are that every universal
(resp. universalized conditional) is LE to an existential (resp.
existentialized conjunction) which has general (resp. conditional)
universal import.  This leads directly to the conclusion that every
existential (even those which are not existentialized conjunctions) is
LE to an existential (in fact to an existentialized conjunction) which
has both general universal import and conditional universal import. This
is a result in the subfield of logic Corcoran called Schematics, the
study of argument schemata: an argument schema is called omnivalid if
all of its instances are valid, omninvalid if none are, and ambivalid if
some but not all are. The universal and existential import schemata are
two of many interesting ambivalid schemata. Thanks to Ole Anders, Mark
Brown, John Corcoran, Todd Ernst, Leonard Jacuzzo, Linda S. Lavida, and
Mary M. Mulhern.


FIFTH MEETING
Wednesday, July 26 2006	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall
PANEL: Kenneth Barber, Leonard Jacuzzo, and John Corcoran. 
TITLE: Teaching Logic.
ABSTRACT: Each member of a panel of logic teachers will give a
ten-minute presentation of a message about teaching logic followed by
ten minutes of open discussion. Among the topics that are under
consideration are: the goals of logic, what to say the first day, the
role of paradigm cases, the role of fallacies, the role of history, the
best non-logical content to use in introductory courses, explaining
connectives, material and logical implication, epistemics and ontics,
number theory, alternative logics, existential import, identity logic,
logic textbooks, which system of logic should be taught first. Other
Teaching-Logic Panels will be held in the fall and spring.
Future Speakers: William Demopoulos (University of Western Ontario and
UC-Irvine), Daniel Merrill (Oberlin College), William Rapaport
(University of Buffalo) Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State University), Barry
Smith (University of Buffalo).

THESE BROWN-BAG MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE ON WEDNESDAYS AT NOON THROUGH
JULY, POSSIBLY INTO AUGUST.  COME WHEN YOU ARE FREE.  BRING LUNCH.
LEAVE WHEN YOU HAVE TO.  ALL ARE WELCOME.

To receive this via email, please send your full name and email address
to John Corcoran. For further information, to report glitches, suggest a
talk, unsubscribe or make other suggestions, please email: John
Corcoran: corcoran at buffalo.edu


THE TASK OF FORMAL LOGIC: KEYNES AND ARISTOTLE: The function of the
formal logician is to distinguish between that which is self-consistent
and that which is self-contradictory. J. N. Keynes 1884/1906, 215.
Aristotle's view was that the function of the formal logician is to
distinguish between what is implied by and what is independent of (not
implied by) a given premise set. In a way, Keynes and Aristotle agree:
in order for a conclusion to be implied by a given premise set it is
necessary and sufficient for the negation of the conclusion to
contradict the premise set; in order for a conclusion to be independent
of a given premise set it is necessary and sufficient for the negation
of the conclusion to be consistent with the premise set.- Frango Nabrasa
2006.