[FOM] re the meaning of set
Mark Lance
lancem at georgetown.edu
Tue Feb 21 07:07:07 EST 2006
F.A Muller: " Since Wittgenstein it has become a triviality
to say that our use of expressions is
constitutive for their meaning. But only
very recently has Paul Horwich made an attempt
to propound a theory of meaning based on this
triviality. "
I'm actually skeptical that one needs a theory of meaning as
background to a discussion of ordinary uses of "set". (There are
other fom issues far more deeply connected to questions of meaning.)
More specifically on this post, a few observations as someone who
works primarily in philosophy of language:
In my view -- and I've published papers defending this --
WIttgenstein did not think use constitutive of meaning.
The view is certainly is not a triviality as many people continue to
deny it, basing meaning on mental states (Chomsky, Fodor, W. Davis),
biological function (milikan), causal relations to the world (devitt)
etc.
Horwich is certainly not the first to propound a theory of meaning
based on use -- Quine, Sellars, Dummett, Hintikka, and Brandom all
have put forward much more detailed accounts of meaning. One can
argue in any of these cases -- including Horwich -- about whether
these really are precisely theories in which "use is constitutive of
meaning," but there is no grounds for singling out Horwich as the
unique follower of Wittgenstein on this. (And needless to say, each
of these philosophers has things to say about the way their account
of meaning relates to mathematical language.)
Mark Lance
Georgetown University
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