[FOM] Deflationism and the Godel phenomena
Timothy Y. Chow
tchow at alum.mit.edu
Fri Feb 18 10:17:58 EST 2005
On Fri, 18 Feb 2005, Jeffrey Ketland wrote:
> (3) I will not accept 0=1
[...]
> (A: Self-Consistency)
> Possibly: A reasoner may assume his own (arithmetic) consistency
> (as in (3) above).
I think there is quite a large difference between unwillingness to assert
0=1 and assuming one's own arithmetic consistency. The latter seems to
presuppose something like, "The arithmetic sentences I'm willing to assert
form a sufficiently precise structure that they can be modeled as a
logical theory." This is implausible. The things I'm willing to assert,
for example, are not closed under logical consequence; prior to seeing a
proof of (say) the prime number theorem, I was willing to assert all the
relevant axioms but I wasn't willing to assert the prime number theorem,
even though the prime number theorem is (and always has been) a logical
consequence of those axioms.
Tim
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