[FOM] Deflationism and the Godel phenomena

[Joseph Vidal-Rosset]

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Aatu Koskensilta a écrit :
|
| On Feb 16, 2005, at 12:58 PM, Joseph Vidal-Rosset wrote:
|
|> Jeffrey Ketland a écrit :
|>
|> | (ii) The Adequacy Condition (adding truth axioms should give a proof of
|> | reflection principles, and in particular "All theorems of S are true").
|>
|> Do we need at this point to grow up to the second order? I believe it.
|
|
| Only if we want to be able to define the truth predicate explicitly.

Thanks.
But this logico-philosophical debate around deflationism about truth
tries to define truth explicitly, wondering after its substantial or
non-substantial property.
Gödel believed in truth as substantial, no doubt, but neither Tarski nor
Carnap did. The point is to see if mathematical logic can decide who is
right, and I have some doubt about the decidability of this
philosophical question. But I'm maybe wrong.

Jo.
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