[FOM] BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM : 5TH ANNOUNCEMENT

[John Corcoran]

BUFFALO LOGIC COLLOQUIUM
2004-2005
THIRTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY YEAR
FIFTH SUMMER ANNOUNCEMENT

QUOTE OF THE MONTH: BOOLE ON MATHEMATICAL LOGIC: That those laws [of
thought] are as rigorously mathematical as are the laws which govern the
purely quantitative conceptions of space and time, of number and
magnitude, is a conclusion which I do not hesitate to submit to the
exactest scrutiny. - Boole 1848, 198.
 
 
FOURTH MEETING
Wednesday, July 28, 2004	12:00-1:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall
SPEAKER: John Corcoran, Philosophy, University at Buffalo
TITLE: Meanings of Argument 
Abstract: The ambiguous word 'argument' has been used in several senses
most of which are vague.  A useful general overview, by no means
comprehensive or definitive, is found in the 1989 second edition of the
Oxford English Dictionary, available online.  My article, however, is
more limited and more focused; it concentrates on the senses, or
meanings, of the word 'argument' that occur most in philosophy and in
related fields such as logic and mathematics.  It presupposes
acquaintance with basic philosophical distinctions: belief/ knowledge,
persuasion/proof, sentence/proposition/statement/ judgment,
causation/implication/inference, material/logical (implication), true/
known-to be-true, use/mention, type/token/occurrence,
ambiguity/vagueness, etc. In the richest and most concrete sense
considered, an "argument" is an actual discourse presented by its
"speaker" with the clear intention of persuading its "listeners" of the
truth of its conclusion by persuading them that its conclusion is in
some sense implicitly contained in their previously accepted beliefs,
i.e. that because of their previously accepted beliefs they should
accept the conclusion as well.  The obvious fact that an argument in
this sense involves much more than simply its conclusion and its
premises (the previously accepted beliefs) is made vivid by reflection
on the fact that many of the arguments of most interest to philosophers
are "reductios", indirect arguments that involve the assumption by the
participants ("for purposes of reasoning") of the denial of the
conclusion.  In this rich sense we speak of Euclid's argument for the
Pythagorean Theorem, Anselm's argument for the existence of god,
Cantor's argument for the uncountability of the reals, etc. At the
opposite end of a virtual spectrum of senses we find the narrow,
abstract sense in which an "argument" is exhaustively described by
giving its premises and its conclusion: it has no speaker, no listeners,
and involves no reasoning.
 
FUTURE MEETING
Thursday, October 14, 2004	4:00-5:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall
SPEAKER: Barry Smith, 
Park Distinguished Professor, Philosophy, University at Buffalo.
Research Scientist, National Center for Geographic Information and
Analysis.
TITLE: The Logic of Biological Classification.
ABSTRACT: Biomedical research increasingly involves the computerized
navigation through large bodies of information deriving from research in
areas such as functional genomics or from the biochemistry of disease
pathways. To make such navigation more effective controlled vocabularies
have been developed, which are designed to allow data from different
sources to be unified. One of the most influential developments in this
regard is the so-called Gene Ontology, or GO, created in the late 1990s
by an international consortium of biologists. GO consists of a list of
some 20,000 standardized terms describing cellular constituents,
biological processes and molecular functions, organized into hierarchies
via relations of class subsumption and parthood. Here we seek to provide
a rigorous account of the logic of classification that underlies GO and
similar biomedical ontologies. Drawing on Aristotle and on Jan Berg's
formalization of Aristotle's theory of definitions, we develop a system
of axioms and definitions for the treatment of biological classes and
instances. The presentation will be accessible to a broad and diverse
audience of philosophers, biologists, computer scientists, linguists and
logicians. 
 
FUTURE MEETING
Friday, October 15, 2004	4:00-5:30 P.M.	141 Park Hall
SPEAKER: Stewart Shapiro, 
O'Donnell Professor, Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus.
Fellow in Logic, University of St. Andrew, Scotland.
TITLE: Vagueness in Context.

FUTURE MEETING
Saturday, October 16, 2004	12:00-2:00 P.M.	141 Park Hall
SPEAKER: Stewart Shapiro, 
O'Donnell Professor, Philosophy, Ohio State University, Columbus.
Fellow in Logic, University of St. Andrew, Scotland.
TITLE: Corcoran as Mathematician (tentative) 

ALL ARE WELCOME

If you wish to be added to the BLC list, please send your name
and email address to John Corcoran at his email address below.

For further information email John Corcoran: corcoran at buffalo.edu


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