[FOM] Platonism and undecidability

[giovanni sambin]

>Harvey Friedman wrote (Mon Oct 27 23:26:39 EST 2003):
>
>>  I was proposing that it is hard to convince people that "every sentence
>>  has a determinate truth value" if truth values cannot be found, or if
>>  truth values are known to be non findable, or there is absolutely no
>>  evidence that truth values can be found, or there is no plan or idea for
>>  finding truth values, etc.
>
>I want to focus on the part
>
>	it is hard to convince people that "every sentence
>	has a determinate truth value" if ...
>	truth values are known to be non findable
>
>and then substitute "intuitionists" for "people" (if I may):
>
>	it is hard to convince intuitionists that "every sentence
>         has a determinate truth value" if ...
>         truth values are known to be non findable
>
>At this point one has a problem. For an intuitionist, the claim
>
>	the truth-value of p is known to be non findable
>
>is inconsistent, hence cannot play any role in making an *intuitionist*
>reluctant to believe that every sentence has a determinate truth value.
>
>Should I conclude that intuitionists are not people?  :-)
>
>Neil Tennant

I am sorry for the crudeness of the following argument, similar to 
one having a walk to show the absurdity of the thesis of absolute 
absence of motion:
I am an intuitionist, and I exist, and hopefully satisfy the 
criterion for being "people".
It seems to me that it is Tennant's task to find where his funny 
argument fails...

Giovanni Sambin