[FOM] Logical omniscience in epistemic logics

[Edwin Mares]

Three are two problems of logical omniscience, which are sometimes
conflated. (1) There is the problem of making all believers believe all
logical truths. (2) There is the problem of making all believers believe
all logical consequences of their beliefs. Situation semantics typically
can help with (1) but doesn't do well with (2).

Ed

-----Original Message-----
From: Aman Tripathi [mailto:amantripathi at airpost.net]
Sent: Wednesday, 5 November 2003 3:38 a.m.
To: fom at cs.nyu.edu
Subject: [FOM] Logical omniscience in epistemic logics


Hi,
One of the ways to model reasoning about knowledge and belief is by using
possible-worlds semantics. But this semantics seems to suffer from the
problem of Logical Omniscience (for knowledge is equated with truth in
all the possible worlds) . A number of attempts have been made to deal
with the problem within possible-worlds framework. However, the problem
remains in some form or the other. Can we use Situation Semantics instead
of possible worlds semantics to deal with the problem? 
- Aman
 

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