[FOM] Semantical realism without ontological realism in mathematics
Roger Bishop Jones
rbj at rbjones.com
Fri May 23 14:57:24 EDT 2003
On Friday 23 May 2003 9:44 am, Aatu Koskensilta wrote:
> However, if one does accept Tarskian definition of truth -->
> ontological realism, the question becomes whether there are
> any modifications of the Tarskian definition which would
> preserve its realistic nature while freeing its applications
> from substantial ontological commitments.
We seem to have slipped from talking of semantic realism
to talk of accepting Tarskian definitions of truth.
I don't believe that being a semantic realist commits one
to any particular way of defining the semantics of a language.
I doubt that Carnap would have accepted the entailment
you suggest, for the simple reason that he could attach
no meaning to the conclusion.
Even if a "Tarskian" definition is used there is no problem
because the ontological questions which arise in
formulating the semantics are internal to the meta-language.
There are other problems which arise in semantics,
but for Carnap and myself, no possible need for the
resolution of absolute ontological questions.
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