[FOM] Another easy solution does not work

[Sandy Hodges]

> Actually, under the Barwise/Etchemendy treatment of propositions (at
> least what they call "Russellian propositions"), each proposition in
> the above infinite list is again just the Liar, and thus is
> paradoxical.
>
> Todd Wilson

Consider these:
1. There is life on Mars.
2.  Socrates on Tuesday said "Sentence 1 is true" and he said nothing
else that day.
3.  What Socrates said on Tuesday is true.
4.  Plato on Tuesday said "Sentence 1 is true" and he said nothing else
that day.
5.  What Plato said on Tuesday is true.
6.  Sentence 1 is true.

By the Barwise and Etchemendy Russellian position, if 2 and 4 are true,
then 3 and 5 are tokens of the same proposition.   But what if their
truth status is not known?    Surely 6 is a proposition: it is not one
proposition if there is life on Mars, and a different one if there
isn't.    If 3 and 5 are also propositions, and not functions of the
truth status of 2 and 4, then 3 and 5 can't be the same proposition,
since 3 tells us something about Socrates' Tuesday activities, and 5
does not.

In Yablo's example, the author of each proposition believed it to be
true that someone after him in line was believing a false proposition,
but he did not know which false proposition that was (only we know
that).   So the propositions can't be the same, as each conveys
information about a different collection of people.

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Sandy Hodges / Alameda,  California,   USA
mail to SandyHodges at attbi.com will reach me.