FOM: Re: Frege and singular propositions

[charles silver]

 Dean Buckner writes:

 > (7) If "Pegasus flies" has a logical meaning, then we could of course
talk
> about "Pegasus" being satisfied (namely by Pegasus existing).  But Frege
> says we can't.  On Kripke's idea of a causal connection between Names and
> their
> bearer, well, this connection has to be more than just accidental,
otherwise
> we could speak of the set of things satisfying "Pegasus" being a subset of
> the things that satisify "flies".

     You use "satisfy" too loosely to have real meaning for Kripke's and
 possibly Frege's views as well.  Kripke could easily maintain that
something
 does indeed "satify Pegasus" and then go on to say that the sentence is
 false (since the actual Pegasus doesn't fly).  (Whether K. would say this
 only hypothetically would depend upon various historical matters.)  Your
 last sentence about subsets is puzzling (esp. "Otherwise").

 > This is precisely what Frege has to
> avoid, and precisely why he (and perhaps Peano) needs a symbol for "is a
> member of".  The object has to "get through" to the surface of the
> proposition, I don't see how a merely causal connection can achieve this.
> Searle's arguments are still pertinent i think.

     What you intend by saying that Searle's arguments are still pertinent
is
 unclear.

 Charlie