FOM: Russell01 meeting abstract
urquhart at cs.toronto.edu
Tue May 29 12:24:07 EDT 2001
I am going to be at the same conference on Russell in Munich
shortly, but I thought I'd raise a question for discussion
that arises from Harvey Friedman's abstract.
I'm inclined to agree with his conclusions, but nevertheless
there is something that still bothers me. Harvey writes:
We Conjecture that all intellectually sensible consistent formal systems
are formally interpretable in current set theory (with large cardinals). It
should follow that all intellectually sensible consistent formal systems
are synonymous with a fragment of current set theory (with large
Now, isn't it true that we tend to define "intellectually sensible"
as "interpretable in current set theory"? If so, there seems
to be a circularity in the argument.
More information about the FOM