FOM: Re: The logical, the set-theoretical, and the mathematical

[Edwin Mares]

Jeffrey,

I don't think logical truths are, in general, devoid of ontic commitments.
(x)(x=x) is a logical truth, but it implies (Ex)(x=x), which is usually
interpreted as saying that something exists. Maybe you want to use a
universally free logic?

Ed Mares


At 02:50 AM 9/12/00 +0100, Jeffrey Ketland wrote:
>Replying to Joe Shipman (<shipman at savera.com> Date: 12 September 2000 01:15
>Subject: FOM: The logical, the set-theoretical, and the mathematical)
>
>1. The Logical
>
>Joe said:
>>My position is as follows.  Comprehension axioms are "logical".
>
>I think that can't be right. Suppose we are interested in whether an
>interpreted sentence S is logically true. Then I would propose these
>necessary conditions:
>
>    (i) S should be recognizably true (in a finite time) by any reasonable
>person, perhaps after careful deliberation, and possibly re-checking.
>    (ii) S should be devoid of ontic commitments
>    (iii) determining the truth value of S should (somehow) be independent
>of contingent knowledge or empirical information.
>

Edwin Mares
Head of Department
Department of Philosophy
Victoria University of Wellington
PO Box 600
Wellington, New Zealand

Ph: 64-4-471-5368