FOM: indubitability (or "certainty") mlink at
Fri Oct 2 16:38:57 EDT 1998

Regarding J. Kennedy's recent remark.

Wittgenstein writes that finitism is on a par with
behaviorism; he defends neither.  Perhaps it is helpful to
note that Kripke's interpretation in terms of
"Wittgensteinian skepticism" has been challenged
convincingly.  See especially: Goldfarb, in the Journal of
Philosophy, 1985, pp. 471ff.; Cavell, Conditions Handsome
and Unhandsome, 1990, pp. 64ff.  For an interpretation of
Wittgenstein's remarks on the foundations of mathematics,
look at Stroud's response to Dummett in Philosophical
Review 74 (1965), pp. 504ff., and Floyd, in Synthese, 1991,
and her recent work on Wittgenstein's remarks on Godel.
--M. Link

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