FOM: re. a q. re. completeness

[michael Detlefsen]

This is a remark on Steve's suggestion for how to understand my question. I
think your question IS interesting Steve. I don't think it's my question,
though. I'm also a little befuddled at someone's finding my definition of
consistency-completeness unclear (because of its use of a counterfactual
conditional) but not finding one unclear that appeals to the notion of a
"mathematically natural" proposition. Hmmm... In truth, though, I don't
find either of them objectionably unclear, so I like Steve's question ...
and I'd be interested in knowing its answer. I just don't think it's the
same as my question(s).

One last question: Do you find it unclear to say 'G's being provable in PA
would make PA inconsistent'?


Mic Detlefsen



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Michael Detlefsen
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana  46556
U.S.A.
e-mail:  Detlefsen.1 at nd.edu
FAX:  219-631-8609
Office phone: 219-631-7534
Home phone: 219-232-7273
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