Colloquium Details
Avoiding Leaks in Hardware and Software
Speaker: Klaus Gleissenthall, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Location: 60 Fifth Avenue Room 150
Date: March 11, 2024, 2 p.m.
Host: Thomas Wies
Synopsis:
Side-channels leaks via cache, timing, and speculation can expose sensitive information across traditional isolation barriers, putting our data at risk. To avoid such leaks, we need to understand how to program hardware securely. In this talk, I will discuss how to formally prove that a hardware design is free of timing side-channels, how to help non-experts in verification complete such proofs, and how to find conditions that let us use hardware securely in software.
Speaker Bio:
Klaus v. Gleissenthall is currently an assistant professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Before joining VU Amsterdam in 2020, Klaus was a post-doctoral researcher at the University of California, San Diego. He received his PhD with distinction summa cum laude from Technical University of Munich. His work has been recognized with distinguished paper awards at POPL, OOPSLA, CCS, honorable mention in the Intel hardware security award, and an ERC Starting Grant.
Notes:
In-person attendance only available to those with active NYU ID cards.