** The Arab Spring Matures by Robert D. Kaplan (http://www.stratfor.com/an
alysis/arab-spring-matures-robert-d-kaplan)
------------------------------------------------------------
September 26, 2012 | 0903 GMT

Stratfor

By Robert D. Kaplan

The easy part of the Arab Spring -- the part that brought instant gratification 
to Western elites -- is over. That part was about the overthrow of tyrannical 
regimes in some places and the weakening of them in others. Because the object 
was only humbling the dictator, it was essentially a liberal affair, an attack 
on the overcentralization of power 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/good-mideast-dictators-robert-d-kaplan) . The 
United Statesand Israel were not relevant to this initial phase.

The second phase now upon us is about who gets to rule in the streets and in 
the palace. It is about defining society from the ground up. This part
 is about political values, and because Islamism is somewhat shaped by views 
toward the United States and Israel, the United States has been the object of 
mob fury 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/understanding-what-went-wrong-benghazi) . 
Israel is, for the moment, spared. That is only because
 the anti-Islamic video happened to have originated in the United States.
 Sooner or later, the mob will vent its anger against Israel directly. After 
all, frustration with the United States is, in significant measure, due
 to its support for Israel and Israel's refusal to stop settlement building.

This internal struggle for power will go on for years. Because it involves
 societies afflicted with severe economic woes, which have little experience 
with free governance, the new regimes will be preoccupied with merely 
maintaining power in the face of tumultuous domestic politics. Such weak, 
preoccupied regimes will have limited capacity to wage war. This is the 
opposite of the situation in Asia, where governments have consolidated military 
and governing institutions through decades of economic growth and can now 
project power outward 
(http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/paradox-chinas-naval-strategy) -- leading to 
territorial disputes in the maritime sphere.

The fact that Arab regimes are inhibited from waging interstate wars is of
fset by the fact that they have difficulty controlling their own borders and 
the militant elements within their societies. Thus, the Sinai Peninsula
 has become more insecure 
(http://www.stratfor.com/video/sinai-militarization-and-israel-egypt-treaty-disp
atch) after decades of relative quiescence
, and armed groups unconnected to the elected government roam Libya, where
 geographic distance and tribal identities bedevil central control. Libya
 is an apt metaphor for the region: It has an elected government but little 
governance.

Indeed, the Middle East has evolved in stages from organized interstate warfare 
during the Cold War decades (1956, 1967 and 1973) to the relative anarchy of 
the Cold War's aftermath. Though, the possibility of interstate warfare remains 
because of one non-Arab state, Iran -- even as major Arab states such as Iraq, 
Syria and Libya have in varying degrees weakened or dissolved while Islamic 
militants run amok and intercommunal tensions flare.

Jihadism also will flourish in this power vacuum created by the replacement of 
strong central authority with weak democratic rule. But rather than a
 transnational jihadism focused on planning attacks against the United States, 
we are more likely to see homegrown jihadism preoccupied with political power 
struggles within each society. After all, some of the pro-western
 governments al Qaeda sought to topple have already fallen, thus al Qaeda
 as a force with a pan-Islamic raison d'etre has been somewhat superseded.
 Everywhere from the Maghreb to the Iranian Plateau, political structures
 are crumbling, while the possibility of a sectarian bloodbath increases in 
Syria the longer the fighting there grinds on. Syrian President Bashar al Assad 
has no possibility to reconstitute his regime 
(http://www.stratfor2Ecom/video/ongoing-crisis-syria-agenda) ; rather, he might 
emerge as the most powerful warlord among many in Syria, with the 
Lebanonization of the country being a likely scenario.

The state of anarchy flows naturally from the lack of institutions hidden
 for decades under the carapace of authoritarian rule. With that rule gone
 or weakened, feeble or nonexistent bureaucracies must try to cope with mayhem 
in the streets and in the tribal desert reaches. The Israelis well understand 
this sobering reality. So far, Israel has only made peace with strong 
authoritarians. Frightened and besieged democrats do not have the political 
space to take risks. Likewise, there is no Palestinian leader who is not 
paranoid and who is not constantly looking over his shoulder. The peace process 
is in disarray 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-israel-biblical-and-modern) : 
Israel may, thus, continue to enlarge settlements and then, perhaps at some 
propitious moment, stage a unilateral, strategic withdrawal from the major West 
Bank cities and contiguous areas it chooses not to occupy.

The toppling of authoritarian regimes may have been unavoidable, but it has 
unleashed a whirlwind 
(http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110824-libya-after-gadhafi-transitioning-rebel
lion-rule) because stable democracy can take
 decades to develop. Moreover, in a world of overcrowded megacities beset
 with bad infrastructure, at a time when media travels at virtually the speed 
of light, the appearance of mobs because of this or that suspected outrage is 
the new normal. Middle East geography 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/geography-iranian-power-robert-d-kaplan) in 
such a circumstance has
 not been negated; it has only become more claustrophobic and more precious.

In this anarchic new Middle East, Egypt is no longer the political anchor
 for the West 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/us-egyptian-presidents-visit-will-test-relatio
ns) that it was until recently. Since the 1970s, begin
ning with dictator Anwar Sadat and continuing with Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's
 geographical centrality 
(http://www.stratfor.com/video/egypts-geographic-challenge) and demographic 
heft were a force for regional stability against radical forces. But the new 
Islamic regime in Cairo must assuage its radical elements, even as internal 
politics give it little energy for seriously projecting power beyond its 
borders. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is politically infirm 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/challenges-saudi-royal-family-succession) 
with aging, Brezhnevite rulers grasping for dear life onto the status quo 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi-nightmares-robert-d-kaplan-and-kamran-bo
khari) , while nascent youth dissatisfaction fed by the toxic combination of 
social
media and unemployment hovers around them. As for Iran, Marg bar Amrika ("Death 
to America") is the bumper sticker of the revolution that must be maintained in 
the face of new economic woes 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/irans-sanctions-driven-currency-crunch) 
coarsening the society -- since
 revolutionary discipline is now especially required to keep the regime intact.

The key insight to be had from all of this is how little leverage the United 
States has. The United States cannot nation-build across the Middle East. It 
can have limited arrangements with local security services in this country and 
that for the sake of protecting American embassies and other equities. It can 
encourage moderate forces with aid and use its leverage to
 influence the Egyptian government on some issues and the Saudi government
 on others. But the United States cannot, for example, make Libya a strong
, well-governed state without an extraordinary effort that would rob Washington 
of bandwidth 
(http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/managing-multiple-crises-robert-d-kaplan) 
elsewhere in the region and around the world.

The Arab Spring, in other words, is about the limiting of American power 
through the breakdown of authority on which Washington once depended to exert 
its influence. The fact that the Middle East is more democratic than it
 once was does not necessarily benefit the United States. This is because
 democracies are themselves value-neutral: They need not always represent
 liberal orders, especially if they are frail and unstable.