SPEAKER: Nishanth Chandran TITLE: How to Delegate Secure Computation to the Cloud Abstract: We study the problem of multi-client verifiable computation, where multiple clients wish to securely outsource an arbitrary polynomial-time computation over their private inputs to a computationally powerful, yet untrusted, ``cloud'' server. We adopt the model of ``on-the-fly'' verifiable computation by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan [STOC 2012]. In this model, the clients can non-interactively upload their encrypted inputs to the cloud, independent of each other, and then later jointly decrypt the encrypted output received from the server. The complexity of each client is independent of the function being computed; yet, at the end, the clients will be assured that the result of the computation is correct, while at the same time protecting their data from the server and each other. In this work, we construct the first multi-client verifiable computation protocol that achieves simulation-based security against malicious clients and server who may be colluding with each other, while relying only on standard cryptographic hardness assumptions. In contrast, all prior works (including Lopez et al.) either rely on non-standard assumptions (such as non-falsifiable assumptions) or only provide security in weaker adversarial models such as non-colluding and/or semi-honest adversaries. Joint work with Rosario Gennaro, Abhishek Jain, and Amit Sahai.