Learning and Auctioning

Description

A number of key questions arise in auctioning that can be naturally cast as learning problems. Determining an accurate solution for such problems is often key since the revenue of many search engine and other popular on-line sires directly depend on the outcome of such auctions.

Related Publications

Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina.
Revenue optimization against strategic buyers.
In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2015). Montréal, Canada, 2015. MIT Press.

Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina.
Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve.
Journal of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), to appear, 2015.

Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina.
Non-parametric revenue optimization for generalized second-price auctions.
In Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2015). Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2015.

Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina.
Learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second-price auctions with reserve.
In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2014). Beijing, China, June 2014.

	Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina. Revenue optimization against strategic buyers. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2015). Montréal, Canada, 2015. MIT Press.
	Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina. Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve. Journal of Machine Learning Research (JMLR), to appear, 2015.
	Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina. Non-parametric revenue optimization for generalized second-price auctions. In Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2015). Amsterdam, The Netherlands, July 2015.
	Mehryar Mohri and Andrés Muñoz Medina. Learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second-price auctions with reserve. In Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2014). Beijing, China, June 2014.