[FOM] Mathematics *Is*, According To Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

A. Mani wrote:
> On Monday 31 May 2010 7:47:02 pm Jon Awbrey wrote:
>> In one of his essay on the Classification of the Sciences --
>>
>> http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm --
> 
> In this he says "Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements 
> universally present in the phenomenon; meaning by the phenomenon, whatever is 
> present at any time to the mind in any way." This 'phenomenology' should not 
> the same as Husserl sense 'phenomenology', else the hierarchy indicated would 
> have a link between mathematics and 'Phenomenology'. 
> 
> What would be a relative characterization of Peirce's concept 
> of phenomenology? (... relative a version of noema)

A. and All,

Just off hand, I think Peirce might say that mathematical reasoning
draws necessary conclusions as being contingent on hypothetical data,
none of which data are necessarily given in experience at all.

That is why normative science depends on mathematical reasoning, since it depends
on answering hypothetical questions of the form, "If I made it so that X were true,
would it necessarily be true that Y is so?"

In some sense, that seems to make mathematics the relative form of phenomenology
that you were asking about.  Or maybe just one form of relative phenomenology?

Jon Awbrey

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